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Changing China: 
Three Decades of Social Transformation
Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh* 
University of Malaya
Abstract 
China is a country in great transformation. Over the last three decades 
the highly remarkable economic performance of the once low-income 
and inward-looking state of China has attracted increasing interest from 
academics and policymakers. China’s astounding transformation is reflected 
not only in her economy, but also in her social changes in the past few 
decades, and this inevitably is also going to have implications for the 
country’s domestic sociopolitical development. For instance, the country’s 
breakneck economic transformation and the accompanying income and 
wealth disparities could be engendering increasingly volatile intergroup 
relations that would result in intensified resource contest which in turn may 
see groups coalesce along socioracial and ascriptive lines and thus further 
polarized by such divides, aggravated by transnational influences brought 
about by the selfsame globalization that has ironically contributed to her 
very economic “miracle” in the first place. Adapting Green’s change process 
model (2008) and Reeler’s threefold theory of social change (2007) to the 
China context, this paper investigates how various dimensions of social 
change have been engendered by the three decades of Chinese economic 
reform and how these various facets of social change are impacting on 
the coming direction and trajectory of the country’s socioeconomic and 
political transformation, how the interplay of State policy and societal 
response within the context of the exigencies engendered by the country’s 
continued odyssey of development, modernization and reform is shaping the 
future of the civil society, and how from both the theoretical and empirical 
perspectives the complex polity-economy-society nexus involved in the 
transformation of modern China are having wider ramifications for the 
country’s future.
Keywords: China, social change, anomie, dictablanda, critical junctures
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1. Introduction
Since the launching of the gaige kaifang (open and reform) policy1 in the late 
1970s, China has been experiencing a tumultuous process of social change 
in a short span of just three decades. Among other aspects, socioeconomic, 
sociopolitical, sociobehavioural and sociopsychological transformations have 
grasped the nation in a frenzy. While the world looks upon China’s “peaceful 
rise” with much fascination and probably a certain level of trepidation, and 
the wide Chinese diaspora takes pride in the reborn greatness of the Middle 
Kingdom, what has often been overlooked in the popular imagination is the 
equally amazing transformation in the mainland Chinese society – whether it 
be psychological, behavioural, political or economic.
Marxism, which has provided the raison d’être of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP)2 in its continued political monopoly under the new conceptual 
politico-economic framework of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, 
considers conflict, in particular class conflict, as a fundamental characteristic 
of society and that continued class struggles would result in more and more 
fundamental changes in society, and while it is not certain that all social 
changes actually result from conflicts, both Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s 
philosophy of history and Karl Marx’s social theory as well as many of their 
derivative theoretical frameworks essentially assert or insinuate that they do 
(Bottomore, 1975: 174-175). Intergroup and intragroup conflicts may evidently 
lead to social changes or create a predisposition to change by disconcerting 
the conventional and prevailing ways of life, and such conflicts include 
competition whose effects could be beneficial or harmful for social relations, 
the former through its socializing and civilizing function as Émile Durkheim 
and Georg Simmel saw as the creation of a network of mutual obligations 
and dependencies, and the latter through the generation of social ills such as 
mental illness and crime (ibid.). What may be disconcerting especially for a 
culture or ideology that places great value on peace, harmony and stability 
is that social conflicts have also been seen as universally necessary, as Ralf 
Dahrendorf, in his argument of the existence of crisscrossing lines of conflict 
in place of Marx’s single fundamental cleavage in society, posited that conflict 
is a necessary element in all imperatively coordinated associations which in 
turn are a universally necessary feature of the human society (Dahrendorf, 
1959: 172, 268; Bottomore, 1975: 171), or as Eisenstadt saw it:
[…] different coalitions of elites construct the boundaries of social systems, 
collectivities, and organizations. Yet no such construction can be continu-
ously stable. The crystallization and reproduction of any social order, of 
any collectivity, organization, political system, or civilizational framework 
is shaped by the different forces and factors […] and generates processes of 
conflict, change, and possible transformation.
(Eisenstadt, 1992: 416)
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Furthermore, as Newman posited, “[the] greater the degree of reward 
disparity and social segregation between a dominant and a subordinate 
group, the greater the likelihood that conflicts between them will be relatively 
intense” or even violent (see Newman, 1973: 158-9) – a case where each 
social conflict situation produces exactly the same pattern of domination and 
subordination, a phenomenon Dahrendorf (1959) called the “superimposition 
of conflict”. In this regard, Lijphart’s remark on religious cleavage is 
equally applicable to other socioracial3 ones, with grave implications for 
ethnoregionalism and peripheral nationalism to which this special issue will 
later return:
If, for example, the religious cleavage and the social class cleavage crosscut 
to a high degree, the different religious groups will tend to feel equal. If, 
on the other hand, the two cleavages tend to coincide, one of the groups is 
bound to feel resentment over its inferior status and unjustly meager share 
of material rewards.
(Lijphart, 1977: 75)
2. Currents and Undercurrents of Social Change
In the subsequent sections, this paper will examine various crucial aspects 
of social change since China’s ruling regime launched its “Reform and 
Open” policy in the late 1970s – in particular the very different pace of 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical changes that could be an important 
contributing factor to the pronounced features of contradictions that 
unmistakably characterize the contemporary Chinese society. Every society is 
different and, as Eisenstadt noted, there is no grand theory that could faithfully 
explain the development of such contradictions everywhere:
Although these potentialities of conflict and change are inherent in all 
human societies, their concrete development, their intensity, and the concrete 
directions of change and transformation they engender differ greatly 
among different societies and civilizations. Societies vary in their specific 
constellation of the specific forces […] that is, different constellations of 
cultural orientations, elites, patterns of the social division of labor, and 
political-ecological settings and processes.
(Eisenstadt, 1992: 418)
In full recognition of this, nevertheless, this paper would still attempt to delve 
further into the complex nexus of the agent-institution-event-context interface 
(Section 4, Figure 19) that could be playing a crucial role in engendering such 
social contradictions shaped inevitably by the currents and undercurrents of 
social change that will be scrutinized here within the theoretical framework 
adapted from Reeler’s threefold theory of social change (2007).
IJCS 1-2 combined PDF 25-10-10.i241   241 10/25/2010   1:07:43 AM
242      Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh  
2.1. Projectable Change
Atado, y bien atado. [Tied-up, well tied-up.]
Generalísimo Francisco Franco (El Caudillo), 
prior to his death on 20th November 1975
Reeler’s (2007) threefold theory of social change, while originally applying 
to a rather different context and usage, could be adapted here to throw light 
on the three decades of intricately interrelated socioeconomic, sociopolitical 
and sociocultural changes in contemporary China. Early years of reform 
underlain by Deng’s well-known gradualist dictum “Cross the river by 
groping the stones”4 signifies the problem-based approach that characterizes 
projectable change. However, the other characteristic of projectable change 
that entails creativity – “imagining or visioning desired results, not as a direct 
solution but as a new situation in which old problems are less or no longer 
relevant – a leap of imagination into the future” (ibid.: 13) made the results 
Figure 1 Reeler’s Projectable Change: The Chinese Context
Agent-Institution Interface
Since 1978: beginning of 
economic reform brought 
about projectable change 
spurred by CCP’s policies 
– Deng’s dicta “cross the 
river by groping the stones”, 
“black cat/white cat”, Chen 
Yun’s bird-cage economy, 
SEZs, anti-bourgeois thought 
pollution … After 1989: Deng’s nanxun brought continuous economic 
reform leading to economic miracle; four cardinal principles reaffirming 
and upholding CCP’s political supremacy; thought control; resistance to 
bourgeois liberalization; socialism with Chinese characteristics; promoting 
central State nationalism and cracking down on peripheral nationalisms; 
controlled intra-Party democratization, grassroot democracy: village 
elections, “stick and carrot” co-optation and control of intellectuals, 
building of “harmonious society”, central State’s tacit consent to local 
repression on weiquan-shangfang; crackdown on falungong; space walk; 
becoming world’s 3rd largest economy and going 2nd, the road to a polished 
dictablanda …
Source: Based on Reeler (2007: 13).
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of such change less certain for post-1989 China as they are highly dependent 
on such prerequisites:
Projectable approaches, through projects, tend to succeed where problems, 
needs and possibilities are more visible, under relatively stable conditions 
and relationships, which are not fraught with crisis or stuckness. Where 
the internal and external environments, especially the relationships, of a 
system are coherent, stable and predictable enough, and where unpredictable 
outcomes do not threaten desired results, then the conditions for projectable 
change arise and well-planned projects become possible.
(ibid.)
2.2. Emergent Change
The air does not cease to have weight, although we no longer feel that 
weight.
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917)5 
Citing an African proverb “We make our path by walking it”, Reeler (2007) 
defined “emergent change” – probably the most prevalent and enduring form 
of change – as a description of “the day-to-day unfolding of life, adaptive and 
uneven processes of unconscious and conscious learning from experience and 
the change that results from that”, which “applies to individuals, families, 
communities, organisations and societies adjusting to shifting realities, of 
trying to improve and enhance what they know and do, of building on what 
is there, step-by-step, uncertainly, but still learning and adapting, however 
well or badly” (ibid.: 9). He differentiated between two kinds of emergent 
change – the less conscious and the more conscious varieties, which this paper 
termed respectively the subliminal or latent emergent change and the overt 
emergent change.
The overt emergent change – Reeler’s more conscious variety – usually 
occurs within a relatively stable and less openly contradictory environment 
“where identity, relationships, structures and leadership are more formed”, 
and conditions for such change can materialize after the resolution of a crisis 
or after a period of projectable change as a result of change fatigue or a 
preference for gains consolidation and more gradual and stable growth (ibid.: 
10). On the other hand, the subliminal or latent emergent change – Reeler’s 
less conscious variety – usually occurs within a shifting and uncertain 
environment “where there are unformed and unclear identities, relationships, 
structures or leadership”, and without evident crises or stucknesses, and being 
less conscious it is characteristically still in formation, less predictable and 
more chaotic or haphazard, and also “therefore most difficult to grasp, requires 
a reading of enormous respect and subtlety” (ibid.).
IJCS 1-2 combined PDF 25-10-10.i243   243 10/25/2010   1:07:43 AM
244      Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh  
2.3. Transformative Change
Truth is on the march; nothing can stop it now.
Émile Zola (1840-1902)
Another type of social change in Reeler’s threefold taxonomy is one stemmed 
from a crisis or stuckness which could take many forms and manifestations 
– may they be “‘hot’ surfaced experiences of visible conflict or ‘cold’ hidden 
Figure 2  Overt (Reeler’s More Conscious) Emergent Change: 
 The Chinese Context
Agent-Institution Interface
Since 1978, overt emergent 
change was occurring through 
– aant-garde of liberal forces, 
Hu-Zhao liberalization … After 
1989: emergence of middle 
class; rise of peripheral national-
isms – March 2008 Lhasa riots, 
5th July 2009 Ürümqi riots …
Source: Based on Reeler (2007: 10).
Figure 3  Subliminal (Reeler’s Less Conscious) Emergent Change: 
 The Chinese Context
Agent-Institution Interface
Since 1978: subliminal or latent 
emergent change was occurring 
through – free market returning, 
post-Mao return of entrepre-
neurship, getihu; Hu Yaobang’s 
passing (1989) … After 1989: 
Taiwan’s democratization 
(December 1989; 1996); “Handover” of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999): 
implications on political and civil liberties; Zhao Ziyang’s passing (2005) 
and publication of memoir (2009); deepening socioeconomic inequalities, 
corruption, guan-shang goujie, interethnic contradictions; anomie and social 
neurosis, school killings, “mass incidents”, dingzihu and forced relocations, 
plight of nongmingong, worker suicides; prominent prisoner of conscience Liu 
Xiaobo awarded Nobel Peace Prize on 8th October 2010 …
Source: Based on Reeler (2007: 10).
IJCS 1-2 combined PDF 25-10-10.i244   244 10/25/2010   1:07:43 AM
Changing China: Three Decades of Social Transformation      245
stucknesses which cannot be seen or talked about” (ibid.: 12). What a ruling 
regime that survived on imposed harmony and stability may fail to recognize 
or be wary to recognize is that such crisis-induced change is perfectly natural 
for the human society:
The possibility of the failure of integrative and regulative mechanisms is 
inherent in any society. Every civilization and every type of political and 
economic system constructs some specific systematic boundaries within 
which it operates. But the very construction of such civilizations and social 
systems also generates within them various conflicts and contradictions that 
may lead to change, transformation, or decline, that is, to different modes of 
restructuring their boundaries.
(Eisenstadt, 1992: 418)
And to make things worse, policy decisions based on such inadequate 
recognition tend to beget even more inadequate decisions given the difficulty 
of admitting public policy errors, or as Rousseau once said, “When one starts 
covering the truth with a veil, they no longer make the effort to lift it.” (Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1762), Émile, ou De l’éducation, Book II, Para. 3416)
One does not need to look too far back in contemporary Chinese history to 
see how a crisis of mammoth proportions could bring a nation to a bifurcation 
into wholesale transformative change – which, unlike emergent change that is 
characterized as a learning process, involves instead unlearning, a liberation 
“from those relationships and identities, inner and outer, which underpin the 
crisis and hold back resolution and further healthy development” – and a cold 
stuckness which under a façade of economic prosperity and social harmony 
could continue to hide the real need for change which in turn when revealed 
could provoke even stronger resistance to change as it requires the unlearning 
of entrenched ideas and values in making way for the acceptance of new ones; 
it is a difficult choice as a crisis and stuckness of this nature tend to involve 
deep and complex histories and dynamics and represent the product of “tense 
or contradictory relationships […] prompted by shifts in external political, 
economic, cultural or environmental contexts” (ibid.: 11-12). A particular 
choice at the moment of crisis could thus lead to protracted cold stuckness, 
instead of a U-process of transformative change7, thus heightening internal 
social contradictions leading to deteriorating sociopolitical and sociocultural 
anomie8 and neurosis resulted from the contradictions engendered by the 
interplay of projected change and the suppressed but unstoppable overt and 
subliminal emergent changes – contradictions whose impacts are particularly 
manifest in the presence of ethnic diversity, ethnoterritoriality, ethnoregional 
inequality and peripheral nationalism, dimensions to which this special issue 
will later return.
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3. Sociobehavioural Change and Socioeconomic Transformation
Social problems are multi-dimensional. Nevertheless, mental illness and 
crime as mentioned above usually stand out as indicators in the public 
imagination.
3.1. Sociobehavioural Transition
Mental illness, mental breakdown and suicides are among the most 
outstanding of indicators of the negative impact of social change. Shocking 
the nation was the recent spate of suicides and attempted suicides9 at the 
Foxconn 富士康 conglomerate’s factory in Shenzhen 深圳, Guangdong 
province, that resulted in the death or injury of more than a dozen workers 
within the short span of about 4 months (from the first suicide on 23 January 
2010 to end of May), which continued with the fatal thirteenth and fourteenth 
“jumps” at its factories in Foshan 佛山, Guangdong, and Kunshan 昆山, 
Jiangsu, respectively on 20th July and 4th August10. Currently the number 
of suicides in China is huge. Suicide is now the fifth main cause of death in 
China where there are over 250 thousand people killing themselves every year, 
with a rate of a suicide every two minutes (Wang, 2008: 755). On average 
every day there are about 750 people in China committing suicide, and there 
Figure 4 Reeler’s U-Process of Transformative Change
Source: Reeler (2007: 12).
Hot Crisis or Cold Stuckness
Uncovering the roots
of the crisis, unlearning
inappropriate ideas, values, etc.
Turning point. Facing the real will to
change. Dealing with resistance to change.
Adopting new values, ideas, etc.
Creating a new situation
IJCS 1-2 combined PDF 25-10-10.i246   246 10/25/2010   1:07:43 AM
Changing China: Three Decades of Social Transformation      247
are an additional number of 2 million people attempting suicide (non-fatal) in 
China every year (ibid.; Tang, 2007). In terms of age distribution, suicide rate 
in China is highest among the elderly and within the 25-34 year-old cohort; in 
terms of gender, China’s female suicide rate is apparently higher than male, 
particularly for rural female and especially high for the 25-34 year-old cohort 
and women above age 65 (Wang, 2008: 755; Xiao, Wang and Xu, 2003).
Regarding crime, Wang (2008: 753-754) listed the following seven 
characteristics of criminal activities in contemporary China:
1)   Abruptness and scale. This refers both to large-scale organized crime that 
emerged in recent years as well as the sudden outbreak of violent crimes 
like the fatal free-floating aggression against young children in primary 
schools or kindergartens across China that broke out recently from March 
to May 2010 killing a total of 17 people, including 15 children, and 
injuring more than 80, in a string of five major attacks and four other 
cases that occurred from 23rd March to 12th May11, and another attack 
on 3rd August that killed 4 and injured more than 20 at a kindergarten in 
Shandong12.
2)   Tendency towards higher social strata. This refers to on-the-job crimes 
committed by high-level officials and hi-tech skilled personnel.
3)   Abuse of public office power getting severe. Such high-level corruption 
is increasingly becoming a cancer in socioeconomic and political life 
and damaging social justice. The Appendix table at the end of this article 
shows government data released in 2006 on 40 corrupt officials who 
fled the country. Other than the first five, most of those in the list were 
leaders of State-owned enterprises. The number of corrupt officials who 
fled the country was said to total about 500 by 2006, according to Shang 
(2007: 11), while according to Wang (2008: 758), based on data released 
for the first time by the Commerce Department, the number was as high 
as over 4000 by 2006, with total amount of embezzlement as high as 
US$50 billion. Just to take the provincial road and transport department 
alone, government statistics show that from 1997 to 2006 a total of 18 
provincial road and transport department heads all over the country had 
been arrested for corruption, and there were even more officials arrested 
for corruption below the provincial department level (Shang, 2007: 6). 
Among the overseas sanctuaries of Chinese corrupt officials, Canada was 
reported to be a paradise with an alleged number of over 2000 Chinese 
corrupt officials with total amount of embezzlement of at least over a 
hundred billion yuan (Ұ).13 Canada is also, for the past decade, the refuge 
of Lai Changxing 赖昌星, the famed founder and head of Xiamen’s 
Yuanhua 远华 Group, who tops the list of fleeing billionaires wanted by 
the Chinese government in terms of amount of alleged embezzlement 
with 25 billion yuan.14 He fled in 1999.
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4)   Resurgence and rapid spreading of large number of crimes of the 
traditional society. Crimes that had literally disappeared in post-1949 
China – for instance, through policy measures against illicit drug 
abuse in 1950, against brothels in 1951, against secret societies in 
1953 – have resurfaced and spread like wildfire, including drug abuse 
and narcotrafficking, smuggling, prostitution, activities of the criminal 
underworld and gambling. Secret societies of the underworld were said 
to total tens of thousands, with members total over a million, rampantly 
committing violent, cold-blooded and unspeakable crimes (Shang, 
2007: 106). Besides, the rise in youth crimes has been alarming, with 
government statistics (for 2005, see ibid.: 114-116) showing 70 per cent of 
people committing crimes being youths below 25 years of age, and over 
70 per cent of youth crimes were committed by those of age 15-16 years. 
The number of youths committing crimes grew by 5.8 per cent during 
the period 2003-2005, with apparent increase in crimes by those below 
18 years of age, involving also an increase in the types and methods of 
crime, as well as in vileness of the nature of crime. Among the country’s 
220 million young students, there was an average of one criminal case 
committed per minute (ibid.: 114). Government statistics show that the 
country’s population involved in drug abuse reached a cumulative 1.16 
million by end of 2005, among whom youths constituted 75 per cent of 
the total, 80 per cent of male drug addicts were involved in other crimes 
and 80 per cent of female drug addicts were engaged in prostitution (ibid.: 
116). The total number of drug addicts in China is increasing by 15-20 
per cent per annum (Wang, 2008: 756). The main illicit drug consumed in 
China is heroin, and there are currently about 700 thousand heroin addicts 
in China, constituting 78.3 per cent of the total number of drug addicts, 
and among these heroin addicts 69.3 per cent are youths below 35 years 
of age (ibid.). On the other hand, the organized criminal underworld, after 
having its heyday during the 1930s-1940s, virtually disappeared from the 
mainland after 1949 when it moves abroad (including Hong Kong 香港, 
Macau 澳門 and Taiwan 台灣) to escape the draconian measures of the 
new regime, but has been penetrating back with a vengeance since the 
beginning of economic reform (Wang, 2008: 757).
5)   New forms of crime emerge in an endless stream. With economic glo-
balization, various new forms of crime exhibit apparent tendencies of 
internationalization, formal organization and intelligence, including illicit 
drug crimes, production and selling of fake and inferior goods, as well as 
environmental crimes.
6)   Distinctive geographical distribution of crimes. While there are more 
transnational/ transregional organized crimes in the southeastern regions 
like the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian which are adjacent to Hong 
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Kong, Macau and Taiwan, transnational illicit drug cases are relatively 
more numerous in the southwestern regions like the provinces of Yunnan 
and Guizhou and the three northeastern provinces (see Figures 5 and 
6 for the regional demarcations), and economic crimes are relatively 
more rampant in the cities of the Pearl River Delta and the Yangzi River 
Delta. Such coastal and river plate cities and areas with relatively higher 
economic openness have crime types that are apparently different from 
those of the country’s northwestern regions. Besides the concentration of 
drug addicts (25.9 per cent) in the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou 
and Sichuan, these economically or commercially advanced coastal 
regions have equally serious problem with the provinces of Guangdong 
and Guangxi together contributing 25.7 per cent of drug addicts to the 
national total and Guangdong alone contributing 15.6 per cent (Wang, 
2008: 756).
7)   Increasing proportion of crimes committed by population on the move 
in total crime rate. This refers to the rural-to-urban migrants whose 
feeling of relative deprivation is-à-is the urban residents is leading to 
increasingly acute intergroup contradictions and tendency of crime.
3.2. Socioeconomic Transformation and Social Order
Regarding the issue of corruption, in recent years, the “neo-corporatism” 
hypothesis emerged to claim that while the traditional Leviathan hypothesis 
from the school of public choice reappeared in Russia in the form of the 
“grapping hand” hypothesis, China is instead characterized by a “helping 
hand” (Krug and Zhu, 2004; Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994, 1998; Oi, 1992, 1995, Unger and Chan, 1995, Nee, 2000; summarized 
in Krug, Zhu and Hendrischke, 2004).15 Gu and Chen (2002) concluded 
on the results of their multiregional analysis: “[…] in the case of China, 
the corruption of the helping hand when taxes are decentralized can be 
socially preferable to the corruption of the grabbing hand when taxes 
are centralized.” Ahlin (2000), based on a conceptual model, argued that 
though deconcentration has the potential to increase corruption, political 
decentralization has the potential to contain it due to interjurisdictional 
competition, while empirical evidence from Crook and Manor (2000) shows 
that political decentralization reduces large-scale corruption but increases 
the petty one in the short run, but both may decline in the long run, and 
Olowu (1993) considered political centralization a root cause of endemic 
corruption in Africa.16 Huther and Shah (1998) also found that increased 
fiscal decentralization was associated with enhanced quality of governance, 
political and bureaucratic accountability, social justice, improved economic 
management and reduced corruption. In this regard, China’s high degree of 
economic decentralization should be noted.17 
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Notes:  Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi in the officially designated Western Region in 
bold italics.
  Regional Boundary
Figure 5 China: Three Economic Regions
Figure 6 China: Six Economic Regions
Notes:  Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi in the officially designated Western Region 
under the three-region scheme in bold italics.
  Regional Boundary
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Figure 7 shows the results of a sample survey by the National Statistical 
Bureau conducted in early November 2007 in all 31 provinces (sheng 省) / 
zizhiqu 自治区 (“autonomous region”) / zhixiashi 直辖市 (municipality with 
province status, directly ruled by the central government)18 covering 101,029 
families regarding social problems the respondents were most concerned with. 
Out of the 13 types of social problems, the medical, those regarding social 
trend (social situation), social order and security, education and employment/
unemployment are the top five, constituting 15.3 per cent, 14.3 per cent, 
13.2 per cent, 12.6 per cent and 10.3 per cent respectively. Urban residents 
were most concerned with employment/unemployment, social trend, social 
order and security and wage and salary, while rural residents were most 
concerned with the medical issue, social trend, education and social order 
and security. This shows that social trend and social order and security are the 
common concerns of both urban and rural residents, while the concern with 
employment/unemployment and wage and salary issues are more urban than 
rural and the medical issues and children’s education are more the concerns 
of rural than urban residents.
It should be noted that many of these such as land requisition and 
relocation19 (which has particularly attracted attention in various dingzihu 钉
子户20 cases), wage, employment, housing and accommodation, environment 
and food hygiene and safety are closely linked in this country to the issue 
of corruption and government-business collusion (guan-shang goujie 官
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Figure 7 China: Most Concerned Social Problems (%), 2007
(a) All China
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(b) Urban China
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商勾结, here referring to the collusion between local government officials 
and businessmen or entrepreneurs in return for favours) and contribute to 
widespread popular resentment and constitute the source of most public 
protests – officially labeled quntixing shijian 群体性事件 or qunti shijian 群
体事件, literally “mass incidents” which take various forms “from peaceful 
small-group petitions and sit-ins to marches and rallies, labor strikes, 
merchant strikes, student demonstrations, ethnic unrest, and even armed 
fighting and riots” (Tanner, 2004: 138) – often against the police and the local 
governments.
After the crackdown on the massive 1989 demonstrations which actually 
began with smaller-scale anti-corruption protests, this root cause of the 
protests has gone worse, not better. Citing Sun Yan in Current History (2005), 
Hutton (2006: 127) reminded us that “large-scale corruption is mounting. The 
average ‘take’ in the 1980s was $5000; now it is over $250,000. The number 
of arrests of senior cadre members above the county level quadrupled between 
1992 and 2001 […]. In 2005 it was disclosed that a cool $1 billion had been 
misappropriated or embezzled in Gansu, one of China’s poorest provinces, by 
a ring of forty or more officials.” Hutton cited Hu’s (2006) estimate that the 
annual economic loss due to corruption over the late 1990s alone amounted 
to between 13.3 and 16.9 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while 
evidence provided by government departments revealed that the annual 
economic loss between 1999 and 2001 due to corruption averaged 14.5 to 
14.9 per cent of GDP.21 As Hutton (2006: 127) noted, “Every incident of 
corruption – smuggling, embezzlement, theft, swindling, bribery – arises in 
the first place from the unchallengeable power of communist officials and the 
lack of any reliable, independent system of accountability and scrutiny […] 
the evidence of the depth of corruption at the apex of government, business 
and finance, mean that any paradoxical usefulness [of corruption in the early 
years of reform in providing flexibility to an otherwise highly bureaucratic 
system] has long since been surpassed. Corruption to this extent is chronically 
dysfunctional and even threatens the integrity of the state.” This threat to the 
integrity of the State is most evident in the worrying frequency of incidents 
of social unrest which mostly stem from protests against local official 
corruption and abuse of power, including the local governments’ suppression 
of weiquan-shangfang 维权上访22. For instance, in 2005 alone, such public 
order disturbances amounted to 87,000 cases, or an average of almost 240 a 
day, involving about 4 million people23. While social unrest among farmers 
and workers has long been observed since the early 1990s, as Lum (2006: 
“Summary”) described, “recent protest activities have been broader in scope, 
larger in average size, greater in frequency, and more brash than those of a 
decade ago”:
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According to Chinese Communist Party sources, social unrest has grown 
by nearly 50% in the past two years, culminating in a particularly violent 
episode in December 2005. China’s Public Security Ministry declared that 
there were 87,000 cases of “public order disturbance” – including protests, 
demonstrations, picketing, and group petitioning – in 2005 compared to 
74,000 reported cases in 2004. In 2003, the PRC government reported 
more than 58,000 “major incidents of social unrest” involving an estimated 
3 million to 10 million persons, of which 700, or less than 2%, involved 
clashes with police, while a Hong Kong-based labor rights group estimated 
that the number of labor demonstrations reached 300,000 that year. The 
December 2005 clash between villagers and People’s Armed Police (PAP) 
in Dongzhou village (Shanwei city), southeastern Guangdong province, in 
which 3-20 villagers were killed, became a symbol of the depth of anger 
of those with grievances and the unpredictability of the outcomes of social 
disputes.
(Lum, 2006: 1-2)
Figure 8 is a stylized presentation based on Zhao (2008) which shows 
different forms and levels of political action as a function of the degree of 
Figure 8 China: Typology of Political Actions
Source: Based on Zhao (2008: 767), Figure 26-1.
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organization, of institutionalization/routinization and of targeted changes. 
The forms and manifestations might be different – from large-scale demon-
strations of 1989 to the sporadic but frequent eruption of, often violent, 
public protests nowadays, including ethnoregional riots – but they all share 
a basic underlying element that the power that be might not be willing to 
recognize:
In any social order […] there is always a strong element of dissension about 
the distribution of power and values. Hence […] any institutional system is 
never fully homogeneous in the sense of being fully accepted or accepted 
to the same degree by all those participating in it […] Thus “antisystems” 
may develop within any society. Although the antisystems often remain 
latent for long periods of time, they may also constitute, under propitious 
conditions, important foci of systematic change. The existence of such 
potential antisystems is evident in the existence in all societies of themes 
and orientations of protest.
(Eisenstadt, 1992: 417)
According to official statistics, “illegal” qunti shijian nationwide in-
creased from 10,000 to 74,000 cases over the decade of 1994-2004, with 
an average annual growth rate of 22.2 per cent, while the number of people 
involved in the qunti shijian went up from 730,000 to 3,760,000, with an 
average annual growth rate of 17.8 per cent (Hu, Hu and Wang, 2006). The 
figures continued to climb to 87,000 cases and about 4 million people by 
2005 (Figures 9 and 10). In general, the number of qunti shijian had been 
rising at an alarmingly increasing rate. From a growth of about 10 per cent 
from 1995 to 1996, qunti shijian was growing at an average annual rate 
of as high as 25.5 per cent from 1997 to 2004, i.e. higher than the average 
growth rate of 22.2 per cent during the decade of 1994-2004, with annual 
growth in certain years reaching as high as above 40 per cent; or with 1994 
figure indexed 100, a steep increase of the index from 100 to 740 in terms 
of the number of cases during the decade of 1994-2004 (an increase of 6.4 
times) and from 100 to 515 in terms of the number of people involved (an 
increase of 4.2 times) (ibid.). In terms of participants’ profiles, while at the 
beginning the people involved in these “mass incidents” were mainly xiagang 
下岗 workers24 and peasants (reflecting land loss and corruption issues) but 
later on the list of participants expanded to include, besides xiagang workers 
and peasants who lost their lands, also workers, urban residents, private 
individual enterprise owners (getihu 个体户), teachers, students and a small 
number of ex-servicemen and cadres, etc. (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 
143), thus reflecting expanding and deepening popular interest conflicts and 
contradictions.
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Figure 9 China: Incidents of Public Protest (Qunti Shijian)
Source: Lum, 2006: 1-2; Tanner (2005), cited in Keidel (2005: 1), Table 1, data 
from Liaowang 瞭望 magazine and China Ministry of Public Security; 
Hu, Hu and Wang (2006).
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Figure 10  China: Numbers of People Involved in Public Protests 
 (Qunti Shijian)
Source: Hu, Hu and Wang (2006); 东方日报, 18th March 2009.
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More recent cases of such public order disturbance were alarmingly on the 
rise in a series of serious incidents including year 2008’s high-profile conflicts 
of 28th June (in Guizhou), 5th July (Shaanxi), 10th July (Zhejiang), 17th July 
(Guangdong) and 19th July (Yunnan). Yet these constitute but just a small 
sample of the overall rise in social unrest across China in recent years, some 
of which involved ethnic conflicts25. Adding to these are the long-running 
Tibet conflicts including the March 2008 Lhasa riots and the March 2009 
conflict in Qinghai’s Guoluo 果洛 Tibetan zizhizhou 自治州 (“autonomous 
prefecture”)26, as well as the July 2009 Ürümqi riots. With the memory of 
the 1989 tragedy constantly hanging like the sword of Damocles, the ruling 
regime is again facing a dire dilemma, as described by Tanner (2004):
[…] the struggle to control unrest will force Beijing’s leaders to face riskier 
dilemmas than at any time since the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations. 
Experiments with less violent police tactics, economic concessions to 
demonstrators, and more fundamental institutional reforms all risk further 
encouraging protest in an increasingly restive society. Nevertheless, these 
challenges must be navigated if the party wants to avoid the ultimate 
dilemma of once again resorting to 1989-style violence or reluctantly 
engaging in a more fundamental renegotiation of power relations between 
the state and society.
(Tanner, 2004: 138)
Figure 11 China: Participants of “Mass Incidents” (Qunti Shijian)
Note:  Among “Workers”, one-third are workers of SOEs. “Others” includes a 
small number of ex-servicemen, teachers, students, cadres etc.
Source:  Hu, Hu, He and Guo (2009: 143), Figure 3.2 (with data of 2001).
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The ruling CCP has not been oblivious to this deteriorating situation. 
Anti-corruption measures have continued to constitute a main prong in the 
Party’s political reform since the Jiang Zemin 江泽民 administration, as Jiang 
himself declared in 2002 in his last political report to the National Congress, 
“If we do not crack down on corruption, the flesh-and-blood ties between the 
party and the people will suffer a lot and the party will be in danger of losing 
its ruling position, or possibly heading for self-destruction.”27 Having averted 
such a dire scenario for the Party in 1989 via a bloody crackdown, CCP was 
in full awareness of the root cause of the Tiananmen 天安门 protests. The 
predominantly Chinese squeaky clean, efficient tiny state of Singapore – and 
her long-ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) – has quite incongruently become 
a role model for the CCP to emulate.28 To the Western accusation that China’s 
so-called “political reform” is nothing but a ruse since political reform in an 
authoritarian state should mean democratization and that China is copying a 
bad Singaporean model to develop its own version of neo-authoritarianism, 
combining free market economy with dissent-muzzling one-party rule, China’s 
answer usually goes along the line like the West should recognize China’s 
specific national conditions and give due respect before China could reach 
the Western standards in human rights and democracy. Whether the neo-
authoritarian experience of the corruption-free tiny city state of Singapore 
could effectively be emulated by a huge country with one-fifth of humanity 
where corruption is endemic29 has always been a centre of debate, given 
the fact that China’s growing social unrest indeed reflects deep institutional 
problems of the evolving local State corporatism after 1989, as Minzner 
(2006: 9) observed:
Particularly at local levels of government, control over all formal political 
and legal institutions is centralized in the hands of the local Party secretary 
and a few deputies. These individuals exercise extensive control over 
institutions such as local legislatures, courts, Party disciplinary committees, 
and the media. This concentrated power in the hands of a few individuals 
breeds numerous problems. First, it allows corruption to thrive. Second, it 
allows local leaders to choke off the flow of information to higher-level 
leaders regarding policy failures that might reflect poorly on local officials’ 
performance. Third, it deprives citizens of effective redress of their rights 
through local legal and political institutions, particularly when the source 
of the violation is a local Party official. Chinese citizens appear to be 
increasingly resorting to mass protests and petitions directed at higher-level 
authorities as a means of circumventing the controls of local officials over 
legal and political institutions, and triggering the intervention of higher level 
officials in resolving their grievances.
While the CCP regime has in the post-1989 era led the country to economic 
miracle and hence, in the eyes of many, has successfully reasserted its 
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legitimacy,30 this reassertion of legitimacy and unassailability has in reality 
not been immune to series of challenges, some rather severe and unexpected, 
since 1989. Underlying these are various thorny issues that emerged both 
in spite of and due to the astounding economic success, one of which being 
socioeconomic stratification as well as ethnoregional disparity that have gone 
from bad to worse over these years.
3.3. Inequality, Poverty and Socioeconomic Stratification
Building upon the foundation set by the Hu-Zhao administration’s audacious 
reformist programmes, Deng Xiaoping moved forward from where his purged 
former protégés have left by reinvigorating the post-Tiananmen chilling 
politico-economic milieu through his nanxun (南巡 / “southern tour”) in 
1992, culminating lately in China superseding Germany to become the 
world’s third largest economy in early 2008, ranked only after the United 
States of America and Japan, and probably superseding Japan in mid-2010.31 
Also impressive was the country’s poverty reduction achievements (see 
Table 1), with GDP per capita reaching today’s US$2,000. In fact, China’s 
poor has dropped to about 14 million in 2007, compared to 250 million 
thirty years ago, according to the National Statistical Bureau of China, while 
average rural income has reached about 4100 yuan32 in 2007 compared to 
just 136 yuan33 at the beginning of economic reform.34 While there has been 
underestimation35 of the poor population, China’s achievement in poverty 
reduction during the past three decades is still remarkable, even if the real 
poverty figure at present reaches a hundred million. Nevertheless, according 
Table 1 China: Rural Poverty
 Year 1978 2006
Rural absolute poverty  250 million 21.48 million
Incidence of poverty  30.7% 2.3%
 Year 2000 2006
Low-income population+  62.13 million 35.5 million
Proportion of low-income   6.7% 3.7%
population in rural population‡
+  In 2006, the rural net income per capita of nationally designated focal poverty assistant 
counties reached 1,928 yuan.
‡  In 2006, the rural absolute poor plus rural low-income population reached 13.7% of total 
rural population in the Western Region.
Source: Data from Fan (2008: 14-19).
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Table 2 China: Comparison of Provincial Gini (Gi) and National Gini (G)*
 Gi < G Gi ≥ G (higher by)
Eastern Region
Beijing 北京 zhixiashi Fujian 福建 (1%-10%)
Hebei 河北 Guangdong 广东 (1%-10%)
Shandong 山东 Hainan 海南 (1%-10%)
Shanghai 上海 zhixiashi Jiangsu 江苏 (10%-15%)
Tianjin 天津 zhixiashi Liaoning 辽宁 (1%-10%)
 Zhejiang 浙江 (15%-29%)
Central Region
Heilongjiang 黑龙江 Anhui 安徽 (1%-10%)
Henan 河南 Jilin 吉林 (1%-10%)
Hubei 湖北 
Hunan 湖南 
Jiangxi 江西 
Shanxi 山西 
Western Region
Chongqing 重庆 zhixiashi Ningxia 宁夏 Hui zizhiqu (10%-15%)
Gansu 甘肃 Qinghai 青海 (1%-10%)
Guangxi 广西 Zhuang zizhiqu Sichuan 四川 (1%-10%)
Guizhou 贵州 
Inner Mongolia / Nei Monggol 内蒙古 
    Mongol zizhiqu 
Shaanxi 陕西 
Tibet / Xizang 西藏 Tibetan zizhiqu 
Xinjiang 新疆 Uygur zizhiqu 
Yunnan 云南 
 
* G = 0.45
Source: Huang and Niu (2007: 161-162), Table 5-3(2), with data of 2003.
to a report released in March 2009 by Beijing’s Ministry of Finance, the 
country’s Gini coefficient which had leapt from 0.282 in 1991 to 0.456 in 
1998 had further increased to 0.457 in 1999 and 0.458 in 2000, with more 
than 50 per cent of the national income in the hands of the richest 20 per cent 
of the population and only 2 to 4 per cent of the national income in the hands 
of the poorest 20 per cent.36 Table 2 shows that China’s provinces/zizhiqu/
zhixiashi whose Gini coefficients (Gi) are higher than the national figure (G) 
of 0.45 totaled 11, i.e. about 35.5 per cent of all provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi. 
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The poor zizhiqu of Tibet was rather egalitarian, with Gini lower than 0.3. 
Other provinces/zhixiashi with reasonable levels of 0.3-0.4 were Shandong, 
Jiangxi, Hubei, Guizhou and Chongqing. The majority of provinces/zizhiqu/
zhixiashi, totaled 23, had Gini levels between 0.4 and 0.5, showing the 
inclination towards widening gap between rich and poor. Two provinces, 
the economically advanced Jiangsu and Zhejiang, had Gini greater than 0.5 
(Huang and Niu, 2007: 162).
The following account in a sense captures the essence of the problem:
China is a profoundly polarised society, with hundreds of millions of 
impoverished workers and peasants at one pole, and a tiny capitalist elite at 
the other. According to a Boston Consulting Group study, China had 250,000 
millionaire households in 2005, ranking the country sixth in the world. These 
households accounted for only 0.4 percent of the total, but controlled 70 
percent of national wealth.
Chan (2007)
In addition, it was also alleged that almost 60 per cent of public revenue was 
used for the benefit of the 70 million-strong community of CCP cadres and 
apparatchiks who enjoyed a level of welfare – including healthcare, education 
and career opportunities – greatly higher than the ordinary citizens, and 
among the rich with wealth worth a hundred million yuan and above, 91 per 
cent or 2932 were the children of high-ranking CCP cadres and apparatchiks, 
possessing assets above 2.045 trillion yuan.37 
The fact that 70 per cent of China’s wealth was in the hand of 0.4 per 
cent of the people was confirmed by Cai Jiming 蔡继明, a Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Committee member, on the 6th Meeting of the 11th 
Standing Committee of the CPPCC, referring to an authoritative government 
department report.38 Cai emphasized that with 0.4 per cent of the people in 
control of 70 per cent of wealth, China’s wealth concentration was higher 
than that of the US. Proposing income tax and inheritance tax reforms, Cai 
emphasized that such wealth concentration in the hands of a minority of 
people has led to inadequate consumption and even distorted consumption. 
In fact, a recent report revealed that with luxury goods consumption reaching 
US$8.6 billion, i.e. 25 per cent of the world market, China superseded 
US to become the world’s second largest luxury goods market by January 
2009, ranked only after Japan.39 Other data show that the degree of wealth 
concentration towards the rich in China is presently growing on average at 
an annual rate of 12.3 per cent which is double the world average growth 
rate. Such tendency is also reflected in sad state of the small and medium 
enterprises, with data showing the disappearance of 7,700,000 private 
businesses over the decade of 1994-2004 and the collapse of the middle class 
leading to an M-shape society.40
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Regarding social stratification, Zhu (2007: 6-7) observed the existence 
in China of an enormous set of “identity circles” encompassing the whole 
society (Figure 12) – “agricultural population” circle, “urban residents” circle, 
“workers” circle, “cadres” circle41:
1)   Agricultural population: Those born into peasant families who have by 
informal procedure moved into other circles, even if having entered other 
classes or strata by work change or even having left the village the whole 
life, are still only considered peasants.
2)   Urban residents: Broadly speaking, all non-peasants belong to this group 
of “urban residents”. Formerly, “urban residents” narrowly defined refer 
to unemployed personnel – those without a fixed job. As “urban people”, 
they had a status higher than peasants, but as people without work units, 
their status was below “workers”. If they were formally employed by 
the labour department, even if they did work, they were just “temporary 
workers”. This community of “temporary workers” no longer exists since 
the 1990s, but the concept is still alive in people’s subconsciousness.
3)   Workers: All workers in accordance with whether they are managed by 
the government’s labour department or personnel department are divided 
into the “workers” and “cadres” sub-circles.
4)   Cadres: From this sub-circle a further division can be made into “general 
cadres” and “leadership cadres”. Civil organizations in China, schools, 
and even public enterprises and their personnel are all subject to the so-
called “administrative stratification”42.
Figure 12 China: Identity Circles 
Source: Zhu (2007: 6), Figure 1-1.
 Peasants
Urban Residents
Workers
Cadres
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Members of the society are unable to completely follow their own will 
in moving across these four circles between which exist different economic 
and political conditions. Hence, between these four circles there exists a 
high-low relationship – in other words, this is not a multidimensional but a 
centripetal structure; moving towards the centre implies the raising of one’s 
social status.
Social stratification can indeed be traced back to the dawn of the Chinese 
civilization. From the Qin (Ch’in 秦) Dynasty to the Qing (Ch’ing 清) 
Dynasty (221 BC – AD 1911), the imperial courts had always divided the 
Chinese populace into four strata – literati and officialdom (shi 士), agriculture 
(nong 農), labour/craftsmen (gong 工) and merchants/businessmen (shang 商), 
with both landlords and peasants included in the category of “nong” as the 
two major strata, followed by the two secondary strata of “gong” and “shang” 
(Table 3) – between which did exist a certain level of vertical mobility (Li, 
2008b: 32-33).
Nevertheless, the traditional official categorization contains its own 
contradictions by grouping together landlords and peasants under “nong” 
and the upper-class big businessmen/merchants and the lower-class petty 
businessmen together under “shang”, and separating officials and literati from 
the landlord class where they actually belong to (ibid.: 33). A clearer treatment 
of stratification is shown in Figure 13.
Tremendous transformation came with the Communist revolution, and by 
1958 emerged a new structure of social stratification with the disappearance 
of the landlord class and the national bourgeoisie, and replacing them was 
the new upper class: the cadres – and as in the past, the huge peasant masses 
remained the country’s lower class (Li, 2008b: 50, see Figure 14). Moving 
into the 2000s Chinese social stratification has witnessed three major 
transformations – a third of the peasants are now the nongmingong 农民工 
(rural-to-urban migrant labour)43 whose total number is almost equal to that 
of the urban workers; urban non-SOE workers have greatly surpassed the 
Table 3 China: Official Social Stratification, 1880s
Class Number of households %
Literati and officialdom (Shi 士)  1,500,000 2
Agriculture (Nong 農) 56,000,000 80
Industry and commerce (Gong shang 工商) 12,500,000 18
Total  70,000,000* 100
* Total population around 350-400 million.
Source: Li (2008b: 33), Table 2-2 (original source: Marsh, 1980: 15).
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Figure 13 China: Social Stratification in Late Qing (Ch’ing) Dynasty
Source:  Li (2008b: 33), Figure 2-1 (original source: The Cambridge History of 
China, Vol. 13, p. 30).
Figure 14 China: Social Stratification, 1959-1979
Source: Li (2008b: 51), Figure 3-1.
5% – members of the royal household,
ministers and officials, other members of the
officialdom, landlords, big businessmen,
candidates of imperial civil examinations
95% – peasants, craftsmen and
artisans, small businessmen
Cadres (10 million in 1959)
Workers of State-owned
enterprises (35 million in 1959)
Peasants (200 million in 1959)
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SOE workers in number as the number of SOE workers has declined rapidly 
after 1997; rapid increase in the number of China’s reborn bourgeoisie (ibid.: 
176, see Figure 15). Disagreeing with the underestimated official 2003 figure 
of 7.73 million who were owners of private enterprises (see Figure 16), Li 
(2008b: 188) estimated the total number constituting the Chinese bourgeois 
class (though still represented a small segment between cadres and SOE 
workers) to be from 10 to 15 million, including four categories missed out 
in the official statistics: the large number of managerial personnel and local 
cadres who virtually turned into enterprise owners due to privatization of 
almost all village and township enterprises within two to three years after 
1998; the many cadres of the large number of small- and medium-scale SOEs 
and even a certain number of large SOEs which were privatized after 1997 
who became the new owners of these enterprises; with the majority of large 
SOEs turning into joint-stock companies in the last decade, the large number 
of administrative personnel in these enterprises and some civil servants who 
were involved in regulating and administering the process of these SOEs 
turning into joint-stock companies had acquired huge volume of shares; 
unknown number of government officials who, having legally or illegally 
accumulated substantial volumes of wealth, invested the money in the share 
markets or saved it in local and overseas banks. Summing up the savings and 
interests, gains in stocks and shares and other non-salary incomes of these 
Figure 15 China: Social Stratification, Present
Source: Li (2008b: 176), Figure 8-1 and pp. 177-194.
Cadres: 40 million cadres +
more than 25 million quasi-cadres
Urban workers: 29 million urban
State-owned enterprise workers
+ 160 million non-SOE workers
Nongmingong (rural-to-
urban migrant labour):
more than 200 million
Bourgeois class: more than
10 million private enterprise owners
Peasants: more than 300 million
Upper class: about 100 million
(7.7% of total population of 1.3 
billion), including a still not
well-defined but emerging
“middle class”
Lower class
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four categories of people would give amounts apparently higher than their 
wages and salaries (ibid.).
An interesting question is that regarding China’s illusive “middle class”. 
The approach in Li’s model as shown in Figure 15 is, citing Gilbert (2003: 
17), not to identify the Chinese “middle class” before China enters the 
stage of late industrialization or post-industrialization, as the majority of the 
Chinese white-collar service-sector professionals are part of the upper classes 
of the cadres and the reborn bourgeoisie. The speed with which this presently 
illusive class is going to emerge unequivocally in the changing class pyramid 
depends of course on the dynamics of social mobility in the long process of 
modern Chinese industrialization. The impacts of China’s economic reform in 
the post-Mao period especially since the critical juncture of 1989 (a catalyst 
that led to Deng Xiaoping’s reaffirmation of the path of reform in his nanxun 
in 1992) on social mobility have been tremendous, and their significance 
is outstanding especially in view of the barriers that existed just before the 
reforms began (Figure 17) – the hukou 户口/huji 户籍 system, administrative 
Figure 16 China: Resurgence of Bourgeois Class since 1989
Source: Li (2008b: 187), Figure 8-3.
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documentation system and political status (ideological) barrier. The hukou 
barrier is the most insurmountable, and only a slim 5.2 per cent of peasants 
managed to cross this barrier during the 1940-1979 period (compared to the 
13.1 per cent of workers who managed to move up into the cadre stratum), 
with 3.1 per cent becoming workers and 2.1 per cent becoming cadres (Li, 
2008a: 497). Within the cadre stratum, political (ideological loyalty) barrier 
had blocked professional skilled personnel (who were thus marginalized 
and unstable within the cadre community) from moving upward into the 
organizational/enterprise cadre community, with only a slim 1.5 per cent 
passed the severe political scrutiny to advance into the latter (ibid.: 498). On 
the other hand, during this pre-reform period there also existed downward 
mobility which could be explained by the temporary changing of status 
due to university enrolment and military service etc. as well as specific 
political policy changes and various political campaigns (ibid.: 498-499). 
Table 4 shows in general an apparent increase in social mobility coming 
along with economic reform and increased openness of the Chinese society, 
while the probably rather unique existence of increased downward mobility 
alongside the usual increased upward mobility resulted from industrialization 
could in a way reflect the simultaneous “dual transformation” consisting of 
industrialization and institutional change (drastic reforms in the economic 
institution) (ibid.: 501-502). All these manifestations of social mobility since 
economic reform began have resulted in the present overall structure of social 
stratification whose details could be illustrated as in Figure 18.
 
4.  Sociopolitical Change and Its Impact on Chinese Social Dilemmas:
  Contexts, Institutions, Agents and Events
Figure 19, based on Green (2008), shows that the process of social change 
typically involves a combination of four different components: context (the 
environment within which changes take place, thus crucial in determining 
the nature and direction of change), institutions (the organizations and rules, 
both formal and informal, that establish the “rules of the game” governing 
the behaviour of agents – including culture, family structure, civil service, 
private sector, governmental system, patron-client network, etc.), agents 
(organizations and individuals actively involved in promoting or blocking 
change, e.g. ruling party, social movements, political and business élite, 
military and police, inspirational leaders, social entrepreneurs) and events 
(one-off events triggering wider change and being key catalysts to social 
and political changes, e.g. wars, pandemics like AIDS, SARS, A(H1N1), 
civil conflicts such as “mass incidents”, ethnic or ethnoregional riots, 
demonstrations and crackdowns, natural disasters, economic crisis) and, as 
Eisenstadt noted:
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Table 4 China: Intergenerational and Intragenerational Mobility Rate (%)
 Intergenerational Mobility
 Total Pre-1980 Employee Post-1980 Employee
Immobility 51.7 58.6 46.0
Total Mobility 48.3 41.4 54.0
Upward Mobility 37.0 32.4 40.9
Downward Mobility 11.3 9.1 13.1
 Intragenerational Mobility 
 (first employment – present employment)
 Total Pre-1980 Employee Post-1980 Employee
Immobility 63.2 64.7 61.8
Total Mobility 36.8 35.3 38.2
Upward Mobility 23.2 23.8 22.6
Downward Mobility 13.6 11.5 15.6
 Intragenerational Mobility 
 (previous employment – present employment)
 Total Change of job   Change of job   Change of job
  1949-1979   1980-1989   1999-2001
Immobility 63.7 86.7 69.8 45.8
Total Mobility 36.3 13.3 30.2 54.2
Upward Mobility 20.9 7.4 18.7 30.5
Downward Mobility 15.5 5.9 11.5 23.6
Note:  Intergenerational mobility refers to status change from father’s 
employment (or stratum) to son/daughter’s employment (or stratum); 
intragenerational mobility refers to status change of an individual’s 
employment (or stratum). Total mobility rate refers to the percentage of 
intergenerational or intragenerational change in stratum or employment 
status, while immobility rate refers to percentage where such change 
never occurs. Upward mobility rate refers to percentage where such 
change is from a lower stratum to a higher stratum, while downward 
mobility rate refers to percentage where such change is from a higher 
stratum to a lower stratum. Total mobility is the sum of upward mobility 
rate and downward mobility rate, and total mobility rate plus immobility 
rate equals 100%. “First employment” refers to the earliest job, “present 
employment” refers to the current job, and “previous employment” refers 
to the job immediately precedes the current job.
Source:  Li (2008a: 501), Table 17-1.
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270      Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh  Figure 18 China: Present Structure of Social Stratification
Note:  Arrow indicates that the whole or a part of a social stratum concerned can be 
included in one of the five major social classes.
Sources: Han (2009: 127), Figure 9.1; Li and Chen (2004: 13), Figure 1-3.
Upper: top-leadership
cadres, managers of large
enterprises, high-level
professionals and bosses
of large private
enterprises
Mid-upper: middle- and
lower-leadership cadre,
middle-echelon
administrators of large
enterprises, managers of
medium- and small-scale
enterprises, middle-
echelon professional
skilled personnel and
bosses of medium-scale
enterprises
Mid-middle: lower
professional skilled
personnel, bosses and
officers of small-scale
enterprises, bosses and
officers of individually-
owned small-scale
enterprises, individually-
owned businesses,
middle- and high-level
mechanics/machinists,
and large-scale
agribusiness
Mid-lower: individual
labourer, commercial-
and service-sector
personnel, workers and
peasants
Lower: workers and
peasants in poverty and
without certainty for a
job, and people in
vagrancy, unemployment
and semi-unemployment
State and social administrative
stratum (with organizational
resources), 2.1%
Managerial stratum (with
cultural or organizational
resources), 1.6%
Private enterprise owner
stratum (with economic
resources), 1.0%
Professional skilled stratum
(with cultural resources),
4.6%
Officer stratum (with small
amount of cultural or
organizational resources),
7.2%
Individually-owned business
& industry stratum (with
small amount of economic
resources), 7.1%
Commercial- and service-
sector personnel stratum (with
very small amount of cultural,
organizational and economic
resources), 11.2%
Worker stratum (with very
small amount of cultural,
organizational and economic
resources), 17.5%
Agricultural labourer stratum
(with very small amount of
cultural, organizational and
economic resources), 42.9%
Urban and rural vagrant,
unemployed and semi-
unemployed stratum
(basically without cultural,
organizational and economic
resources), 4.8%
Upper administrators, 9.4%
Middle administrators, 17.0%
Lower administrators, 57.9%
Middle & upper unit administrators, 15.7%
Upper managers, 12.6%
Middle managers, 41.4%
Lower managers, 46.0%
Large enterprise owners, 0.5%
Medium enterprise owners, 27.6%
Small enterprise owners, 71.9%
Professional personnel in science, education,
culture and health, 69.3%
Professional personnel in engineering and
technology, 22.4%
Professional personnel in business, commerce and
service, 8.3%
Party & government department officers, 62.4%
Enterprise officers, 37.6%
Small employer of business & industry, 22.0%
Self-employed business & industry, 78.0%
Primary-level supervisors of business & service,
4.4%
Relatively white-collar personnel of business &
service, 17.0%
Blue-collar personnel of business & service,
78.6%
Primary-level supervisors of secondary industry,
3.3%
Skilled workers of secondary industry, 33.5%
Unskilled workers of secondary industry, 63.2%
Specialized farmers, 12.6%
Part-time farmers, 25.0%
Ordinary farmers, 62.4%
Youth waiting for job, 22.8%
Xiagang personnel, 35.3%
Semi-employed personnel, 3.6%
Other unemployed, 38.3%
5 Major Socioeconomic Classes    10 Major Social Strata
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[… any] setting of social interaction, but particularly the macrosocietal 
order, involves a plurality of actors – elites, movements, and groups – with 
different levels of control over natural and social resources. These elites 
continuously struggle over the control, ownership, and the possibility of 
using such resources, generating ubiquitous conflicts on all levels of social 
interaction.
(Eisenstadt, 1992: 416)
The categories listed in Figure 19 may, however, overlap, e.g. the CCP is both 
an institution and agent in blocking or promoting different kinds of changes. 
The inner circle of the diagram consists of active citizens as agents and the 
effective State – the CCP’s Party-State – as the most important institution, 
in terms of change components. This inner circle is surrounded by an outer 
circle of context consisting of wider components of change which in a way 
are less susceptible to political or public action, such as events. While the 
contextual factors (outer circle) are having an immediate and crucial impact 
– as shown in the diagram by the inter-circle solid arrows – on the institutions 
and agents of change, these institutions and agents are also having certain, 
though limited, control – shown by the dotted arrows – over these contextual 
factors. Originally constructed to understand the constraints and possibilities 
for building active citizenship and an effective, accountable State (ACES), 
this model would need to accommodate additional complexities of the unique 
environment of China’s combination of economic liberalization and one-party 
political authoritarianism.
4.1. Critical Junctures
[…] while I recognize the dangers to truth of relating scholarship to life, I 
also believe that we who live by the pen bear some measure of obligation, 
however tenuous, to those who die by the sword.
Alan Wood (1995: xiii)
Hage, Hanneman and Gargan (1989: 89-91) remarked that theories of the 
determinants of public spending should not only be problem specific but also 
period specific. The historical dimension – the timing of State44 involvement 
– is a crucial factor.45 Levi-Strauss (1967: 281-3) perceived time not solely in 
mechanical, cumulative or statistical terms, but also in social terms – deriving 
its properties from concrete social phenomena. Complementing his view of 
ethnicity as a special case of stratification, an analytical perspective concerned 
with conflict and power (the Weberian approach), Katznelson (1971: 69-
70) emphasized the importance of the notion of “critical structural periods” 
– historical periods when “critical structural decisions” are made. Citing 
Schattschneider’s remark that “organization is the mobilization of bias” (1961: 
71), Katznelson noted that critical structural decisions are those that define the 
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“structured relationships” which not only limit but also shape the direction 
of behavioural choice. In other words, social time rather than historical time, 
which can be misleading, is the crucial variable.46 
Traditional Chinese mystical beliefs see great natural calamities as omens 
of tumultuous dynastic changes. Probably one of the deadliest wraths of 
nature in modern times – the official death toll stood at around 242,000, one 
third of some unoffical estimates – the Tangshan 唐山 earthquake on 28th 
July, in an ominous turn of events during the “Curse of 1976”, was preceded 
by the death of Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai 周恩来)47 on 8th January and that 
of Zhu De (Chu Teh 朱德) on 6th July, and followed by Mao Zedong (Mao 
Tse-tung 毛泽东)’s passing on 9th September that brought his ten-year Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (wuchan jieji wenhua da geming 无产阶级
文化大革命) to a close. The so-called Gang of Four (si ren bang 四人帮), 
led by Mao’s widow Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch’ing 江青), were arrested on 6th 
October in what amounted to a palace coup, paving the way for the return of 
the twice-purged pragmatist and reformist Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p’ing 
邓小平) to the government and party in the following year, who was to deal 
the coup de grâce to Mao’s failed autarkic collectivist utopia.
Deng Xiaoping’s return to power signalled China’s entry into a new age, 
with his pragmatism paving the way for the rise of Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 and 
Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 whom Deng entrusted to plan and implement China’s 
market-oriented economic reforms from 1980 to 1989. These reforms were 
nothing less than revolutionary, whose origin could be traced to Zhao’s 
successful experimental reforms – during which Zhao laid the foundation 
of his key reform framework of the coming years48 – from 1978 in Sichuan, 
where Zhao was the Party’s First Secretary, before Hu and Zhao entered the 
politburo respectively in 1978 and 1979 and the Standing Committee in 1980 
when Hu was appointed the Secretary General and Zhao later the Deputy 
Premier and then Premier (Bao, 2009: 28-29). In terms of political culture and 
atmosphere, this was also a period of limited political liberalization, an aspect 
of reform where the tug-of-war between the reformist and conservative forces 
was particularly acute, which eventually led to the downfall of, in turn, first 
Hu in January 1987, then Zhao in June 1989, when they overstepped the mark 
into the minefield of “bourgeois liberalization” where Deng who sanctioned 
full-scale economic reform was not prepared to bring China into.
Exiled dissidents estimated the number of civilians, workers and students 
killed in the crackdown during the night of 3rd-4th June 1989 to be from 
2000 to 300049, while the official death toll stood at four hundred and forty-
three, 223 of whom were soldiers and police officers, plus 5000 soldiers and 
police officers and 2000 civilians wounded in the crackdown (Hutton, 2006: 
27)50. The Tiananmen demonstrations had ended in a tragic crackdown and 
arrested the maturing of the political system with the purge of Zhao Ziyang 
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and the arrest and exile of many chief reformists and intellectuals. Aspects 
of political reform have since either been rolled back or stalled. In view 
of the close link between political decentralization and democratization,51 
the tragic end of the Tiananmen protests and democracy movement of June 
1989 has left an ineffaceable shadow over democratic pluralist development 
and ethnoregional accommodation. The post-1989 robust, even miraculous, 
economic growth has been used time and again rather successfully by the 
CCP for the ex post justification of the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, that 
the brutal crackdown had been necessary to preserve China’s stability and 
economic progress, but the continuing, even recently escalating, social unrest 
– including those more alarming incidents with ethnic or ethnoregional flavour 
– that culminated in Xinjiang’s July Fifth deadly riots of 2009, just a month 
past the 20th anniversary of the 1989 tragedy, points to the need to objectively 
and critically examine the underlying contradictions amidst the euphoria of 
economic success.52
4.2. Path Dependency of Political Change
The 1989 crackdown could be seen as a wake-up call for the CCP to embark 
rigorously on a path of continuing economic reform while rolling back the Hu-
Zhao era of limited politico-cultural liberalization and the subsequent collapse 
of Communist Party-rule in USSR and Eastern Europe from the end of 1989 
to early 199053 had seemed to reaffirm the correctness of such decision to 
crack down on the part of the CCP to ensure the survival of its one-party 
rule. The 1989 tragedy could also be seen as a catalyst for the single-minded 
determination to deliver on the economic front after Deng Xiaoping’s nanxun 
later in 1992 to reaffirm the Party’s policy of moving forward with economic 
reform and liberalization, coupled with more determined approach in dealing 
with political dissent. 
There is indeed little unique for a politically authoritarian country 
to achieve economic miracles. Many authoritarian and neo-authoritarian 
countries have done it before, such as Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石’s Taiwan and 
Park Chung-hee 박정희 / 朴正熙’s South Korea, or in a way even Augusto 
Pinochet’s Chile and Soeharto’s Indonesia. In fact, many such countries are 
among the models CCP’s China, in its search for a way forward after 1989, 
found attractive to consider for emulation. Like May Fourth of 1919 which, 
while inclusive of the liberal tradition, eventually turned Chinese intellectuals 
away from Western liberalism to Bolshevism, planted the seeds of Mao’s 
ascending the Tiananmen on 1st October 194954 and of the contradictions 
between national rejuvenation, modernization and radicalism, the 1989 
events and tragedy in a way also sowed the seeds of escalating internal 
contradictions and tension in subsequent policy orientation which was 
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reflected in the determined effort in economic reform while resisting the tide 
of political “bourgeois liberalization” and ruling out the adoption of multi-
party democracy. Even not seen in ethnic and ethnoterritorial terms, such 
social contradictions have manifested themselves in the alarmingly widening 
income gap, deteriorating socioeconomic inequalities and proliferating social 
unrest, as discussed in the previous section.
CCP’s China has been adamant that each country has the right to choose 
her own path to development and the sanctity of national sovereignty must 
at all costs be protected from foreign intervention55 – a position largely 
supported by most developing countries including most ASEAN members. 
While steering the country towards the status of an economic superpower, 
with the inevitable concomitant expansion in political and military might and 
prowess, the CCP, building on the foundations set by the former Hu-Zhao 
administration56 under Deng’s auspices, also embarked on a remarkable 
process of internal reform and rejuvenation. Many of these internal reforms 
have involved power succession or leadership transition which has been 
remarkably successful over the years and has definitely played a crucial role in 
maintaining intra-Party political stability and smoothing the path of economic 
reform and transition. These basically involve ideology restructuring, 
recruitment of new breed of élite into the leadership, construction of “political 
exit” channel for ageing leaders and grooming of the core of future generation 
of leadership (see, e.g. Zheng and Lye, 2004), which is of course part and 
parcel of the “stick and carrot” approach in the co-optation and control of 
intellectuals. Besides, Beijing has also been emphasizing the democratization 
of rural governance since the National People’s Congress passed the “Village 
Committee Organic Law of the PRC (Experimental)” in 1987 that introduced 
the direct election of the directors, deputy directors and members of the 
villagers’ committees. At least theoretically, these grassroots government 
officials, being elected by the local people, could be more independent in 
their dealings with the higher authorities since their political legitimacy 
depends on popular votes rather than appointment by higher authorities 
(Zheng and Lye, 2004). The recent years saw the geographical expansion of 
such villagers’ committee elections, with 929 counties across China covering 
Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Fujian, Jiangxi and Shaanxi holding 
such elections in the year 2003 (ibid.).57 Nevertheless, such village committee 
elections should not be taken as a sign that China is taking the first step 
in political reform moving towards multiparty liberal democracy. In fact, 
the country’s leadership has never made any pretension that this is so. In 
the sixfold typology of regime classification of Diamond (2002), China is 
classified as “politically closed authoritarian”. When describing the Franquist 
regime as “authoritarian”, Gunther (1980: 2) elaborated, “It was based upon 
the explicit rejection of mass suffrage as a means of elite recruitment and a 
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basis of legitimacy […] The concept of political conflict among social groups 
was formally regarded as illegitimate, and mass organizations which engaged 
in what the state regarded as conflictual political activities were vigorously 
suppressed.” It is interesting to compare this with the case of post-1989 
China. While many authors inside and outside China have been lauding the 
country’s “grassroots democratization” and intra-Party reforms as pointing to 
a promising path of de-authoritarian evolvement, the perception that China 
is moving out from this “politically closed authoritarian” category of regime 
type could prove to be as misleadingly whimsical as it is empirical unfounded. 
Furthermore, past record of mismanagement and repressive, often violent, 
response to dissent, including the excesses during the Cultural Revolution 
both in China proper and in ethnic regions like Tibet and Xinjiang, and the 
1989 tragedy, may not be encouraging for many, including the ethnoregional 
minority nationalities.
Indeed, while promoting the rural elections in 1987, Peng Zhen 彭真 
had argued that such elections could be used to help the Chinese Communist 
Party govern the country’s rural areas and perpetuate the Party’s rule (Zheng 
and Lye, 2004). Any perception that such electoral initiatives are implying 
that the Party is loosening its stranglehold over China’s politics could be 
illusory as the signals conveyed by the ruling regime regarding the tolerance 
threshold for dissent remain unmistakable, not least highlighted in recent 
years by the arrest and jailing of various civil rights lawyers, researchers, 
journalists, activists and other dissidents which represent another reference 
point for reading civil rights development in China. Besides these high-profile 
cases, there are also many other little observed arrests and imprisonments 
that rarely raise an eyebrow beyond the border. According to the advocacy 
group Reporters Sans Frontiers (Reporters without Borders), there are more 
journalists in prison in China than anywhere else in the world.58 A report of 
the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) at the end of January 2009 
accused China of reneging on her promise of press freedom during her bid 
for hosting the Olympics and called for the country to immediately release 
imprisoned journalists and halt the repression of journalists with the current 
national security and other laws – and this came amidst reports that a new 
series of rules and regulations would be launched in 2009 to strengthen the 
control on journalists and news reporting ostensibly for maintaining quality 
and authenticity in news reporting.59 Reporters Sans Frontiers ranked China 
number 167 out of a total of 173 countries in its 2008 Worldwide Press 
Freedom Index and considered the number of arrests and cases of news 
surveillance and control by China’s political police and Department of 
Propaganda to be still very high, while Human Rights Watch asserted that 
China’s extensive police and State security apparatus continued to impose 
upon civil society activists, critics and protestors multiple layers of controls 
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(Lye, 2009: 215, 237) and the crackdown on dissent – whether the targets be 
civil rights activists, campaigners for multi-party political reform or falungong 
法轮功 followers – has remained relentless. In terms of international 
perception of civil and political rights, in the 2010 Freedom House’s Annual 
Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (ratings reflect events 
from 1st January 2009, through 31st December 2009), China was rated 7 on 
political rights and 6 on civil liberties (Figure 20).60 
Despite the much touted intra-Party and grassroots democratization, it 
is undeniable that at the moment China remains an authoritarian state, with 
party regulations on cadre selection still charging “local Party committees 
with nominating key officials in local governments, legislatures, and courts” 
(Minzner, 2006: 10):
Local Party committee control extends over the electoral systems that permit 
citizen participation in the selection of delegates to local people’s congresses 
and village/residents committees. Selection of who may serve as a candidate 
is under the control of local election committees dominated, and sometimes 
chaired, by county and township Party secretaries. Election committees use 
Notes:  1 is the best rating, 7 the worst. Ratings reflect events from 1st January 
2009, through 31st December 2009.
 *  Xizang (Tibet) Zizhiqu (“autonomous region”), China.
 +  Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), China.
Source:  Data from Freedom House (2010).
Figure 20  International Perception of Political Rights and Civil Liberties:
          Mainland China, Taiwan and ASEAN, 2009
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non-transparent practices to narrow the list of acceptable candidates […] 
Citizens who attempt to challenge Party-nominated candidates can find 
themselves unable to even get on the ballot. Chinese officials do permit a 
degree of citizen political participation, but only within channels that local 
Party institutions can control and monitor. Some non-Party members do 
win seats on local village committees. “Consultative” channels, such as 
the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference, allow non-Party members 
to offer nonbinding input into policy formulation. Chinese authorities 
have also recently experimented with allowing citizen participation in the 
selection of local Party officials. These experiments, however, grant citizens 
only a limited voice in the nomination of potential candidates, allow Party 
committees to eliminate names from the nominee lists, and retain Party 
control over the final approval of the results.
(ibid.: 10-11)
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 9) opined that a transition from authoritarian 
rule could produce a democracy, but it could also terminate with a liberalized 
authoritarian regime (dictablanda) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (demo-
cradura).61 As the above discussion shows, while shadows of the remnants 
of her ghostly past still linger to haunt the one-party State, there are already 
telling signs that the continuing transformation from a dictadura (dictatorship) 
into a dictablanda leading further to a highly restrictive democradura in the 
near future is the most possible direction the CCP regime is heading to and 
indeed planning to head to, given the fact that the Western, “bourgeois liberal” 
democracy (democracia) has already been ruled out of the cards, or at least 
not until mid-2000s. In fact, following Professor Zhou Tianyong from the 
Central Party School, China’s authoritarian one-party political system will 
and should remain unchanged until at least 2037 (Zhou, Wang and Wang 
(eds), 2007: 2, 6, 45-46, see Bo, 2009: 10-11). This is in line with what Deng 
Xiaoping stated in 1987, that direct general elections could only be held after 
half a century had passed in the 2000s, and at the moment the country had to 
make do with indirect elections above the county level and direct elections 
only at county and below county level, given the colossal population and 
inadequate level of cultural quality of the people (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 
19-2062).
 
4.3. Political Reform: Pax Sinica sine Trias Politica?
Government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state, 
an intolerable one.
Thomas Paine (1776), Common Sense, Ch. 1
While the establishment of village committees in rural areas through direct 
elections began in 1988, a year before the 1989 tragedy, the “Organic Law on 
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Village Committees” – according to which, the director, deputy director, and 
members of the village committee are directly elected by villagers for a term 
of three years, and villagers who are at least 18 years old have the right to 
vote and to stand for election – was only officially promulgated in November 
1998 (Bo, 2009: 7), some years after the post-Tiananmen uncertainties, and 
grassroots elections were expanded to the township level in the same year and 
the county level in 2002 (ibid.: 7-8).
After the 13th Party Congress in October 1987, at which Zhao Ziyang 
– who became the Party’s general secretary and first vice-chairman of the 
Central Military Commission – proposed the one and only political reform 
package in the history of the Chinese Communist Party which attempted to 
introduce reforms such as the separation of power between Party and State 
(Zhao, 2009: 286)63, and the successful experiment on the “permanent party 
congress system” in the Jiaojiang 椒江 district64 of the prefecture-level city 
of Taizhou 台州, Zhejiang Province, in 1988-1989, such voting system on 
the appointment and removal of cadres was only promoted again by the 
Central Organization Department in 2001 (Bo, 2009: 13-14), years after the 
post-Tiananmen uncertainties. Further intra-party democratization ensued, 
including the Plenum Voting System whereby the party’s leading cadres are 
selected by the plenum of the party committee through secret ballot:
In April 2004, the CCP Central Committee promulgated a regulation on 
“methods of selecting and recommending candidates for chief leaders of the 
party committee and the government of the next lower level by voting in 
the party’s local committee plenary sessions.” The regulation provides that 
candidates for chief positions of the party and the government of the city, 
prefecture, league, county, district, flag, township, and neighborhood should 
in general be presented to the plenum of the party committee of the next 
higher level where the appointment will be decided through secret ballot. 
For chief positions of the party and the government at the prefecture and 
county levels, the standing committees of the provincial party committee 
and the municipal party committee should nominate candidates, respectively 
and the respective plenums will review them and make a decision by secret 
ballot.
(Bo, 2009: 14-15)
In short, we are witnessing intra-party democratization picking up speed 
again after the historic political reform package introduced by Zhao Ziyang 
at the 13th Party Congress in October 1987 was temporary halted after the 
1989 tragedy. With 1989 as the watershed, CCP’s élite political thinking 
has markedly progressed from Deng Xiaoping’s complete dismissal of the 
North Atlantic democracy, especially the trias politica (tripartite separation 
of powers) for checks and balances65, to affirmation at least in theory by the 
Hu-Wen administration66 the notions of democracy, the rule of law, freedom, 
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and human rights as universal common values of the humankind, which, as 
we have seen, has been accompanied by the remarkable pace of intra-party 
democratization.67 However, as Minzner (2006: 21) noted, all the institutional 
reforms so far “share a common thread: firm commitment to the principle of 
centralized Party control”:
Officials have curtailed social and political reforms when they appear to 
challenge this core principle of centralized Party control. Since the late 
1980s, Chinese officials have allowed citizens to take part in local elections 
for village committees. But they have quashed local experiments aimed at 
expanding these initiatives to higher levels in the Chinese bureaucracy, and 
have maintained tight control of the nomination and selection of candidates 
to screen out individuals who might challenge Party control. Similarly, in 
the late 1990s, Chinese officials created a regulatory structure to govern the 
registration of civil society organizations with more attenuated ties to the 
state. But when a group of social activists attempted to use these channels 
in 1998 to openly register branches of the Democracy Party, Chinese 
officials rapidly suppressed the group and sentenced the leaders to lengthy 
prison terms. This unwillingness to alter core principles of centralized Party 
control appears to make it unlikely that officials will be able to address the 
institutional factors that drive social unrest.
(ibid.)68
This is made absolutely clear in the State Council’s October 2005 White 
Paper on “Building Political Democracy in China” which stated that “Party 
committees serve as the leadership core over all [government and mass] 
organizations at the same level […] and through Party committees and cadres 
in these organizations, ensure that the Party’s policies are carried out […] 
Party committees ensure that Party proposals become the will of the state, 
and that candidates recommended by Party organizations become leaders in 
the institutions of state power.”69 That this remains the overriding cardinal 
principle of political logic is evident in the unusual political discourse 
emerged recently related to the 30th anniversary of the establishment of 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ). During Premier Wen Jiabao’s 
visit to Shenzhen on 20th August 2010, he openly called for the SEZ to 
implement political reform “lest we are moving into a blind alley”, leading 
to calls from many academics for launching a Shenzhen “special political 
zone” at the anniversary.70 This, however, has led to a backlash from the State 
media denouncing the interpretation of political reform as adopting Western 
capitalist or bourgeois democracy and trias politica separation of powers, 
and President Hu Jintao while lauding the “Shenzhen spirit” in his speech at 
the 30th anniversary celebration ceremony on 6th September has stuck to the 
realms of economic reform, industrialization, urbanization and modernization, 
apparently ignoring Wen’s call for political reform two weeks earlier.71
IJCS 1-2 combined PDF 25-10-10.i280   280 10/25/2010   1:07:46 AM
Changing China: Three Decades of Social Transformation      281
4.4. State/Leninist Corporatism?
Infidelity does not consist in believing, or in disbelieving, it consists in 
professing to believe what one does not believe.
Thomas Paine (1794), The Age of Reason, Part I
In the process of maintaining a tight grip on political power in maintaining 
the Party-State monopoly while delivering on the economic front and bringing 
prosperity and wellbeing to the long-suffering people of this giant country, the 
neo-authoritarian developmentalism followed by the CCP since 1989 could be 
leading the country on a path threaded before by various East Asian countries 
– a model sometimes termed “State corporatism”. The post-1989 State 
corporatism, or referred to by some observers as “Leninist corporatism”72, 
bears a close resemblance to Franco’s Nueo Estado (New State), and the 
“harmonious society” vision declared in recent years recalls Franco’s vision 
of social cohesion and harmonious relationship between employers and 
workers via corporatism that would promote a close collaboration between 
them under the direction of the State and his corporatist policies to regulate 
the economy by controlling the conditions of work, wages, prices, production 
and exchange, though Gunther (1980: 3) somehow described Franquist Spain 
as “halfheartedly” corporatist:
Labor unions were outlawed, and in their place were created 27 vertical 
syndicates, to which nearly all workers, technicians and employers belonged. 
“Representative” institutions (e.g. the Cortes and local government bodies) 
were organized along corporatist lines. Nevertheless, hundreds of economic 
and social organizations (which either were considered to be non-political 
by nature or were formed by groups supportive of the regime) remained 
completely independent of the state-dominated corporative structure.
While it is interesting to discern both similarities and contrasts between this 
and the case of post-1989 China, and corporatism, or State corporatism, 
might not be a grand theory that could adequately explain the new, emerging 
developmental paradigm in China’s astounding transition, it may yet prove 
to be helpful in understanding the inevitable transforming political landscape 
which, as Unger and Chan (2001) argued, could be moving in a “societal 
corporatist” direction in incremental shifts instead of the introduction of any 
form of political democracy, and as Unger and Chan further observed, the 
exclusion from these corporatist structures of the peasants and most of the 
non-State-sector workers whose grievances would thus be devoid of such 
mechanisms for articulation does not auger well for social and political 
stability. Some aspects of State corporatism may indeed recall the classic 
analysis of Bonapartism as a basis of State autonomy. Being propelled into a 
leading position by a balance of class forces, combined with the inability of 
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the subordinate classes to exercise control over their supposed representatives 
in the State apparatus, the government – or here the Party-State – uses the 
leverage gained to preserve both the status quo and the interests of the 
dominant class. The dominant class (or the bourgeoisie, as in Marx’s (1852) 
original description of the Bonapartist regime in The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Napoleon), in turn, is willing to abdicate to a certain extent its 
opportunity to rule in exchange for other kinds of protection by the ensuing 
strong State (Stepan, 1985).73 Therefore it is important to recognize that the 
State, or a Party-State, is neither necessarily a neutral nor a passive actor. It 
may be perceived as an autonomous body that possesses its own interests and 
objectives independent from the rest of the populace. It can be a potentially 
disinterested party that engages in mediation and crisis management. However, 
it can also negotiate to achieve goals based on narrower interests. The State 
can use its influence to establish, entrench or expand its power (Enloe, 1980). 
In a way, while the 1989 events and tragedy can be seen as a culmination 
of the unstable development of an early stage of State corporatism since 
reform began partly due to the liberalism of the Hu-Zhao administration, the 
tragedy can also be observed to be the catalyst of the subsequent authoritarian 
corporatist evolution and reaffirmation of the path of economic reform (after 
Deng’s nanxun) and economic success as realization of the root causes of 
the tragedy had served to spur the CCP into attempting to reinvent itself 
as a strong, benevolent and enlightened ruler (i.e. a dictablanda), or as 
Thomas Hobbes referred to in his 1651 treatise, “the generation of that great 
Leviathan”.74
5. Concluding Remarks
Winston Churchill, in 1939, called Russia “a riddle wrapped in a mystery 
inside an enigma”75. This prologue, in conjunction with the special issue’s 
later discourse on ethnoterritoriality, examines a no less enigmatic country 
whose geographical size is as massive, whose population is as complex, 
and whose modern blood-stained epic of a history is both momentous and 
torturous, harrowing yet monumental. In a sense, China as a self-contained 
East Asian land mass is comparable to Russia as a self-contained Eurasian 
land mass. Both countries are more a continent than a country, both enjoying 
a sense of geographical isolation that feeds much the national psyche and 
popular subconsciousness of aloofness and conceit. This paper, together with 
the issue’s later tract on ethnoregionalism and peripheral nationalism, looks 
at the modern timeline of sociopolitical and socioeconomic development and 
transformation of China, focusing on a number of critical junctures where 
different critical decisions were made that have determined the subsequent 
course of socioeconomic and political development of the country. Also 
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examined are the State responses at times of crisis – how Mao’s passing was 
followed by two-step forward, three-step back political liberalization and 
“selective centralization”76 in a system that could be perplexingly described 
as “regionally decentralized authoritarian”77. In his iconoclastic 1985 study, 
Charles Tilly questioned the idea of a social contract in state making, where 
a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind 
of government, and defined “those peculiar forms of governments we call 
national states” as “relatively centralized, differentiated organizations the 
officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief 
concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, 
contiguous territory” (Tilly, 1985: 170). Without going so far with Tilly in 
seeing nation-states as “quintessential protection rackets with the advantage 
of legitimacy”, it is still impossible not to question the long taken-for-
granted notion of the inviolable sovereignty of the nation-state and even 
the very essence of the nation-state itself. Benedict Anderson, too, defined 
a nation as a community socially constructed and ultimately imagined by 
the people who perceive themselves as part of that group and “regardless 
of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation 
is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this 
fraternity that makes it possible […] for so many millions of people, not so 
much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson, 
1991: 6-7). The sovereignty of a nation-state is imagined, according to 
Anderson, because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment 
and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, 
hierarchical dynastic realm, giving rise to the national dreams of freedom 
whose gage and emblem were the sovereign state. Similarly, other historicists 
(in contrast to the primordialists) like Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm also 
posited that nations and nationalism are products of modernity and have been 
created as means to political and economic ends, and the nation, assuming 
the nineteenth-century conceptual entity of a nation-state, is the product of 
nationalism – but not ice ersa – through the unification of various peoples 
into a common society or community (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). 
It is in this context of nation-state as imagined community that the issue’s 
later disquisition on ethnoregionalism and peripheral nationalism will pick 
up where the present paper has left, to proceed to examine and analyze the 
causes and implications of the July Fifth Xinjiang riots against the backdrop 
of economic and political reforms and the intriguing question of China’s 
centralism . decentralization.
China has come a long way, difficult and laudable, culminating in the 
country claiming to have superseded Japan to become the world’s second 
largest economy in 201078. Going back to the critical juncture of 1989, 
that year’s student movement which snowballed into social protests of 
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unprecedented scale is in many ways a return of May Fourth. While May 
Fourth of 1919 had eventually led to the triumph of Maoism-Leninism which 
in a way hijacked the early socialism of Ch’en Tu-hsiu (Chen Duxiu 陳獨
秀)79, the 1989 tragedy represented a prelude to the subsequent hijacking of 
the Hu-Zhao administration’s initiative for politico-economic liberalization by 
the strengthening one-party authoritarian State corporatism preferred by Deng 
Xiaoping who once and again felt wary of and threatened by his protégés’ 
“bourgeois liberalization”. The conservative backlash has since complicated 
the uneasy coexistence of a highly decentralized economic structure 
brought through the no-holds-barred market economic reform with a highly 
centralized illiberal political regime or a proto-dictablanda which might have, 
among other ramifications, limited the possible extent of accommodation 
of ethnic and ethnoregional aspirations and precipitated the tragic events of 
14th March 2008 and 5th July 2009. “Left alone, crises do get unconsciously 
resolved over time, tragically or happily or somewhere in-between”, 
observed Reeler (2007: 12), “But they can also be more consciously and 
proactively resolved through well led or facilitated transformative change 
processes.” The resolution of the 1989 crisis in a tragedy and the purge of 
the political reformists in a way shut down the transformative change wing80 
of the bifurcation facing the CCP at that time and led to the protracted cold 
stuckness in sociopolitical modernization and its uneasy coexistence with 
accelerated market reform that brought national economic prosperity. Theo 
Lefevre, prime minister of the Belgian coalition government which drafted 
and passed the 1961-63 language laws, was said to have called Belgium 
“a happy country composed of three oppressed minorities” (Covell, 1985: 
230) – referring to the country’s forever squabbling Flemings (Vlamingen) 
and Walloons (Wallons) and probably less so, the Germans.81 Taking a cue 
from that, while hymns are being sung, justifiably, to short-term economic 
miracle and national glory, much care should probably be taken in the 
officially sanctioned building of a “people first” (yi min wei ben 以民为
本) “harmonious society” (hexie shehui 和谐社会) that such eulogizing 
would not be at the expense of the golden opportunities for more holistic 
transformative reforms during this period of economic success, that central 
State nationalism bordering on dominant-group ethnocentrism would not 
be tacitly promoted at the expense of more accommodation of peripheral 
ethnoregional nationalisms, and that in full recognition of the overt and 
subliminal emergent changes that have not ceased to exist as undercurrents 
in a nexus of contradictions beneath the officially sanctioned projectable 
changes, these projectable changes would not be looked upon as policy 
guidance simply to maintain and justify the cult of a dictablanda at the 
expense of the long-term greater good (Figure 21).
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6. Structure of the Volume
Following the prologue, the other thirteen papers in this special issue are 
divided into three sections. The first section Social Change, State and 
the Ciil Society consists of four papers, beginning with Gregor Benton’s 
article, “Dissent and the Chinese Communists before and since the Post-Mao 
Reforms”, that looks at extra-party dissent under CCP before and since 1949, 
from during the Mao era to the post-Mao decades. Distinguishing between 
opposition and dissent under Communist regimes, Benton argues that at least 
until the 1980s Chinese communism and the democracy movement never 
wholly excluded one another. Focusing on the advent of the information 
age, Chin-fu Hung, in the second article under this section, “The Politics of 
China’s Wei-Quan Movement in the Internet Age”, argues that empowerment 
by the modern information technology could be making some public protests 
(“mass incidents”) a threat to China’s sociopolitical stability and the rule 
of the CCP regime, in contrast to the many that are spontaneous, loosely 
organized, and eventually short-lived. While traditionally the practices and 
governing logic in China have been lacking in accommodating the needs of 
civic engagement in public affairs, Hung observes that the Chinese public is 
awakening to begin defending their protected civil and legal rights especially 
with onset of the age of the Internet. The prospects of political change, both 
positive and negative, constitute the focus of the subsequent paper by Shigeto 
Sonoda, “Emergence of Middle Classes in Today’s Urban China: Will They 
Contribute to Democratization in China?”, which examines whether or how 
urban middle classes will bring about political change, or democratization, in 
the Chinese society. Using two different datasets, Sonoda’s analysis points to 
the ambivalence of the Chinese urban middle classes’ political orientations 
and behaviours. Leaving sociopolitical change to move into social connections 
and social network, this section continues with Lucia Leung-Sea Siu’s 
paper, “Gangs in the Markets: Network-Based Cognition in China’s Futures 
Markets”, which looks at social connectivity within the investor community 
of China’s commodity futures markets which she found somewhat analogous 
to the traditional Chinese bang 幫 or gang. Based on empirical ethnographic 
fieldwork and documentary research, Siu argues that the markets consist of 
flexible socioeconomic aggregates in continuous interaction with each other, 
whose characteristics are shaped by social connectivity and background 
affiliation, while capital factions display properties of distributed cognition 
and network-based rationality.
Beginning the subsequent section of the volume, Social Change, Social 
Classes and Stratification, Kate Hannan’s paper, “Chinese Migrant Workers: 
From Labour Surplus to Labour Shortage”, charts the action taken by migrant 
workers in China’s low-end/labour-intensive manufacturing hubs when the 
global financial crisis led to a reduction in their employment opportunities, 
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wages and conditions, and proceeds to discuss the migrant worker situation 
as it stands today. Focusing on three aspects of the migrant labour situation 
in China – how the migrant labour surplus that came in the wake of Chinese 
export orders declining following the global financial crisis had eventually 
turned into a shortage; the present situation where the migrant workers’ 
relatively more active strategy is bringing about changes in wages as well 
as State response; the very fact that the migrant workers have been paying 
all along a disproportionate price for their country’s industrial and urban 
development – Hannan argues for a more pro-active approach to promote the 
interests of migrant workers instead of for Chinese government leaders and 
officials and a range of other Chinese commentators to be merely paying lip 
service to publicly recognize the considerable contribution made by these 
workers who have been “left out of the wealth”. Also looking at the labour 
issue, Qi Dongtao’s paper, “Chinese Working Class and Trade Unions in the 
Post-Mao Era: Progress and Predicament”, in turn examines the changes and 
predicaments of the Chinese working class as a whole and the role of the trade 
unions in contemporary China. Observing the Chinese working class today 
to be highly heterogeneous and stratified, Qi’s study points to the significant 
decline in the working class’ political and economic privileges since the early 
1980s and the failure of the Chinese trade unions, as State apparatuses, in 
protecting workers’ interests due to their institutional over-dependence on the 
government. Also looking at the transformation of the class structure, Yang 
Jing on the other hand analyzes the pertinent issues related to the rise of the 
middle class in China, including its sociopolitical outlooks, and the future 
prospects in her paper, “Stumbling on the Rocky Road: Understanding China’s 
Middle Class”. While recognizing that China is still far away from being a 
middle-class society, Yang nevertheless calls for government action to help 
overcome pressing challenges that are contributing to the vulnerability of the 
nation’s nascent, diverse middle class.
The final section of this volume, Social Change, Collectie Action and 
Nationalism, comprises six papers that deal with a range of critical social issues 
of contemporary importance in China today – “mass incidents”, central State 
and peripheral nationalism, protection of environmental and cultural heritage in 
the face of the onslaught of economic development and industrialization, and 
the State’s media initiatives to shape the country and the regime’s international 
image. In the first paper of this section, “Three Waves of Nationalism in 
Contemporary China: Sources, Themes, Presentations and Consequences”, 
Yang Lijun and Lim Chee Kia explore the development of Chinese nationalism 
in the contemporary era by placing it in the context of State-society relations, 
its significance and implications being dependent on State-society interaction. 
While recognizing that today’s China is a multifaceted society in terms of 
ideology where different discourses are contesting for influence, Yang and Lim 
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have kept their sharp focus on the country’s nationalism to reveal the dynamics 
of ideational changes in contemporary China in the context of the evolvement 
of State-society relations as well as the implications for international relations. 
Looking at the large-scale social protests or “mass incidents” since the turn 
of this century, the next paper by Yanqi Tong and Shaohua Lei, “Large-Scale 
Mass Incidents and Government Responses in China”, presents a systematic 
analysis of the distribution, frequencies, types, patterns and consequences 
of such large-scale mass incidents in China in recent years. By focusing 
their analysis on “large-scale mass incidents” (i.e. involving more than 500 
participants), Tong and Lei delve further into the causes of the protests and the 
impacts of State response and implications for the State itself as well as State-
society relations. Also focusing on the issue of public protests, Shan Wei in his 
paper, “Explaining Ethnic Protests and Ethnic Policy Changes in China”, turns 
our attention to the protest behaviour of China’s non-Han ethnic minorities, 
focusing specifically on the Xinjiang conflict of July 2009 and the Tibet riots 
of March 2008. Beginning with a discussion of the three theories of political 
contention and collective conflict – greed, grievance and opportunity – as 
applied to the China context, Shan argues that these ethnic riots have stemmed 
from various key factors, including economic inequalities, the lack of religious 
freedom and the incompetence of local governments, and that Beijing’s current 
economy-centred policy adjustments to promote stability in the ethnic regions 
in the aftermath of these riots, while might be promising at the moment, would 
inevitably be facing critical challenges in the long run.
While not completely taking a break from the preceding issues in particular 
those concerning regional ethnic minorities, Gary Sigley and Lye Liang Fook, 
in the next two papers, turn our attention to China’s problem of environmental 
and cultural destruction and the State’s response to the challenges in terms of 
the country’s and ruling regime’s international image. Sigley’s paper, “Cultural 
Heritage Tourism and the Ancient Tea Horse Road of Southwest China”, 
reviews the environmental and cultural destruction brought about by China’s 
modernization and examines the possible role tourism may play in the cultural 
heritage preservation of the particular case of Chama Gudao 茶馬古道 – the 
“Ancient Tea Horse Road” which represents a cultural route of enormous 
significance to the many different ethnic communities in southwest China. 
Rather than the standard form of mass commercial tourism which itself could 
be contributing to such environmental and cultural destruction – the latter 
process often a by-product of modernization which in ethnic minority areas 
the locals tend to refer to as hanhua 漢化 (“becoming Han”) – Sigley argues 
for a model that involves more culturally sensitive forms of community-based 
sustainable tourism, by targeting the four major participants in the production 
and consumption of tourism, i.e. the government, tourism operators and 
developers, local communities and tourists. The issue of cultural heritage is 
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also a major underlying element when Lye argues in his paper “China’s Media 
Initiatives and Its International Image Building” that China’s trying to lay the 
foundations of her soft power, including extending the reach of her Confucius 
Institutes worldwide, forms the context within which the media initiatives the 
ruling regime has undertaken in recent years aiming at improving the country’s 
international image can be best understood. While there has apparently been 
international recognition of improvement, for instance that the Chinese 
government had allowed significantly greater foreign media access to Ürümqi 
following the deadly rioting there in early July 2009 than it had in the case 
of the Lhasa riots in March 2008, Lye observes that it is still premature and 
unrealistic to conclude that the media initiatives have succeeded in portraying 
a positive image of China. Finally, returning to the issues of nationalism, 
social protests and ethnoregionalism touched upon earlier, the closing paper 
of this section, “Ethnoregional Disparity, Ethnoterritoriality and Peripheral 
Nationalism: Socioracial Dilemmas in Contemporary China” by Emile Kok-
Kheng Yeoh, analyzes the involuted nexus between the challenges posed by 
central-peripheral conflicts, ethnoterritorial aspirations, income and wealth 
inequalities and interregional economic disparity exacerbated by the country’s 
“retreat from equality” over the recent decades. While proceeding to ponder the 
pitfalls and prospects of further decentralization and contemplate the feasibility 
of the road beyond fiscal federalism, Yeoh cautions that ethnoregionalization 
of poverty may add to decentralization, especially in the absence of a federal 
process, the threat of centrifugal tendencies especially if decentralization 
leads to a politics of cutthroat competition instead of a decentralized politics 
of accommodation and the resultant provincial protectionism intensifies local 
particularism and peripheral nationalism, hence precipitating secessionistic 
ethnogenesis or reethnicization. This volume ends with two book review 
articles by Gregor Benton and Sabrina Chong Yee Ching. As this is a special 
issue, an index is added to facilitate referencing.
This issue represents a collection of selected papers, reviewed and duly 
revised, among the many that were originally presented at the ICS 2010 
International Conference “China in Transition – Economic Reform and Social 
Change”. I would like to thank Miss Susie Yieng-Ping Ling 林燕萍, editorial 
manager of the journal, for her impeccable administrative help in making 
the publication of this issue on time possible. The cover photograph of this 
issue is one that I took in April 2010 during my stay in Beijing – a street 
scene that I believe could fully reflect the astounding transformation that the 
Chinese society has undergone during the recent decades. I am grateful to Mr 
Lionel Wei-Li Liong 梁偉立, the journal’s editorial assistant, for the technical 
help in using the photograph for cover design and for his great assistance in 
proof-reading the final manuscripts. The responsibility for any errors and 
inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.
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with a PhD from the University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, England (1998), 
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Campus and at the Workplace (2004), Economic Kaleidoscope (2005), China 
and Malaysia in a Globalizing World (2006), Emerging Trading Nation in an 
Integrating World (2007), Facets of a Transforming China (2008), China in the 
World (2008), CJAS Special Issue (26(2)): Transforming China (2008), Regional 
Political Economy of China Ascendant (2009), China-ASEAN Relations (2009), 
Towards Pax Sinica? (2009), IJCS Special Issue (1(1)): Changing China (2010) 
and East Asian Regional Integration (2010). <Email: emileyeo@correo.nu, 
emileyeo@gmail.com>
1.   改革开放政策.
2.   Or more officially, the “Communist Party of China” (CPC).
3.   An important point to note here is that there are crucial socioeconomic reasons 
behind the ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious divides. This is especially the case 
in Brazil and Spanish speaking America where ethnic markers are relatively fluid, 
as reflected in the Brazilian proverb: “A rich black man is a white and a poor 
white man is a black” (Mason, 1970: 122). It is in this light that the attribute 
“ethnic” may not be as exact as “socioracial”, which reflects the concept of 
“social race” (is-à-is “biological race”) expounded by Wagley (1959).
4.   “Mo zhe shitou guo he 摸着石头过河.”
5.   Émile Durkheim (1895; trans. 1938), The Rules of Sociological Method, edited 
with introduction by Steven Lukes, New York: The Free Press, 1982, p. 53.
6.   Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), Émile, ou De l’éducation, translated by Allan 
Bloom with introduction, New York: Basic Books, 1979.
7.   In the case of China, a road not taken two decades ago in 1989.
8.   See Émile Durkheim’s Suicide (1897). A related condition is acedia which 
Thomas Aquinas identified with “the sorrow of the world” (Summa Theologica, 
Secunda Secundae).
9.   Despite rumoured allegation that some cases could be murders linked to the 
factory security office (大纪元时報 (The Epoch Times (Malaysia)), Issue 93, 
June 2010).
10.  东方日报 (Oriental Daily News, Malaysian daily), 21st July 2010 and 6th August 
2010.
11.  Including those that killed 8 and injured 5 in Fujian province, killed 2 and 
injured 5 in Guangxi, injured 19 in Guangdong, injured 32 in Jiangsu, injured 5 
in Shandong and killed 9 in Shaanxi (东方日报, 1st May 2010).
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12.  光华日报 (Kwong Wah Yit Poh, Malaysian Daily), 4th August 2010.
13.  东方日报, 26th June 2010.
14.  东方日报, 9th July 2010.
15.  The “helping hand” and the “grabbing hand” were said to be the same “invisible 
hand on the left” described by Olson (2000). Gu and Chen’s analysis with a 
multiregional econometric model found that “[w]hen local revenue share rises, 
the helping hand of local government becomes stronger and further leads to 
promotion in local economies and subsequently the national economy. When the 
centre increases its revenue share and adopts other recentralization measures, 
local governments become losers and switch from helping to grabbing hand.”
16.  These studies, including Huther and Shah’s, were cited by Tugrul Gurgur and 
Anwar Shah of the World Bank (2000). Gurgur and Shah’s study also confirmed 
that decentralization support greater accountability in the public sector and reduce 
corruption.
17.  Although the scope of China’s economic decentralization goes far beyond 
decentralization in public finance, but even measured solely by the latter, China 
has been said to be the world’s most economically decentralized country (Xu, 
2008: 187-188) given that China’s local public spending has since the mid- 
and late 1980s been steady at about 70 per cent of her total national public 
spending, whereas in federal countries such as the US, Germany and Russia, the 
proportions of local public spending in total national public spending are only 
respectively 46 per cent, 40 per cent and 38 per cent. From the angle of central-
local economic relations, China is also one of the most, or to some, even the most 
economically decentralized countries in the world, with most parts of resources 
controlled by the local governments, including the allocation of land, energy 
and financial resources (ibid.: 187). In fact, one of the characteristics of China’s 
economic decentralization is the relative self-sufficiency of the local economy 
whether at the provincial level or the county level. The local governments are 
fully responsible for the launching and coordination of local reform, for local 
economic development, and for the legislation and law enforcement within their 
respective jurisdictions. Such a characteristic not only marks China’s economic 
institution apart from a central planning economic system, but also makes her 
local governments more powerful in competences than the local governments in 
most federal countries in the world. (ibid.: 188)
18.  Referring to the 22 sheng (i.e. provinces), 5 zizhiqu (i.e. “autonomous regions” 
– each a first-level administrative subdivision having its own local government, 
and a minority entity that has a higher population of a particular minority ethnic 
group – of Guangxi 广西 of the Zhuang, Nei Monggol/Inner Mongolia 内蒙古 
of the Mongols, Ningxia 宁夏 of the Hui, Xizang/Tibet 西藏 of the Tibetans and 
Xinjiang 新疆 of the Uyghurs) and 4 zhixiashi (municipalities under the central 
government) (see Table 2).
19.  The tragedies befalling people who are forced to be relocated are vividly recorded 
in a recent book relating heart-rending tales of people who would not submit to 
the forced relocation to make way for the Shanghai World Expo of 2010 – a dark 
side of the glorious event that involved people being beaten to death, tortured and 
imprisoned (see Du Bin 杜斌 (2010), Shanghai Kulou Di 上海骷髏地/Shanghai 
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Calvary), Taipei: Ming Pao Ch’upanshe 明報出版社 (Ming Pao Press). Also 
little reported is the plight of the 1.27 million people relocated to make way for 
the construction of the Three Gorges Dam, a monstrous project that put under 
water Hubei and Chongqing’s 20 districts and counties, over 270 villages and 
townships, over 1500 enterprises and over 34 million squared metres of houses. 
Like the above case of Shanghai, with low compensation, these “Three Gorges 
migrants” have since been suffering from psychological problems common to 
uprooted people, facing problems of adaptation, often exploited by the local 
authorities and feeling discriminated by the locals, and some migrant villages 
have turned into vice dens. (东方日报, 7th June 2010)
20.  Often translated as “nail house”, dingzihu refers to a household who refuses to 
be relocated to make way for real estate development.
21.  Hu Angang (2006), Great Transformations in China: Challenges and Opportuni-
ties, Oxford University Press, cited in Hutton (2006: 127).
22.  Weiquan refers to the quest for protecting and defending the civil rights of the 
citizenry by non-State actors. Shangfang, a centuries-old tradition in China, 
refers to the action of people with grievances who take the last resort of going 
to Beijing, the capital, to attempt to get their complaints heard against local 
injustice.
23.  东方日报, 18th March 2009.
24.  The term “xiagang” refers to redundant workers mainly at State enterprises, 
without directly describing them as “unemployed”. Still officially attached to their 
work units or enterprises, the xiagang workers continue to receive basic minimum 
subsidies for their living and medical expenses, and are encouraged to change 
job, probably through State-run job and re-employment centres, or go into small 
businesses. In line with State enterprise reforms, the number of xiagang workers 
has been on the rise: 4 million in 1995, 8 million in 1996, 12 million in 1997, 
16 million in 1998, 20 million in 1999, though dropping to 11 million in 2001. 
(Zhou, 2006: 289)
25.  Such as the bloody Han-Hui ethnic conflicts in 2004 and 2007.
26.  东方日报, 23rd March 2009.
27.  Cited in Hutton (2006: 126).
28.  See, for instance, Professor Lü Yuanli 吕元礼’s best-selling Chinese tome “Why 
Can Singapore Do It?” (2007).
29.  Ultimately, as Fang (1991: 254-255) warned, “There is no rational basis for a 
belief that this kind of dictatorship can overcome the corruption that it itself 
has bred. Based on this problem alone, we need more effective means of public 
supervision and a more independent judiciary. This means, in effect, more 
democracy.” (“China’s Despair and China’s Hope”, originally appeared in The 
New York Reiew of Books on 2nd February 1989, translated by Perry Link.) 
Describing China as “doubtless a post-totalitarian regime ruled by a ruthless 
Party”, Béja (2009: 14-15) ruminated on the 20th anniversary of the Beijing-
Tiananmen massacre: “Twenty years after the 4 June 1989 massacre, the CCP 
seems to have reinforced its legitimacy. It has not followed the communist 
regimes of the Soviet bloc into oblivion. Its policies of elite cooptation, subtle 
response to social contradictions, and instrumental support for the ‘rule of law’ 
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have become major complements to its continued control over the press and the 
political system. It has made concessions to prevent discontent from crystallizing 
into social movements that might challenge its rule, and it has sent in the police 
to silence dissidents. Over the course of the same two decades, the opposition has 
had to wrestle with the trauma of the June 4 Massacre and the huge difficulties 
that it has raised for anyone who would challenge the CCP’s primacy.”
30.  See, e.g. Bo (2010). In an interesting attempt at refutation of Minxin Pei’s 
(2006) claim of CCP’s illegitimacy, Bo has set out to refute point by point Pei’s 
arguments which were based upon a series of international indexes which the 
former listed in details: “China is one of the most authoritarian political systems 
in the world according to the Polity IV Project, is almost completely ‘unfree’ 
according to the Freedom House; and is one of the most corrupt countries 
according to Transparency International. China was ranked in the bottom third 
of the eighty countries surveyed in terms of ‘quality of governance ranking’ 
according to one group of the World Bank and was considered a weak state 
according to another group of the World Bank. China found itself next to the 
legion of failed states and most repressive countries in terms of ‘voice and 
accountability’ and also in the company of weak states such as Nicaragua, 
Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Egypt, and Mali in terms of ‘regulatory quality’. 
China was no better than Namibia, Croatia, Kuwait, and Mexico in terms of 
‘government effectiveness’, was comparable to Belarus, Mexico, Tunisia, 
and Cuba in terms of ‘political stability’, and was in the company of Mexico, 
Madagascar, and Lebanon in terms of ‘rule of law’.” (Bo, 2010: 102-103, citing 
Pei, 2006: 5-6)
31.  According to a report published on China’s National Bureau of Statistics website 
on 14th January 2009, the confirmed 2007 GDP of China at current prices 
amounted to 25.7306 trillion yuan, an increase of 13 per cent from the previous 
year (东方日报, 16th January 2009). While observed to be still short of a third 
of US’s GDP, analysts had predicted China’s GDP to overtake Japan’s in three 
to four years, just as it overtook the United Kingdom and France in 2005 and 
Germany in 2008. Nevertheless, according to an announcement by Yi Gang 易
纲, the director of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange and the deputy 
governor of China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, on 30th July 
2010, China had already superseded Japan to become the world’s second largest 
economy in 2010. However, in terms of GDP per capita, Japan’s (US$37800) was 
more than 10 times that of China (US$3600) in year 2009, and Japan’s GDP per 
capita ranking, while having dropped from world’s number 2 in 1993 to number 
23 by 2008, was still far ahead of China’s which ranked beyond 100 (东方日报, 
9th August 2010).
32.  Equivalent to about 2130 ringgit. “Yuan 元” is the largest denomination of 
China’s currency “renminbi 人民币” (“people’s currency”, RMB), equivalent to 
about US$0.146.
33.  Equivalent to about 70 ringgit.
34.  东方日报, 7th December 2008.
35.  China’s 2008 definition for absolute poverty is annual net income per capita 
under US$785 (about 2860 ringgit), that for low income is US$786 to US$1067 
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(about 2853 ringgit to 3873 ringgit) – which is lower than that used by the World 
Bank (ibid.).
36.  世界日報 (World Journal) (US), editorial on 15th March 2009, reprinted in 东
方日报, 17th July 2009.
37.  东方日报, 17th February 2009 and 29th June 2009. The largest denomination 
of China’s renminbi 人民币 is yuan 元 / 圆 (Latinized symbol ¥ or Ұ), a term 
with cognates in the Japanese yen or en 円 (from 圓; Latinized symbol ¥) and 
Korean wŏn 원 / 圓 (Latinized symbol ₩). Following the US (rather than British) 
convention, billion = 1000,000,000 and trillion = 1000,000,000,000.
38.  东方日报, 23rd June 2009.
39.  东方日报, 29th June 2009.
40.  东方日报, 29th June 2009.
41.  Nongye renkou quan 农业人口圈, chengzhen jumin quan 城镇居民圈, gongren 
quan 工人圈, ganbu quan 干部圈.
42.  Xingzheng jibie 行政级别.
43.  Totaled about 130 million, China’s nongmingong have today turned into a unique 
community of breathtaking proportions. With a high degree of mobility, the over 
a hundred million people shuttling on the railways and roadways of China every 
year during the Spring Festival (chunjie 春节 – Chinese New Year) have become 
a unique phenomenon in the world (东方日报, 30th March 2009).
44.  The term “State” with a capital “S” is used in this chapter (except in some 
quotations) to refer to the central body politic of a civil government – in con-
trast with the private citizenry or a rival authority such as the Church, whereas 
“state” with a lower-case “s” refers in general to other senses of the term, 
including a “country” or a political territory forming part of a country. The 
word “nation” in this sense is generally avoided since it has the alternative 
connotation of a community of common ethnic identity, but not necessarily 
constituting a state.
45.  As Beard (1948: 220-2) noted: “[…] many of our neglects, overstresses, and 
simplifications are due to the divorce of political science from history […] if 
political science, economics, law and sociology were cut entirely loose from 
history, they would become theoretical, superficial, and speculative, or what 
might be worse, merely ‘practical’, that is, subservient to vested interests and 
politicians temporarily in power.”
46.  For instance, the “critical structural period”, when definitive State response to 
exigencies generated by a country’s ethnic diversity, came in the year 1970 both 
in Malaysia (the implementation of NEP) and in Belgium (beginning of the fed-
eralization process), and at the end of the 1970s in Spain (the 1978 Constitution 
that saw the emergence of the Autonomous Communities, and the approval of 
the Statutes of Autonomy for all of these Communities from 1979 to 1983).
47.  The Wade-Giles transliteration, the scheme commonly used before CCP’s 
popularization of Hanyu Pinyin, in brackets. Note Wade-Giles’s use of apostrophe 
– accurate though slightly clumsy – to indicate aspiration.
48.  With the creation of the keywords of reform including “loosen”, “devolve”, “share 
profit”, “reinvigorate” (songbang 鬆綁, fangquan 放權, rangli 讓利, gaohuo 搞
活) etc.
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49.  东方日报, 3rd June 2009.
50.  Hutton’s figures, drawn from Zhang, Nathan and Link (2001), were those of 
the General Office of the State Council reported to the Committee of Elders. 
Hutton also cited the estimates of Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, Beijing 
correspondents of the New York Times, that up to 800 unarmed people were killed 
and several thousands injured (Kristof and WuDunn, 1994, cited in Hutton, 2006: 
364).
51.  The structure of political party systems and more specifically their level of 
internal centralization have been argued to be the determinants of the fiscal 
structure of the State, i.e. the degree of decentralization, in the studies on 
decentralization as a means for democratizing political regimes and enhancing the 
efficiency of public policy, its implications for service delivery and democracy, 
and the political determinants of the process of devolving resources and policy 
responsibilities to subnational governments (Montero, 2001: 43). In her paper 
on the case of Latin America, Escobar-Lemmon (2001: 28) noted that at least 
there “the process of decentralization has come about in parallel to the process 
of democratization” and the “rationale is that strong subnational power centers 
will check the national government, consequently preventing the re-emergence of 
a strong, authoritarian leader nationally.” Thus, according to Escobar-Lemmon, 
“decentralization becomes a way to avoid political crises and/or democratic 
breakdown. Given that political decentralization could increase opportunities 
for democratic participation, there is reason to believe that there is a systematic 
relationship between decentralization and democratization.” Elaborating on his 
second fundamental characteristic of a federal system – democratic pluralism both 
between and within the territorial components – Duchacek (1988: 16-17) drew 
attention to federalism being a territorial twin of the open democratic society: 
“Federalism is not compatible with authoritarian socialist and fascist one-party 
systems and military juntas. If a single party delegates some minor parts of 
its central power to the territorial components in which single-party rule also 
prevails, the result is a unitary and centralist system or, at best, an association 
or league of territorial dictatorships […] a spatially sectorized unitary system 
or a confederation of […] single-party territorial components […] a territorial 
dimension of Lenin’s “democratic centralism” – inter-territorial and inter-factional 
consociationalism of a special kind, but not a federal democracy.”
52.  In his letter to the 15th Party Congress in 1997 during his house arrest, Zhao 
(2009: 79) lamented the halting of the political reform he initiated, “Because of 
the impact of the [Tiananmen] incident, the political reform initiated by the 13th 
Party Congress died young and in midstream, leaving the reform of the political 
system lagging seriously behind. As a result of this serious situation, while our 
country’s economic reform has made substantial progress, all sorts of social 
defects have emerged and developed and are rapidly spreading. Social conflicts 
have worsened, and corruption within and outside of the Party is proliferating 
and has become unstoppable.”
53.  The 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations being the first uprising in a whole series 
of similar events that led to the demise of authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe 
countries and Mongolia, the fact that most of these countries were Soviet satellite 
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states with Communist Party rule virtually planted by the USSR rather the result 
of in the main part homegrown – though foreign inspired – mass revolutionary 
movement, and that their 1989-1990 protest movements came after the shocking 
Beijing-Tiananmen massacre all apparently played their roles in the diverse State 
response between China and these states, perhaps with the exception of Romania 
which took a popularly supported palace and army coop to overthrow the hated 
Communist dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu.
54.  Spontaneous as the 1989 Tiananmen protests, the “demonstrations that erupted 
on 4th May 1919 developed into a loose nationalist political movement that was 
one of the antecedents of the Communist Party’s own official foundation in 1921” 
(Hutton, 2006: 7).
55.  In principle, i.e. irrespective of whether a country’s government is democratic, 
despotic like Burma, totalitarian like North Korea, or even genocidal like 
Sudan, the former Democratic Kampuchea or the murderous Serbian militia in a 
disintegrating Yugoslavia.
56.  While still rudimentary, the rehabilitation and other de facto de-Mao programmes, 
or even the liquidation of the research office of the central Secretariat, and the 
closing down of left-wing magazines such as Red Flag, led the way to further 
internal structural reform of the CCP in coming days (MacFarquhar, 2009: xxi).
57.  How effective are such elections as a means for rural governance democratization? 
Ann Thurston, who has followed such village elections since 1994, drew the 
following rather mixed conclusions (see Ann Thurston, “Village Democracy 
in China” <http://www.chinaelections.org>, cited in Yu, 2004): “First, the local 
emperors who came to power with the collapse of the communes still exist in 
some places. Usually they are able to exert control because they are also very 
rich, are in control of much a [sic] of a village’s resources, and are able to 
influence higher levels in the government and party hierarchies. Second, many 
villages continue to exist in a vacuum of leadership. When, for instances, I have 
had the opportunity to visit Chinese villages with friends rather than through 
official sponsorship, it seems I invariably happen upon villages which are 
suffering crises of leadership, villages where elections, if they have been held at 
all are only pro forma, and the village leader is generally weak and ineffectual. 
Third, I have seen cases, too, where they local emperors are actually elected, 
ostensibly democratically. These are instances, for instance, where the second 
candidate seems to have been put there only for the sake of complying with 
election regulations and where the village chief who is running for re-election 
also controls a major portion of the village resources … Finally, and most 
important, I have also seen elections that by any measure anywhere in the world 
would be recognized as genuinely competitive, fair and democratic …”
58.  “Hong Kong Reporter Being Held By China”, Washington Post Foreign 
Service, 30th May 2005. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/05/29/AR2005052900986.html>
59.  东方日报, 14th February 2009.
60.  Seven being the worst rating and 6 next to worst, thus making her one of the 19 
“worst of the worst” countries in terms of political rights and civil liberties (Pud-
dington, 2010: 5), just marginally better than Burma, North Korea, Sudan, Libya, 
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Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and Somalia that were all 
rated 7 on both political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2010).
61.  Cited in Diamond (2002: 24).
62.  Cited from 邓小平文选, 1993 ed., Vol. 3, 人民出版社, pp. 220-221.
63.  Besides his declaration that China is at the “initial stage of socialism” which 
served to clear the way for further market transformations. See “A Brief 
Biography of Zhao Ziyang”, in Zhao (2009: 283-287).
64.  The most successful among the 12 counties (cities, districts) in the provinces of 
Zhejiang, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Hebei, and Hunan that the Central Organization 
Department chose to conduct the first round of experiments on the “permanent 
party congress system” (Bo, 2009: 13).
65.  “In developing our democracy, we cannot simply copy bourgeois democracy, or 
introduce the system of a balance of three powers. I have often criticized people 
in power in the United States, saying that actually they have three governments 
[…] when it comes to internal affairs, the three branches often pull in different 
directions, and that makes trouble. We cannot adopt such a system.” – Deng 
Xiaoping, “Take a Clear-Cut Stand against Bourgeois Liberalization”, 30th 
December 1986. <http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/ol3/text/c1630.
html>
66.  The current administration of President Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 and Premier Wen 
Jiabao 温家宝.
67.  See, for instance, Bo (2009: 16).
68.  Dissident Xie Changfa 谢长发 was sentenced to 13-year imprisonment for his 
involvement in organizing the China Democracy Party since 1998. His conviction 
followed those of the civil rights activists Huang Qi 黄琦, Tan Zuoren 谭作人 
and Guo Quan 郭泉, who voiced out on the alleged school building construction 
scandal following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake that resulted in huge number 
of student casualties due to the collapse of school buildings (东方日报, 3rd 
September 2009). The epitome of the prisoners of conscience at the moment is of 
course Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波, the key founder of “Charter 08” (Ling-ba Xianzhang 
零八宪章), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 8th October 2010, in a 
year with a large number of the nominees for the prize being persecuted Chinese 
dissidents and civil rights activists including prominent figures like Wei Jingsheng 
魏京生, Gao Zhisheng 高智晟, Chen Guangcheng 陈光诚 and Hu Jia 胡佳.
69.  State Council Information Office, “White Paper on Building of Political 
Democracy in China”, 19th October 2005 <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/
doc/2005-10/19/content_486206.htm>, cited in Minzner (2006: 9-10).
70.  东方日报, 27th August 2010, 6th September 2010.
71.  东方日报, 6th September 2010, 7th September 2010. Old ways die hard, 
anyway – while Wen calls for Shenzhen’s political reform, the city has declared 
a list of personae non gratae consisting of shangfang petitioners, political 
dissidents, released labour camp inmates, troublemakers who frequently “make 
things difficult” for the government, dingzihu in relocation disputes, falungong 
followers, as well as drug addicts (东方日报, 6th September 2010).
72.  See, e.g., Hutton (2006: 8, 98, 144-148).
73.  In the context of modern multiethnic societies, particularly those with an 
economy dominated by the minority, members of the demographically/politically 
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dominant group are often willing to grant greater autonomy to a State (and its 
élite managers), which implements preferential policies in their favour.
74.  “The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them 
from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another […] is, to confer 
all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that 
may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will […] This is the 
generation of that great Leviathan […]”, said Thomas Hobbes in Leiathan 
(1651).
75.  Cited in Lin (2009: 351).
76.  For such institutionalized relationship between the central State and the localities, 
see Zheng (1999).
77.  See Xu (2008).
78.  See note 31.
79.  In a way analogous to the French Revolution being hijacked by Maximilien 
Robespierre’s Reign of Terror. Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s socialism was but one of the twin 
manifestations of the May Fourth spirit, the other being liberalism represented by 
Hu Shih 胡適.
80.  See note 7.
81.  Jules Destrée, the Belgian politician at the turn of the century, once remarked 
to King Albert: “Let me tell you the truth, the great and horrifying truth: there 
are no Belgians.” (“Laissez-moi vous dire la vérité, la grande et horrifiante 
vérité: il n’y a pas de Belges”, Jules Destrée, Lettre au Roi sur la séparation de 
la Wallonie et de la Flandre, 15 août 1912, cited in Quévit, 1982: 71.) Doubts 
about the existence of a Belgian identity (belgitude) above those of the Flemings 
(Vlamingen) and Walloons (Wallons) have dominated much of modern Belgian 
history. The earliest use of the term “belgitude” can be traced to Brugmans 
(1980), cited in Dumont (1989). Although Brugmans’s article is written in 
Dutch, he has coined the term in French. “Belgitude”, according to Brugmans, 
is “a shared sense of belonging as Belgians (een Belgische samenhorigheid), 
a Belgian mentality” (see Dumont, ibid.: 16). Can we talk about a sinitude for 
China and what would that mean from the perspective of the country’s non-Han 
nationalities?
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Abstract 
While Chinese economic reform in the recent decades has brought about 
stunning economic miracles, it also aggravated the problems of unemploy-
ment, poverty and inequality that continue to plague China in her politico-
socioeconomic development into the new millennium, and with poverty 
having the properties of being concentrated in the western region and in the 
ethnic minority areas, ethnoregionalization of poverty inevitably ensues, 
presenting the country not only with economic challenges but also long-term 
sociopolitical uncertainties. Focusing on the involuted nexus between the 
challenges posed by central-peripheral conflicts, ethnoterritorial aspirations, 
income and wealth inequalities and interregional economic disparity exacer-
bated by the country’s “retreat from equality” over the recent decades, the 
revival of old regionalisms, the creation of new regionalisms brought about 
by increased local autonomy, as well as the evolving role of the one-party 
State in the economy and society, this paper proceeds to ponder the pitfalls 
and prospects of further decentralization and contemplates the feasibility of 
the road beyond fiscal federalism. While the alleviation of the multi-faceted 
problem of poverty in China is inevitably linked to the country’s regional and 
minority policies and hence may call for a stronger emphasis on the elements 
of decentralization and localization, the paper does caution that the same 
problem with its ethnoregional dimension may also add to decentralization the 
threat of centrifugal tendencies especially if decentralization leads to a politics 
of cutthroat competition instead of a decentralized politics of accommodation 
and the resultant provincial protectionism intensifies local particularism and 
precipitates secessionistic ethnogenesis or reethnicization.
Keywords: ethnic diersity, ethnoterritoriality, national question, peripheral 
nationalism, ethnoregionalism, intergroup relations
IJCS 1-2 combined PDF 25-10-10.i569   569 10/25/2010   1:08:04 AM
570      Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh  
1. Introduction
In terms of the link between ethnic diversity and public policy, the outwardly 
homogeneous China shares with a country like multiethnic Spain in their 
common majority-minority ethnic configuration, as compared to, say, countries 
like the mainly bi-ethnic Belgium and Malaysia which are characterized by 
a “precarious balance” in intergroup relationship1. While the development of 
the Spanish political reform is influenced by the dominant group’s reaction 
to subordinate groups’ aspirations and that of Belgium or Malaysia is shaped 
more by intergroup competition and variations in the balance of power, China 
is unique due to her long-running absolute Han predominance in demography 
and political configuration, with her minority ethnic groups – while large 
in absolute numbers – as a whole not even reaching a critical mass as a 
proportion of the country’s total population. Yet multiethnic countries like 
Spain and China share much in terms of the territoriality of their ethnic 
divisions, homeland nature of all the major ethnic factions, though not level 
of economic affluence and political democracy and any common strategy 
of adopting some form of political decentralization and fiscal federalism 
during the last few decades in response to the exigencies engendered by their 
respective patterns of ethnic conflicts.
2. Ethnic Identity and the Nationality Question
The fact that China is technically speaking, if one follows the critical mass 
approach2, not a multiethnic country, with the majority Han constituting 92 
per cent of the population, often obscures the fact that the ethnic minorities 
are huge in absolute numbers – about 110 million in total, including the 
16 million Zhuang, 10 million Manchu, 9 million Hui, 8 million Uygurs, 
5 million Mongols and 5 million Tibetans – although they are practically 
dwarfed almost to invisibility by the sheer size of the Han population. 
Although the race-neutral3 policy of the Chinese State does contain certain 
elements of affirmative action in favour of the minorities, poverty is still 
highly concentrated in the ethnic minority areas4 and ethnic regions in western 
China are clearly disadvantaged for both historical (being marginalized by 
centuries of Han-Chinese imperial expansion5) and geographical (e.g. terrains 
which are mountainous, desertified, environmentally fragile) reasons. Despite 
that, these ethnic minorities’ pattern of habitation should no doubt be of 
strategic concern for the central government, for the country’s over 21000 
km land frontier borderline region is basically populated with these minorities 
who are also distributed over 64 per cent of the whole country (Chen, 
Wang, Chen and Fang, 2007: 61). In general, China’s ethnic distribution 
simultaneously shows patterns of concentration as well as intermingling. 
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Table 1 China: Ethnic Composition – The National Picture (percentage)
 1 Han 汉 92 29 Tu 土 0.017
 2 Zhuang 壮 1 30 Xibe (Xibo) 锡伯 0.015
 3 Manchu (Man) 满 0.9 31 Mulam (Mulao) 仫佬 0.014
 4 Hui 回 0.8 32 Kirghiz (Kirgiz) 柯尔克孜 0.013
 5 Miao 苗 0.7 33 Daur (Tahur) 达斡尔 0.0108
 6 Uyghur (Uygur) 维吾尔 0.63 34 Jingpho (Jingpo) 景颇 0.0106
 7 Yi 彝 0.58 35 Salar (Sala) 撒拉 0.0077
 8 Tujia 土家 0.51 36 Blang (Bulang) 布朗 0.0073
 9 Mongol 蒙古 0.43 37 Maonan 毛南 0.006
 10 Phöpa (Zang/Tibetan) 藏  0.41 38 Tajik 塔吉克 0.0029
 11 Bouyei (Buyi) 布依 0.23 39 Pumi 普米 0.0026
 12 Dong 侗 0.22 40 Achang 阿昌 0.0025
13 Yao 瑶 0.19 41 Nu 怒 0.0024
14 Chosŏn (Korean) 朝鲜 0.17 42 Evenki (Ewenki) 鄂温克 0.0023
15 Bai 白 0.14 43 Kinh (Vietnamese) 京 0.0017
16 Hani 哈尼 0.11 44 Jinuo (Jino) 基诺 0.0016
17 Li 黎 0.0985 45 De’ang 德昂 0.0014
18 Kazakh (Kazak) 哈萨克 0.0983 46 Uzbek (Ozbek) 乌孜别克 0.0013
19 Dai 傣 0.091 47 Russki (Russian) 俄罗斯 0.0012
20 She 畲 0.06 48 Yugur (Yugu) 裕固 0.00109
21 Lisu 傈僳 0.05 49 Bonan (Bao’an) 保安 0.00103
22 Gelao (Gelo) 仡佬 0.039 50 Oroqen (Olunchun) 鄂伦春 0.00062
23 Lahu 拉祜 0.036 51 Moinba (Menba) 门巴  0.00066
24 Dongxiang 东乡 0.033 52 Drung (Dulong) 独龙 0.00052
25 Wa (Va) 佤 0.0312 53 Tatar (Tartar) 塔塔尔 0.00045
26 Sui (Shui) 水 0.0307 54 Hezhen (Hezhe) 赫哲 0.00038
27 Nakhi (Naxi) 纳西  0.025 55 Gaoshan 高山 0.00025
28 Qiang 羌 0.018 56 Luoba (Lhoba) 珞巴 0.00021
Source: Computed with census data.
There is wide geographical distribution of each ethnic group, showing a 
pattern of wide scattering with small concentrations – the Hui, for instance, 
who are distributed across most provinces/zizhiqu and most cities, towns 
and counties of the country, relatively more so in Ningxia, Gansu, Henan, 
Xinjiang, Qinghai, Yunnan, Shandong, Anhui and Liaoning, but with a sixth of 
the total population concentrated in the Ningxia Hui Zizhiqu; or the Manchu 
who are distributed among over a thousand cities, towns and counties across 
the country, but with relative concentration in the Northeast and with over 
50 per cent of the total population inhabiting the Liaoning province, over 
2.11 million in Hebei, 1.03 million in Heilongjiang and 0.99 million in Jilin; 
or the Zhuang with 87 per cent of the total population of over 16.17 million 
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Table 2 China: Ethnic Distribution# by Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi+
  Proince/zizhiqu/zhixiashi Ethnic distribution
 1 Qinghai* Han 汉 54%; Tibetan 藏 23%; Hui 回 
16%; Tu 土 4%; Salar (Sala) 撒拉 2%; 
Mongol 蒙古 2%
 2 Xinjiang* (Uygur Zizhiqu) Uyghur (Uygur) 维吾尔 45%; Han 
41%; Kazakh (Kazak) 哈萨克 7%; 
Hui 5%; Khalkh 1%; Mongol 1%
 3 Guangxi* (Zhuang Zizhiqu) Han 62%; Zhuang 壮 32%; Yao 瑶 3%; 
Miao 苗 1%; Dong 侗 1%
 4 Guizhou* Han 63%; Miao 12%; Bouyei (Buyi) 
布依 8%; Dong 5%; Tujia 土家 4%; 
Yi 彝 2%; Gelao (Gelo) 仡佬 2%; Sui 
(Shui) 水 1%; Bai 白 1%
 5 Yunnan* Han 67%; Yi 11%; Bai 4%; Hani 哈
尼 3%; Dai 傣 3%; Zhuang 3%; Miao 
2%; Hui 2%; Lisu 傈僳 1%; Lahu 拉
祜 1%; Wa (Va) 佤 1%; Nakhi (Naxi) 
纳西 1%
 6 Ningxia* (Hui Zizhiqu) Han 65%; Hui 34%
 7 Inner Mongolia* (Mongol Zizhiqu) Han 79%; Mongol 17%; Manchu (Man) 
满 2%; Hui 1%
 8 Hainan Han 83%; Li 黎  16%; Miao 1%; 
Zhuang 1%
 9 Liaoning Han 84%; Manchu 13%; Mongol 2%; 
Hui 1%; Chosŏn (Korean) 朝鲜 1%
 10 Hunan Han 90%; Tujia 4%; Miao 3%; Dong 
1%; Yao 1%
 11 Jilin Han 91%; Korean 4%; Manchu 4%; 
Mongol 1%
 12 Gansu* Han 91%; Hui 5%; Tibetan 2%; 
Dongxiang 东乡 1%
 13 Xizang/Tibet* (Tibetan Zizhiqu) Tibetan 93%; Han 6%
 14 Chongqing* (Zhixiashi) Han 94%; Tujia 5%; Miao 2%
 15 Sichuan* Han 95%; Yi 3%; Tibetan 2%
 16 Heilongjiang Han 95%; Manchu 3%; Korean 1%
 17 Hubei Han 96%; Tujia 4%
 18 Hebei Han 96%; Manchu 3%; Hui 1%
 19 Beijing (Zhixiashi) Han 96%; Hui 2%; Manchu 2%
 20 Tianjin (Zhixiashi) Han 97%; Hui 2%; Manchu 1%
 21 Fujian Han 98%; She 畲 1%
 22 Guangdong Han 99%; Zhuang 1%
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concentrated in Guangxi Zhuang Zizhiqu and the rest distributed in the 
adjacent areas of Yunnan and Guizhou; or the Dong who are concentrated in 
the adjacent areas of Hunan, Guizhou and Guangxi; or the Miao with half of 
the total population of 8.9 million inhabiting Guizhou and the rest distributed 
among the province’s surrounding areas in Yunnan, Guangxi, Hubei, Hunan, 
Chongqing and Sichuan; or the Yi who mainly populate Yunnan and Sichuan, 
but also Guizhou (ibid.).
A distinctive feature of the distribution of China’s ethnic minority 
communities is that they are mainly found in the mountain areas. Other than 
some minorities like the Manchu and the Hui who traditionally stay on the 
plains and in the cities, the majority of China’s ethnic minorities are staying on 
the plateaux and in the remote mountain areas, and out of the total of 106.43 
million ethnic minority population (8.41 per cent of China’s total population), 
over 50 per cent are staying in the country’s mountainous southwestern 
and northwestern regions (ibid.: 62). Besides, there is an apparent ethnic 
distribution by degree of elevation. Take the southwestern mountain area as 
an example (ibid.: 45): the Han are mainly living on the plains and in the hilly 
areas of an elevation of 400-700 metres, Tujia and Miao at 400-1000 metres, 
Dai and Bouyei (Buyi) at 700-1500 metres, Yi, Qiang, Nakhi (Naxi) and Lisu 
at 1500-2500 metres, and Tibetans at 3000-4500 metres (Figure 1).
Table 2 (continued)
  Proince/zizhiqu/zhixiashi Ethnic distribution 
23 Henan Han 99%; Hui 1%
 24 Zhejiang Han 99%
 25 Shandong Han 99%; Hui 1%
 26 Anhui Han 99%; Hui 1%
 27 Shanghai (Zhixiashi) Han 99%
 28 Shaanxi* Han 100%
 29 Jiangsu Han 100%
 30 Shanxi Han 100%
 31 Jiangxi Han 100%
#  China as a whole – Han 92% + 55 other “nationalities” (minzu 民族) including 
Zhuang 1%, Manchu 0.9%, Hui 0.8%, Miao 0.7%, Uygur 0.68%, Tujia 0.65%, 
Yi 0.63%, Mongol 0.47%, Tibetan 0.44%, etc.
+  Decimals are rounded to the nearest. Ethnic groups below 1 per cent are not 
shown.
*  Provinces, zizhiqu, and zhixiashi now classified as the “western region”.
Source: Computed with census data.
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As noted by Gladney (1991: 6-7), due to the interchangeability of the 
terms “ethnicity” and “nationality” in the literature, there is much confusion 
over minority nationality identity in China. The term minzu 民族 is used 
for both concepts of nationality and ethnicity (or zhongzu 种族) in China, 
the former being what the Chinese State has designated “56 nationalities”. 
While “ethnicity” should more rightly refer to an individual’s self-perceived 
identity, it is also often influenced by State policy. Gladney pointed out that 
in contrast to the limited term minzu (“nationality”/“ethnicity”) used in China, 
Soviet ethnological vocabulary distinguished in Russian between ethnos, 
nationalnost, and narodnost (“ethnicity”, “nationality”, “peoplehood”) (ibid.: 
Chapter 1, note 19). In China, “nationality” (minzu) is what the Chinese State 
has conferred upon the 56 ethnic groups identified mainly in the 1950s (ibid.: 
6). This historical background explains a lot about China’s “national” policy 
till today. 
Leaving aside the Han-non-Han dichotomy, even the so-called “Han 
Chinese“ as a homogeneous ethnic group, whether phenotypically or 
culturally, may not be what it has always been taken for granted. The great 
diversity of the mutually unintelligible regionalects is well known. The 
speakers of many of the Chinese regional languages are in fact simply 
Figure 1 China: Vertical Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southwestern 
 Mountain Region
Source: Chen, Wang, Chen and Fang (2007: 45).
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too numerous for the word “dialects” to be used as an appropriate term to 
designate their languages. For instance, the number of speakers of either 
Cantonese/Yue 粤 or Hokkien/Fujianese/Min 閩 is larger than the number 
of speakers of either Polish or Ukrainian, the two East European/Slavonic 
languages with most numerous speakers except Russian, or the speakers 
of Dutch, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish combined. In China, regional 
differences, including the distinction between the wheat-eating northerners 
and rice-eating southerners, have always been observed, or as one observer 
noted, the Hanjen 漢人 and the T’angjen 唐人, plus “national minorities” who 
have to different extents been Sinicized:
The contradistinction between Han Chinese and national minorities 
repeatedly made […] suggests that the Han Chinese constitute a 
homogeneous, discreet community from whom the national minorities are 
readily distinguishable. In fact, however, the cultural gap between “Han 
Chinese” and “minority” is often no greater than that between Han Chinese 
of different regions. There is an almost continuous ethnocultural spectrum 
extending from the northern, wheat-eating, Mandarin-speaking Chinese 
at one end to, at the other, the dark-skinned K’awa in the south who are 
primitive food-gatherers and speakers of a language of the Mon-Khmer 
family. In between are the more than 100 million “Han” Chinese of south-
coastal China who speak dialects other than Mandarin and who, in fact, 
sometimes refer to themselves as T’ang-jen (men of T’ang, after the T’ang 
dynasty, seventh to tenth centuries) rather than as Han-jen (after the Han 
dynasty, third century B.C. to third century A.D.) and the more than ten 
million persons of the “national minorities” in south China who have been 
to varying extents acculturated to Chinese ways – to the point, in some cases, 
that they had no awareness of being different, of being a “minority,” until 
they were informed of the fact by workers from the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences who came to their areas after 1949.
 (Moseley, 1966: 8-9)
While ethnic diversity may affect the role of the State, whether in terms 
of the various aspects of decentralization or the trend and pattern of budgetary 
policy, it is not the ethnic composition per se but its interaction with the 
socioeconomic structure of the society concerned that really matters. The 
Weberian approach views ethnic group as being not “natural” (as kinship 
group is) but “rational” and primarily political:
Ethnic membership (Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group precisely 
by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like 
the latter. In our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it 
only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political 
sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter 
how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity.
(Weber, 1968 tr.6: 389) 
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Contrast the Weberian approach with Geertz’s approach in his 1963 paper on 
the effect of “primordial sentiments” on civil politics:
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the “givens” 
– or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, 
the assumed “givens” – of social existence: immediate contiguity and 
kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from 
being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular 
language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social 
practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen 
to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of  
themselves. 
(Geertz, 1963: 109)
Today, studies on intergroup relations usually see ethnicity not as a 
“‘given’ of social existence”, but a political construct linked directly to 
power relations and resource competition. The boundary marker of ethnicity 
is frequently mobilized to meet the rising need of identity investment for 
economic and political purposes (the “situation theories” of ethnicity, see 
Barth, 1969). Heiberg (1979) observed that for political purposes, descent 
has never been regarded by the Basques in Spain as a sufficient criterion 
for ethnic inclusion. “Basqueness” is measured instead in terms of the 
adherence to certain morally-loaded political and social prescriptions, or more 
specifically, whether one is a Basque nationalist.7 Thus it is as an instrument 
for political mobilization that ethnicity often plays a key role in the interplay 
between group activities and public policy8 which again is apparent in the 
case of the Uyghurs’ ethnic identity in Xinjiang, as lucidly described by 
Gladney (2003: 3-4):
Chinese histories notwithstanding, every Uyghur firmly believes that 
their ancestors were the indigenous people of the Tarim basin, which did 
not become known in Chinese as “Xinjiang” (“new dominion”) until the 
eighteenth century. Nevertheless, the identity of the present people known 
as Uyghur is a rather recent phenomenon related to Great Game rivalries, 
Sino-Soviet geopolitical manoeuvrings, and Chinese nation-building. While 
a collection of nomadic steppe peoples known as the “Uyghur” have existed 
since before the eighth century, this identity was lost from the fifteenth 
to the twentieth century […] The Islamicization of the Uyghur from the 
tenth to as late as the seventeenth century, while displacing their Buddhist 
religion, did little to bridge their oases-based loyalties. From that time 
on, the people of “Uyghuristan” centred in Turpan, who resisted Islamic 
conversion until the seventeenth century, were the last to be known as 
Uyghur. The others were known only by their oasis or by the generic term 
of “Turki”. With the arrival of Islam, the ethnonym “Uyghur” fades from 
the historical record.
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The emergence of a modern “Uyghur” ethnic identity is thus basically a 
political construct:
Competition for the loyalties of the peoples of the oases in the Great Game 
played between China, Russia and Britain further contributed to divisions 
among the Uyghur according to political, religious, and military lines. 
The peoples of the oases, until the challenge of nation-state incorporation, 
lacked any coherent sense of identity. Thus, the incorporation of Xinjiang 
for the first time into a nation-state required unprecedented delineation of 
the so-called nations involved. The re-emergence of the label “Uyghur”, 
though arguably inappropriate as it was last used 500 years previously to 
describe the largely Buddhist population of the Turfan Basin, stuck as the 
appellation for the settled Turkish-speaking Muslim oasis dwellers. It has 
never been disputed by the people themselves or the states involved. There 
is too much at stake for the people labelled as such to wish to challenge that 
identification. For Uyghur nationalists today, the direct lineal descent from 
the Uyghur Kingdom in seventh century Mongolia is accepted as fact, despite 
overwhelming historical and archeological evidence to the contrary.
(Gladney, 2003: 4-5)
Similarly, answering the question “Who are the Chinese?”, Moseley observed 
that “Han Chinese” as an ethnic marker began with its use for political 
mobilization linked to the May Fourth Movement:
Psychologically, the Han Chinese only became a nation in response to 
Western imperialism; culturally, this movement was greatly reinforced by 
the literary reform movement led by Hu Shih and others. And nationalism 
has been a dominant feature of Chinese Communism. Yet much of China’s 
heterogeneity – in speech, diet, and physical appearance – so often remarked 
upon by foreign visitors still remains. With reference to its ethnic component, 
being “Chinese” is a dynamic quality. “Chineseness” may be likened to a 
geographical zone, a blurred place on the map, through which an unending 
stream of peoples has filtered in a north-south direction […] On the whole, 
this southern movement was gradual and piecemeal, being characterized by 
an influx of Chinese colonizers from the north who mixed with the local 
people […] The indigenous populations that have remained unabsorbed 
sometimes live side by side in discreet communities with the Chinese, 
sometimes retreat back into the hills, and sometimes attempt to emigrate 
southward. Thus, in any given national minority region of south China today 
there is a whole range of comparative “Chineseness” among the inhabitants 
which altogether eludes the dichotomy, “Han Chinese”-“national minority.”
(Moseley, 1966: 10-13) 
The above description does not apply to Xinjiang – China’s “wild west” 
– and Tibet, in contradistinction to the southern regions or, with Chinese 
colonization greatly facilitated by railroads built by the Western powers, Inner 
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Mongolia to the north and the northeastern region formerly being Manchuria. 
Incidentally, Inner Mongolia had already been overwhelmingly Chinese by the 
time the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was created in 1947, and in the 
case of the northeast “the Manchus disappeared and Manchuria became safely 
Chinese, dooming in advance the Japanese attempt to establish an independent 
‘Manchukuo’” (ibid.: 13). In this contradistinction lies the root of the Chinese 
government’s present problem of Xinjiang and Tibet:
Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet retained their uniqueness: although held 
by successive Chinese dynasties, the imperial administration was always 
unstable because it lacked the ballast of a sizable Han Chinese community.9 
They were tied to China without ever becoming Chinese. Outer Mongolia 
broke away altogether and succeeded in establishing an independent 
state […] With the modern transportation and communication facilities10 
developed by the Chinese Communists, the colonization of Sinkiang and 
Tibet is now proceeding, although it has encountered bitter resistance. 
(ibid.)
3. Socioracial Fragmentation and Ethnoregional Dilemmas
If widening socioeconomic inequality and deepening corruption are the two 
most prominent manifestations of the internal structural contradictions of 
the path of policy development of the CCP post-1989 – not least of which 
is the authoritarian political centralism amidst de facto fiscal federalism and 
economic decentralization – a third manifestation, as mentioned earlier, social 
and socioracial unrest, closely linked to the previous two, is becoming an 
increasing headache for the ruling regime, rapidly growing with worrying 
frequency and escalating scale. While social unrest in general has been so 
frequent that they have grown into almost a part of daily life, those with a 
socioracial flavour11 should be the most worrying for the ruling CCP including 
the recent two ultra-serious incidents of ethnoregional disturbance – the 
14th March 2008 riots in Tibet and the 5th July 2009 riots in Xinjiang, with 
the latter claiming almost 200 lives, mostly Han, according to the Beijing 
government or as least 500, mostly Uyghur, dead12 and nearly 10,000 Uyghur 
“disappeared” as alleged by Rabiyä Qadir 热比娅13. Whether the riots and 
racial attacks had been triggered by the police and army firing on unarmed 
Uyghur protesters – in other words, a mini-Tiananmen – as alleged by Rabiyä 
Qadir and Örkesh Dölet 吾尔开希 or simply Uyghurs going on a rampage 
against Han interests as claimed by the government, the ethnoregional 
content of this latest, probably the most deadly, incident of social unrest is 
unmistakable.
While the July Fifth riots in Ürümqi was triggered by the June 26th 
Uyghur-Han brawl – which was in turn triggered by the alleged rape of two 
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Han female factory workers by six Uyghur workers which the government 
condemned as an ill-intentioned rumour – at a Shaoguan 韶关 (Guangdong 
province) toy factory involving hundreds and ending up in the death of two 
Uyghurs, reciprocal resentment towards immigrants or settlers is equally 
familiar in the ethnic homeland regions of China, typically Tibet and Xinjiang. 
Such resentment of the local ethnic communities against large-scale migration 
of the country’s Han majority into her ethnic regions is nothing peculiar. 
Such outburst of resentment, long suppressed under authoritarian rule, has 
become more and more a rule rather than exception in the major formerly 
Communist Party-ruled countries including the former Soviet Union and those 
in Eastern Europe. Similar conflicts, albeit with differing characteristics, are 
also witnessed all over the post-Cold War World, whether in Darfur or in 
Irian Jaya, whether stemming from the rise of ethnoreligious bigots or on 
the contrary, the demise of authoritarian rule that makes way for the spread 
of free market democracy (see, e.g. Chua, 2003)14. Similar development can 
be observed in the case of China, which can be explained by the underlying, 
natural and inevitable tendency of the development of “antisystem” in the 
overall social change referred to earlier in the special issue’s prologue on a 
changing China, which a ruling regime may sometimes find it “inconvenient” 
to recognize:
[Some groups] may oppose the concrete levels at which the [values 
and] symbols are institutionalized [i.e. common norms established and 
legitimized] by the elite in power and may attempt to interpret them in 
different ways. They may not accept the models of cultural and social 
order that they think are upheld by the “center” as the legitimator of the 
existing distribution of power and resources, and they may uphold cultural 
orientations different from or counter to those upheld by the center. Other 
groups may develop new interpretations of existing models […] Even if 
for very long periods of time a great majority of the members of a given 
society may identify to some degree with the values and the norms of the 
given system and be willing to provide it with the resources it needs, other 
tendencies develop in connection with intergroup conflicts, demographic 
changes, and the development of heterodox ontological visions and these 
changes may give rise to changes in the initial attitudes of any given group 
to the basic premises of the institutional system.
(Eisenstadt, 1992: 417)
Thirty years of economic reform, by bringing about a sea change in economic 
life and rule of game, has unleashed forces and momenta – whether in 
March-June 1989, March 2008 or July 2009, whether with or without an 
ethnoregional content – that had caught the ruling establishment by surprise 
and overtaken its ability to catch up and understand and to effectively 
accommodate. Raised expectation of what is now perceived to be possible 
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– paradoxically a result of the almost no-holds-barred shedding of egalitarian 
“socialist” State monopolistic central-planned “chi daguofan 吃大锅饭” 
[eating from one big wok] economic system for an unabashed rugged 
capitalist about-face (or, officially, “socialism with Chinese characteristics”) – 
has fuelled the passion for speedier targeted change (see Figure 2 on typology 
of political action in the issue’s prologue on China’s social transformation) 
and in the context of ethnicity or ethnoterritoriality brought back the long-
suppressed ghost of identity investment which the ruling establishment could 
be ill-prepared to accommodate (as depicted in Davies’s J-curve shown in 
Figure 2).
4. Peripheral Nationalism and the Ethnoregional Troubles
On the other hand, recent years have witnessed increasing nationalist 
sentiment tacitly encouraged by the Han political centre – especially 
among the young, many born or grew up after 1989, very much encouraged 
by China’s increasing international standing spurred by her new-found, 
Figure 2 Davies’s J-Curve Theory of Revolution
Source: Vander Zanden (1988: 584), Figure 21.2 (adapted from Davies, 1962: 6, 
Figure 1).
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astounding economic strength and political and military might – a “centralist 
nationalism” that serves the CCP well. The “hundred years of national 
humiliation” stigma has been used time and again to explain or justify the 
upsurge of nationalism and the obsession over territorial integrity. Unity has 
been the greatest concern of the generation that holds dear to the conviction 
that China’s shameful defeat at the hands of Western and Japanese colonizers 
would never be allowed to be repeated, and that, though not often explicitly 
stated, high degree of regional autonomy especially in the non-Han ethnic 
regions like Tibet and Xinjiang could be the prelude to separatism and pave 
the way to China’s disintegration, as the cases of the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia have amply attested to.15
To understand fully the Chinese central State’s unwavering position 
regarding such ethnoregional separatist sentiments, it is inadequate to attribute 
it, as quite often done, to “China’s obsession with national security and the 
integrity of its historical borders” (Cook and Murray, 2001: 147). Instead, one 
needs to go back to the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism:
Marxist-Leninist theory on the national question defines a methodology 
for dealing with specific questions concerning the status of communities 
called nations or nationalities […] According to Communists, the funda-
mental cleavages of world society are along class rather than national 
lines. “Nations” are artificial units which came into being with the rise of 
capitalism and which are destined to disappear when capitalism is replaced 
with Communism; nationalism is a club used by capitalists to keep the 
world proletariat divided and subdued. When the proletariat seizes power 
throughout the world, then, according to the theory, nations and nationalism 
will vanish.
(Moseley, 1966: 4-5)
Related to this, it is apparent that the national question has been central, not 
peripheral, to the revolutions in both Russia and China:
 […] the national question has been used by the Communists in both 
countries to promote the attainment of revolutionary goals as interpreted 
by Great Russians and Han Chinese, respectively. And when one realizes 
that more than half the population of Russia at the time of the October 
Revolution consisted of peoples other than the Great Russians, and that 
more than half the territory of China “liberated” in 1949-1950 was inhabited 
by peoples other than Han Chinese, it will be appreciated how immensely 
important the national question was to the success of both revolutions […] 
In concrete terms, what “Marxist-Leninist theory on the national question” 
as applied in Russia and China really means is that claims for national 
independence on the part of minorities in socialist countries is [sic] counter-
revolutionary, and only in capitalist and colonial countries are such claims 
correct. Once the Communist Party, the vanguard of the proletariat, seizes 
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power, then the oppression of one nationality by another is impossible; 
anyone still demanding independence, therefore, can only be an agent, 
witting or unwitting, of world imperialism and therefore an enemy of “the 
people.” By similar arguments it is demonstrated that national minorities do 
not need their own Communist parties, since their interests are abundantly 
guaranteed by the unique Communist Party of the country.
(ibid.: 6-7)
A correct perspective on the issue of ethnoregionalism and the root cause of 
ethnoregional secessionism and the accompanying peripheral nationalism 
– long regarded by the Party-State as irrational, ungrateful and unfathomable 
– free from the preconceived bias of “centralist nationalism” is important to 
understand the complexities of Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan and other chasms16, 
for as Eisenstadt noted, such conflicts are but part and parcel of pluralism:
Conflict is inherent in any setting of social interaction for two basic reasons. 
The first reason is the plurality of actors in any such setting. The second 
reason is the multiplicity of the principles inherent in the institutionalization 
of any such setting – the multiplicity of institutional principles and of 
cultural orientations – and the power struggles and conflicts among different 
groups and movements that any such institutionalization entails.
(Eisenstadt, 1992: 416)
On the other hand, the whole idea of the Confucian grand unity (datong 大
同) in the Cultural China construct should not be taken for granted without 
paying due consideration to the will of all groups, whether dominant or 
subordinate, in the People’s Republic of China. This so-called “grand unity” 
emphasized in the Cultural China construct, far from being a voluntary 
federalization by amalgamation, has always been a top-down arrangement in 
the millennia of China’s history, shaped mostly by conquest and domination. 
As Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out in the case of the former Soviet Union, the 
disintegration of such an entity represents the dissolution not of a country, but 
of the command structure that has long gone against the genuine will of the 
constituent nationalities of the empire (Gorbachev, 1991).17
According to the 2000 census, Uyghurs are but only 45 per cent of 
the population of Xinjiang although the region was organized as a “Uygur 
Autonomous Region”. Even if we add on the Kazakhs (7 per cent) and the 
Hui (5 per cent), Uyghurs and their Muslim co-regionalists contribute only to 
about 57 per cent of the population. Lin Huihsiang, writing in 1936, provided 
the following information:
Today’s Hui 回 (Muslim) tsu 族 (nationalities) are mainly found in 
Hsinchiang 新疆 , Kansu 甘肅  and Shaanhsi 陕西  – and mostly in 
Hsinchiang […] the T’uchüeh 突厥 (i.e. Turk) tsu were earlier found to the 
north of the Hsiungnu 匈奴 (Huns), later moved southward into Mongolia. 
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After the conquest of Huike 回紇 by Hsiachiaszu 黠戞斯 (Kirghiz), 
they moved southwest into the regions of Hsinchiang and Kansu. After 
the suppression of the Muslim rebellion, Hsinchiang was changed into a 
province in the Eighth Year of the Reign of the Ch’ing dynasty Emperor 
Kuanghsü 清光緒八年 (i.e. 1882). Today the Muslim population there still 
constitutes eighty per cent.
(Lin, 1936: 42-43)
If Lin’s data were accurate, today’s Uyghur (and other Muslim) population 
in Xinjiang is a far cry from that in the 1930s. On another note, the history 
of Xinjiang is a history of continuous rebellion and imperial, often brutal, 
suppression. Lin (1936) wrote:
Islam’s entry into Hsinchiang 新疆 began in early 11th Century, but then it 
was limited to the southwestern corner of the region. The expansion became 
rather rapid by the Yüan dynasty 元朝. By the time of early Ch’ing dynasty 
清朝 the southern part was completely populated by Muslims, who came to 
expand into the region’s north after the time of Emperor Ch’ienlung 乾隆 
[…] Since the conquest of Huike 回紇 by Hsiachiaszu 黠戞斯 (Kirghiz), 
Muslims had migrated southwest from the north to south of the T’ienshan 
(天山) mountain. Since then the T’uchüeh 突厥 (Turk) people have been 
mostly residing in Hsinchiang. After the conquest of Weiwuerh 畏吾兒 (i.e. 
Uighur) by the Mongols, it belonged to Mongol’s Chagatai Khan. During the 
Ming dynasty (明朝) located in this region were Hami 哈密, Huochou 火
州, T’ulufan 土魯番 (i.e. Turpan) etc. which were semi-independent, among 
which the strongest being T’ulufan whose population, other than Muslims, 
also consisted of Ch’iang 羗, T’ufan 吐蕃 and Mongols […] By the time 
of Emperor Ch’ienlung, Amusana 阿睦撒納 of the Chunkeerh 準葛爾部 
(i.e. Dzungaria) rebelled against the Ch’ing government; Muslim leader 
Hechomu 和卓木 took the opportunity to lead the Muslims to fight for 
independence from the Ch’ing court but was defeated and killed. Hence the 
Muslim region again came under Ch’ing rule in the 24th Year of the Reign 
of Emperor Ch’ienlung 乾隆二十四年 (i.e. 1759) […] The next rebellion 
came in the 25th Year of the Reign of Emperor Chiach’ing 嘉慶二十五年 
stemming from Ch’ing officials’ persecution of the Muslim people. This 
revolt led by Changkeerh 張格爾, offspring of Hechomu, was finally crushed 
by the Ch’ing army in the 7th Year of the Reign of Emperor Taokuang 道
光七年 […] Muslim uprising occurred again in the 1st Year of the Reign of 
Emperor T’ungchih 同治初年 and Shaanhsi, Kansu and Hsinchiang almost 
all achieved independence. Shaanhsi’s and Kansu’s independence movements 
were crushed by Tso Tsungt’ang 左宗棠 who was sent in the 7th Year of the 
Reign of Emperor T’ungchih to the western region, who proceeded to crush 
the independence movement of Hsinchiang in the 2nd Year of the Reign of 
Emperor Kuanghsü 光緒二年.
(Lin, 1936: 37-41)
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That said, the case of Xinjiang is still much more complicated than a simple 
Muslim struggle for independence against Han colonizers, as Gladney (2003: 
24-25) cautioned:
The problems facing Xinjiang, however, are much greater than those of Tibet 
if it were to become independent. Not only is it more integrated into the rest 
of China, but the Uyghur part of the population is less than half of the total 
and primarily located in the south, where there is less industry and natural 
resources, except for oil […] however, unless significant investment is found, 
Tarim oil and energy resources will never be a viable source of independent 
wealth. Poor past relations between the three main Muslim groups, Uyghur, 
Kazak, and Hui, suggest that conflicts among Muslims would be as great as 
those between Muslims and Han Chinese. Most local residents believe that 
independence would lead to significant conflicts between these groups, along 
ethnic, religious, urban-rural, and territorial lines.
In fact, influx of ethnic Han into Xinjiang intensified only after the establish-
ment of the People’s Republic, with the numbers of Han settlers in Xinjiang 
rising from less than half a million in the early 1950s to 7.5 million by 2000 
and 8.1 million by 2006.18 On a historical timeline, Han Chinese colonization 
of the region has only been quite a recent phenomenon with large-scale Han 
migration into the region in the mid-19th century:
[…] it was not until 1760, and after their defeat of the Mongolian Zungars,19 
that the Manchu Qing dynasty exerted full and formal control over the 
region, establishing it as their “new dominions” (Xinjiang), an administration 
that had lasted barely 100 years, when it fell to the Yakub Beg rebellion 
(1864-1877) and expanding Russian influence. Until major migrations of 
Han Chinese was [sic] encouraged in the mid-nineteenth century, the Qing 
were mainly interested in pacifying the region by setting up military outposts 
which supported a vassal-state relationship. Colonization had begun with the 
migrations of the Han in the mid-nineteenth century, but was cut short by the 
Yakub Beg rebellion, the fall of the Qing empire in 1910 […]
(Gladney, 2003: 4)
Such independence movements have not ended with the overthrow of the 
Manchu dynasty in 1911, as the ensuing warlord era dismembered the region 
and the nascent republican China faced the danger of losing the territory on 
various occasions – the short-lived East Turkestan Islamic Republic in 1933 
and East Turkestan Republic in 1944 which lasted till 1949 when the People’s 
Liberation Army entered Xinjiang (“peaceful liberation”) and the region was 
incorporated as part of the new People’s Republic, later established as the 
“Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” on 1st October 1955.
As the Uyghur population dwindled to just 45 per cent today (compare 
this with Lin’s nineteen-thirties figure of about 80 per cent) while large-
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scale Han Chinese settlement has caused the latter’s proportion to burgeon 
to 41 per cent20, Uyghurs’ resentment against what they perceive as the Han 
Chinese empire’s internal colonization and the exploitation of the region’s 
rich resources by the Han Chinese central State is inevitable. Large-scale 
demographic transfer of members of a country’s dominant ethnic group into 
a minority ethnic region of the country inevitably, for the ethnic minority, 
raises the spectre of internal colonization, plundering of local resources, 
dominant cultural assimilation, and unequal resource contest. In the case of 
Xinjiang, adding to such perception is the historical legacy left by China’s 
use of Xinjiang as the testing ground for its nuclear weapons programme 
from 1964 to 1996, which according to recent Japanese research results 
by Professor Jun Takada 高田純, a physicist at the Sapporo 札幌 Medical 
University, have probably resulted in a “conservative minimum” of 194,000 
deaths from related illnesses out of the 1.48 million people who were exposed 
to radioactive fallout from the testings, 1.2 million people afflicted with 
leukaemia, solid cancers and fetal damage, including 35,000 newborns who 
were deformed or handicapped. The 46 nuclear testings over the span of 32 
years at Xinjiang’s Lop Nur have been disastrous in particular for the ethnic 
minorities including Uyghurs and Tibetans as wind direction had brought 
nuclear dust to the Silk Road cities and townships in Xinjiang and Gansu, 
bringing about cross-generational legacy of cancer affliction – with Xinjiang’s 
cancer rates allegedly 30 to 35 per cent higher than the national average 
– birth deformities and shorter lifespan.21
Similar phenomenon can be observed in Tibet. The Sinicization of 
Ürümqi is paralleled by the Sinicization of Lhasa 拉萨. The official popula-
tion figures for Tibet differ much from certain unofficial ones. The official 
figures have been disputed by the Tibetan government-in-exile who claimed 
that “accelerating Han population transfer into Tibet […] has reduced the 
Tibetan people to a minority in their own land [… and today] there are 
over 7.5 million non-Tibetan settlers in Tibet including Chinese and Hui 
Muslims, compared to six million Tibetans” (Cook and Murray, 2001: 141). 
However, such allegations of population transfer were rebutted by the Beijing 
government – according to whose official figures Tibetans constitute 93 per 
cent of the Tibet’s total population – who argued that “the only Han Chinese 
living in Tibet are specialists who have gone there voluntarily to help in the 
region’s development [… and they] make up less than five per cent of the 
population and many of the people are there for only a few years before 
returning home” (Cook and Murray, 2001: 141). The figure of 93 per cent 
Tibetans was one given by the 2000 Census. In fact, official data for the year 
2005 gave the proportion of Tibetans as high as 95.28 per cent and that of Han 
as only 3.91 per cent of the total population of Tibet.22
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5.  The Inverted Paradigm: State Policy-Induced Ethnogenesis,
  Reethnicization and Polarization
J’accuse. [I accuse.]
Émile Zola (1840-1902), L’Aurore, 13th January 1898
As a comparison with the case of China, let us look at an inverted paradigm 
in contrast to the discussion so far, using the case of Spain’s Andalucía. 
Andalucía, of course, is Castilian. Nevertheless, what uneven development 
and public policy can do to fuel regional separatist sentiments is evident 
even in Andalucía where the population has little ethnolinguistic differences 
from the Spanish (Castilian) political centre, for while government responds 
to challenges from ethnic community organizations that seek to influence 
public policy, “within an inverted and complementary paradigm [...] ethnic 
communities take shape as response to stimuli which induce a process of 
ethnogenesis” (Gheorghe, 1991: 842-843). The shockingly rapid emergence 
since the late 1970s (with the advent of the Comunidades Autónomas 
project) of a politically disciplined and powerful regional cultural identity 
in Andalucía, which Greenwood (1985) argued to be as authentic as the 
Basque or Catalan ethnic movement, basically stems from the local people’s 
grievances that they have been subjected to centuries of exploitation not 
merely by Andalucian capitalists, but by the Castilian political centre as well. 
This interesting phenomenon of public policy-induced ethnogenesis evident 
in the large southern impoverished region of Andalucía, which shares the 
linguistic identity of the Spanish (Castilian) centre, is the direct result of the 
post-Franco Comunidades Autónomas project. “The rapidity with which a 
politically disciplined and powerful regional cultural identity has emerged in 
Andalusia shocked everyone”, commented Greenwood (1985: 222-223), “[...] 
the idea that the Andalusian movement is something qualitatively different 
from the ‘true’ ethnic movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia must 
be exploded.”23 
This phenomenon of public policy-induced ethnogenesis is also evident 
in the increasing support since the 1980s for Italy’s Lega Nord (Northern 
League), whose leader has declared the aim to set up a state called “Padania” 
free from Rome’s rule and from union with the poorer South.24 Such 
centrifugal development in Italy, of course, reflects the increasing resentment 
of the more prosperous North for having to subsidize the poorer South and 
a tax revolt against Rome.25 Although from the ethnolinguistic perspective 
the country is relatively homogeneous (with small Sard, Friul, German 
and Occitan minorities), Italy’s late but rapid unification has left a legacy 
of widespread “pseudo-ethnic” sectionalism, which is no less ascriptive 
than that Greenwood found in Andalucía, across its numerous regions and 
compartments, partly reflected linguistically in the local dialetti or koinés. 
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In the case of China, such public policy-induced ethnogenesis is evident 
in, for instance, the most assimilated of minorities, the Zhuang whose ethnic 
consciousness was virtually created by the Han-dominated central Communist 
Party-State in the early 1950s26, who have begun to press for preferential 
treatments from the central government, as the country’s deadly race towards 
economic prosperity continues to widen economic disparities between the 
ethnic minorities and the Han majority, making it more and more challenging 
to manage ethnic nationalism and ethnoregionalism in the People’s Republic 
(Figure 3)27, as well as having dire implications for the prospects and 
consequences of further decentralization and possible federalization, a critical 
dimension to which this paper will later return.
6. Western Regional Development Programme
It is a fact that Beijing has been intensifying efforts in developing the western 
region of China, including Xinjiang, in particular after the launching of 
the Western Regional Development Programme (xibu dakaifa 西部大开
发). However, such heavy economic support and financing of disputed or 
ill-integrated regions for national territorial cohesion is nothing unique. For 
instance, ethnopolitical conflict brought about by the annexation of East Timor 
obviously had an effect on fiscal allocation in Indonesia in the years before 
Timor-Leste (East Timor) officially freed herself in May 2002 from more 
than two decades of Indonesian occupation and became a sovereign state. In 
fact, as Shah and Qureshi (1994) showed, the Indonesian “province” of Timor 
Timur (East Timor) received the highest per capita general-purpose central 
transfer among all Indonesian provinces (Shah and Qureshi, 1994: 62). Timor 
Timur, together with Irian Jaya (a province with strong secessionist sentiment), 
also received special preference in SDO (“subsidy for autonomous regions”) 
grant allocation (ibid.: 65). It could of course be argued that Timor Timur was 
Indonesia’s poorest “province” – both Timor Timur and Nusa Tenggara Timur 
had the lowest per capita non-oil Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of just about 
Figure 3 Interrelationship of Ethnic Fragmentation and State Policy  
Ethnic fragmentation State Policy 
(Ethnic communal/commercial/
political organizations)
(Ethnogenesis/Reethnicization affecting
ethnic intensity/pluralism/sectionalism)
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360,000 rupiah or US$180 (ibid.: 54, 254, Tables 3.8, A5.10). Furthermore, 
Timor Timur (and Irian Jaya) had the lowest proportion of own-source 
receipts in total current receipts and Timor Timur had the lowest proportion 
of aggregate own revenues of local governments in total current revenues and 
proportion of own revenue in total receipts (ibid.: 84, 86) that qualified the 
“province” for higher central transfers28, but the continuing destitution of the 
poverty-stricken region was very much a result of the occupation and brutal 
military campaign against the independence movement.
It is also a fact that Xinjiang has not fared badly in development and 
modernization in recent years. In terms of GDP, Table 3 shows that Xinjiang 
has had a moderate performance among the provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi of 
the western region and fared much better than Tibet which has been the worst 
performer. In terms of GDP per capita, Xinjiang is the best among them. 
Rural poverty is still a serious problem for Xinjiang, with rural incidence of 
poverty in the bracket of 5-10 per cent but not as bad as Tibet and Qinghai 
whose rural incidence of poverty is above 10 per cent (Figure 4). In terms of 
urbanization, Xinjiang is also a moderate performer, ranking 17th among the 
country’s 31 provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi29, compared to the least urbanized 
Tibet (ranked 31st) (Figure 5). Other key indicators, shown in Figures 6-10, 
reveal a similar picture.
Figure 4 China: Distribution of Rural Poor
Source: Chen (2006: 176), Table 7-1. Data are for year 2003.
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Figure 5 China: Urbanization in Ethnic Zizhiqu and Multiethnic Provinces
  (Rate of urbanization; National ranking in rate of urbanization)
Figure 6 China: Gini by Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi
Source: Huang and Niu (2007: 161-162), Table 5-3(2).
Source:  Zhongguo Minzu Fazhan Baogao, 2001-2006, p. 232, Table 18 (original 
source: Zhongguo Renkou Wenhua Suzhi Baogao, 2004).
* National Gini (G) = 0.45
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Figure 8  China: Illiteracy in Ethnic Zizhiqu and Multiethnic Provinces,
  2000 (Illiteracy rate; National ranking of illiteracy rate)
Figure 7  China: Average Education Level in Ethnic Zizhiqu and
  Multiethnic Provinces, 2000 (Years of schooling; 
 National ranking of education level)
Source:  Zhongguo Minzu Fazhan Baogao, 2001-2006, p. 231, Table 17 (original 
source: Zhongguo Renkou Wenhua Suzhi Baogao, 2004).
Source:  Zhongguo Minzu Fazhan Baogao, 2001-2006, p. 230, Table 16 (original 
source: Zhongguo Renkou Wenhua Suzhi Baogao, 2004).
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Figure 10  China: Population Engaged in Agriculture in Ethnic Zizhiqu and
  Multiethnic Provinces (Million people in 2000; Growth in million
  1990-2000; Growth rate)
Figure 9  China: Incidence of Absolute Poverty by Province/Zizhiqu/
 Zhixiashi, 2005
Source:  Zhongguo Minzu Fazhan Baogao, 2001-2006, p. 232, Table 19 (data from 
the 2000 Population Census).
Source:  Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao 2007, p. 39, Table 2.3.
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However, implementing the western regional development project 
within a cautious political framework is not without risks either. First, with 
strong constraints in the devolvement of central power, it could be difficult 
to coordinate the interests of the central and local governments over the 
power of authorization and permissions and to determine how far the right to 
independent development could go. Besides that, it may not be easy to adjust 
the interests of local governments over limited financial resources and projects 
to be implemented. Finally, there is the fact that 80 per cent of the ethnic 
minorities in China live in the western regions and national border areas where 
the new regional development strategy is targeted. Without accompanying 
decentralization of political power and the conferring of substantial degree 
of regional autonomy in the control and use of local resources, ethnic 
minorities may perceive the central State’s projects as attempts at internal 
colonization – for instance, the mixed feelings of the Tibetans towards the 
Qinghai-Tibet railway – leading to their outright opposition to the whole 
regional development strategy itself, thus exacerbating the already simmering 
ethnoregional tensions, even culminating in repeated disturbances such as the 
deadly 14th March 2008 riots in Tibet and 5th July 2009 riots in Xinjiang. 
Paradoxically, further devolution in China that seems to be the logical 
extension of the already decentralist process of economic reform may yet be 
arrested by the lack of the will for political change – which is crucial to the 
maintenance of long-term stability – due to the illusory confidence brought 
about by the economic success itself.
7. Regional Development and Resource Politics
In a way as in Spain where ethnic division is territorial with her ethnic 
minorities concentrated in Catalonia (Catalunya/Cataluña) and the Basque 
Country (Euskadi/País Vasco) which constitute the economic backbone 
of the country, in China where the major ethnic division is also largely 
territorial, the country’s major ethnic minority groups including the Uyghurs 
and Tibetans are concentrated in the resource-rich western provinces and 
zizhiqu (Figure 11).30 It was forecasted that by 2010, the western region’s 
coal, petroleum, natural gas and a whole range of abundant mineral resources 
will be adequate to guarantee China’s economic development or exports, 
and hence the western region – being the major energy source for the 
whole of China, providing 34 per cent of the nation’s coal, 78 per cent of 
hydroelectricity and 59 per cent of natural gas (Zhongguo Xibu Jingji Fazhan 
Baogao 2006, p. 268) – is poised to become the country’s important reserve 
base of strategic resources.
The geographical demarcation of the western region for the xibu dakaifa 
programme was nevertheless not an easy process, since being incorporated 
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as a part of the western region means that the regional government concerned 
would be entitled to receive various benefits, including priorities in obtaining 
projects funded by the central government and other fiscal subsidies. That 
explains why regional governments all over the country at that time of 
demarcation were swept into a frenzy trying to get their regions classified 
as “western” – in a course of events resembling the fiebre autonómica 
(autonomy fever) when the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas project was 
first introduced after the death of the Caudillo – no matter how unconvincing 
their arguments were. However, given the fiscal constraints of the central 
government, continued fiscal help from the central government could be 
problematic. Hence, fund-raising would depend on the ability to attract 
domestic- and foreign-capital enterprises. That explains why many regional 
Figure 11  China: Distribution of Mineral Reserves 
 (Region as Proportion of All China)
 
Source:  Zhongguo Diqu Jingji Fazhan Zhanlüe Yanjiu, 2003, p. 122, Table 7-4. 
(Computed from “Quanguo Kuangchan Chuliang Hui Zongbiao 全国矿
产储量汇总表”. Calculated with reserve volume as at end of 1997.)
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governments had raced to announce preferential policy measures as soon 
as the proposal was made for the xibu dakaifa strategy (IDE Spot Surey, 
2001: 24). Such interregional scrambling for future benefits even at the early 
stage of the strategy can provide a glimpse into the potential resource contest 
between regions, especially given the understandable difficulty to coordinate 
and adjust the interests of regional governments over the distribution of the 
resources for the strategy.
Furthermore, the reassertion of old regionalisms and the development 
of new regionalisms in particular with an ethnic overtone have always 
constituted a challenge to countries facing an inevitable long-term prospect 
of decentralization and devolution, as apparent in the fiebre autonómica that 
threatened to bring about the virtual disappearance of the central Spanish 
State when the country’s Comunidades Autónomas project was first introduced 
after the death of the Caudillo. The undertaking of costly projects, such as the 
creation of regional public television networks, regional institutes for business 
development and promotion, the development of major infrastructures, etc., 
by the Autonomous Communities in a concerted effort to compete with each 
other in the levels of performance and achievement, for political legitimacy 
and consolidation, have served to further exacerbate the existing rivalry over 
public resources and worsen the conflict between the Communities as well 
as between the centre and the periphery, with significant implications for the 
development of ethnoterritorial consciousness and interethnic relations in 
Spain. Even the fact that the Han Chinese command an unequivocal majority 
of 92 per cent of the total population of China needs not render the country 
immune to such threats.
The following section aims to take this discussion a step further by 
analyzing the socioracial problems of China’s ethnic regions, with particular 
reference to the case of Xinjiang, with regard to the possible theoretical 
implications of the impact of continued Han Chinese influx on interethnic 
relations which will in turn affect regional stability in the objective 
environment created by the State’s ethnic and regional policies.
8.  From Ürümqi to Lhasa: Perception of Superordinate-Subordinate
  Power-Size Configuration
One important aspect of the numerical structure of ethnicity refers to the role 
played by the relative size of ethnic groups in the societal power structure. 
The superordinate-subordinate relationship in a multiethnic society is related 
to the concept of “minority” which avoids some of the definitional problems 
accompanying the concepts of “race” and “ethnicity”, especially those related 
to the nature and significance of different types of group markers. The concept 
of “minority”, instead, focuses on the size and strength of the groups involved, 
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in terms of variations in the economic, political and social balance of power. 
Wirth (1945: 347) defined a minority as “a group of people who, because of 
their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in 
the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who 
therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination”. This 
definition has been criticized because it makes the existence of minorities 
completely dependent on the feelings of minority group members, despite 
his caveat that minorities “objectively occupy a disadvantageous position in 
society” (ibid.: 348). Wirth’s emphasis on the disadvantageous social position 
of the minority leads to his neglect of the latter’s numerical relationship to the 
wider society. For him, collective perception of their distinctive disadvantages 
is the decisive criterion that distinguishes minorities from other subordinate 
populations irrespective of their number, nature and disadvantage, as a people 
“whom we regard as a minority may actually, from a numerical standpoint, 
be a majority” (ibid.: 349). 
Disregard for the numerical aspect, in addition to the importance attached 
to subjective definitions of the situation by the minority, leads to the view 
that every instance of group conflict in society is by definition, a “minority 
problem” (van Amersfoort, 1978: 219). Many researchers besides Wirth have 
shown the same disregard for the numerical aspect, e.g. Wagley and Harris 
(1967), preferring to emphasize the power dimension of the “minority” 
concept. Nevertheless, whether the concept of a minority group depends 
upon actual numbers, is more than a matter of definition, since power and 
numerical dimensions are ultimately linked to each other. As Stone (1985: 
43-44) remarked:
[...] this basic demographic fact [of actual numbers] will affect many 
different aspects of race relations, not least the question of the “costs” for 
the dominant group of promoting racial justice: whether such policies can 
be pursued in a relatively peaceful, evolutionary manner, or whether they 
are more likely to lead to persistent conflict and violence. 
 When analyzing the possible impact of public policy on ethnic conflict, 
such disregard for the numerical aspect diminishes any projected result. Smith 
(1987: 343-4) emphasized this numerical dimension in his critique of Wirth’s 
definition:
To lump together all disadvantaged populations irrespective of size 
without prior study of the relationships between their demographic ratios, 
organisation and differences of collective status, assumes in advance the 
irrelevance of these variables or the randomicity of their distribution. Such 
assimilation of demographic fractions and majorities is sociologically 
unsound because the situations of aggregates often differ as functions of their 
relative size and organisation or lack of it.
IJCS 1-2 combined PDF 25-10-10.i596   596 10/25/2010   1:08:07 AM
Socioracial Dilemmas in Contemporary China      597
Relating the numerical dimension directly to the question of political 
power, van Amersfoort (1978: 221) noted that in a modern democratic state 
the “characteristic problem for a minority group is not so much that it is 
difficult to ensure formal rights, but that the numerical situation restricts 
the possibility of translating such rights into social influence”. A useful 
redefinition of the concept of “minority” is that by Schermerhorn (1970: 
14):
Combining the characteristics of size, power, and ethnicity, we [...] use 
“minority group” to signify any ethnic group [...] that [...] forms less than 
half the population of a given society, but is an appreciable subsystem with 
limited access to roles and activities central to the economic and political 
institutions of the society.
For Schermerhorn only those subordinate ethnic groups that are numerical 
minorities of nation-states qualify as “minority groups”. He thus implicitly 
endorsed all other criteria set by Wagley and Harris (1967: 10) to distinguish 
(ethnic) minorities, whose membership must be transmitted by rules of descent 
and endogamy, from other disadvantaged collectivities (whose disadvantages 
are due to social mobility, e.g. refugees, captives, and other disadvantaged 
categories such as women, slaves, proletarians and peasants). The “ethnic 
group” is defined by Schermerhorn as “a collectivity within a larger society 
having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, 
and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome 
of their peoplehood”, and the “dominant group” as “that collectivity within 
a society which has preeminent authority to function both as guardians and 
sustainers of the controlling value system, and as prime allocators of rewards 
in the society” (Schermerhorn, 1970: 12-3).
For a fundamentally bi-ethnic region like Xinjiang31, it is apparent that 
the relationship between State policy and ethnic conflict and antagonism 
is influenced by the subordinate group’s aspirations, the dominant group’s 
orientations and their dynamic interaction. Figure 12 constructs a power-
size configuration of ethnic groups similar to Moscovici’s diagram of group 
power-influence configuration (Moscovici, 1985: 26). Based on this para-
digm, a typology of multiethnic societies can be constructed, as illustrated 
in Figure 13.
Excluding case 4 which is by definition not applicable, Figure 13 shows 
a threefold typology of multiethnic societies. Case 2 represents a Jd-Ns 
type of society which combines a subordinate demographic minority with 
a dominant demographic majority – a typical example is China as a whole 
with her demographically (92 per cent) and politically dominant Han Chinese 
majority. Case 3 is an Nd-Js society in which the numerical majority is 
dominated by a demographic minority – as the local Uyghurs and other real 
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and exotic minorities in Xinjiang possibly perceive themselves in relation to 
the minority Han Chinese settlers (around 40 per cent) backed by the Han 
Chinese-dominated central State, hence as an extension of the Han Chinese-
dominated central State power. The subordinate-superordinate intergroup 
relationship in a society with no obvious demographic majority (an Nd-Ns 
society) is represented by case 1 – the mainly bi-ethnic relations in Xinjiang 
between the Uyghurs (about 45 per cent) and Han Chinese (about 40 per cent) 
or if we take the estimates of the Tibetan government-in-exile, the relations 
between the Tibetans (about 44 per cent) and Han Chinese settlers (together 
with the minority Hui settlers totaling about 56 per cent). If the non-Han 
Figure 12 Power-Size Configuration of Ethnic Groups
Notes: Jd = dominant demographic majority (Schermerhorn’s “majority group”)
 Js  = subordinate demographic majority (“mass subjects”)
 Nd = dominant demographic minority (“élite”)
 Ns  = subordinate demographic minority (“minority group”)
Power
Size
Figure 13 Typology of Multiethnic Societies
    Superordinate
   Nd  Jd
 Ns 1  2 
Subordinate
 Js 3  4 
Note: Typology based on the paradigm presented in Figure 12.
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nationalities see the Han influx into Xinjiang as in a way an extension of the 
Han dominance of the central State, to them the Xinjiang society then belongs 
to the Nd-Ns category, while the continued influx of the Han following 
increasing economic prosperity of the region is seen as moving the society 
towards a Jd-Ns configuration, or probably it could have already to a certain 
extent reached that stage, if some unofficial data on population composition 
are accurate. Indeed, if we look at cities – the centres of prosperity – while 
the populations of Kashgar/Qeshqer (Kashi 喀什) and Hotan/Xoten (Hetian 
和田) are still in the main Uyghur, that of the capital city Ürümqi/Ürümchi 
(Wulumuqi 乌鲁木齐) is already almost 80 per cent Han.32 Official data, in 
fact, show that Ürümqi’s population is currently 12.62 per cent Uyghur and 
74.70 per cent Han.33 Similar situation is also apparent in Tibet and Lhasa.
Schermerhorn’s concept of a minority mentioned above, which he 
redefined as a variety of ethnic group, is part of the fourfold typology he 
developed to take account of the numerical and the power dimensions 
(Schermerhorn, 1970: 13):
Figure 14  Schermerhorn’s Fourfold Typology of Dominant-Subordinate
 Relations
   Dominant Groups
   Size   Power
  Group A  +   +  Majority Group
  Group B  –   +  Élite
   Subordinate Groups
    Size   Power
  Group C  +   –  Mass subjects
  Group D  –   –  Minority Group
The fourfold typology illustrated in Figure 14 includes not only “majority 
group” and “minority group”, which are dominant and subordinate 
respectively in terms of both size and power, but also “élite” and “mass 
subjects” where numerical superiority and power do not coincide. Societies 
that combine the subordinate numerical minorities (“minority groups”) with 
dominant demographic majorities (“majority groups”) (D+A, such as China 
as a whole), are contraposed as the structural opposites of those in which 
the numerical majority of “mass subjects” are dominated by a demographic 
minority, the “élite” (C+B, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, if one sees the minority 
Han settlers as an extension of the Han Chinese-dominated central State 
power). While it is undeniable that the typology provides a comprehensive 
picture of the dominant-subordinate relationship, the C+B case, other than 
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cases of internal colonization of a country’s ethnic regions, is rare in today’s 
world after the demise of Western colonialism in the Third World and the 
end of White rule in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Nevertheless, 
the fact that such configuration is rare other than internal colonization does 
not imply its total disappearance – two obvious examples are Rwanda and 
Burundi where the Hutu majorities are still politically dominated by the Tutsi 
minorities.
Cases 2 and 3 in Figure 13 thus correspond to Schermerhorn’s AD and BC 
configurations respectively. However, since societies containing disadvantaged 
demographic minorities do not necessarily have the complementary majorities 
that Schermerhorn postulated (e.g. Niger, Nigeria, Liberia, Benin, see Smith, 
1986), the inclusion of case 1 is necessary, examples of which as we have 
seen above are China’s Xinjiang and possibly Tibet.
Such a typology can be considered exhaustive, since “race relations are 
essentially group power contests” (Baker, 1978: 316) wherein symmetrical 
power relationships among groups are rare and often transient:
Whatever the power relationship (symmetrical, where both are equal, or 
asymmetrical, where one is dominant), each group may initiate action 
or respond to the acts, or anticipated acts, of others [...] Given changing 
circumstances over time, group power capabilities (measured in terms of 
group resources, additive resources, mobilization capabilities and situations) 
may alter, thereby transforming the character of group power relations. At 
any given moment in time (T1) the power of A may be equal to that of B 
(symmetrical), at a later period (T2) that of A may be superior to that of B 
(asymmetrical, with A dominant), or at another point (T3) that of A may be 
less than that of B (asymmetrical, with A subordinate).
(Baker, 1978: 317-8)
The infrequency of a symmetrical power relationship was also noted by 
Hoetink in his study of slavery and race relations in the Americas:
A race problem exists where two or more racially different groups belong 
to one social system and where one of these conceives the other as a threat 
on any level or in any context [...] One of the groups will commonly be 
perceived and perceive itself as dominant; the chances that two racially 
different groups within one society would attain an equilibrium of power, 
though not absent, are exceedingly small.
(Hoetink, 1973: 91)
Hoetink (1973: 47-8) basically saw the multiethnic horizontally layered 
structure as a special form of Herrschaftsüberlagerung – “a stratification 
consisting of at least two layers of which the upper layer has, as it were, 
moved over the lower one (by military conquest, colonial usurpation, and 
so forth) or the lower layer has been pushed under by the upper one (by 
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subjugation, the importation of forced labour, and the like)”. In societies with 
such horizontal ethnic division, stimulation of solidarities based on economic 
or class position may have an aggravating, rather than an ameliorating, effect 
on ethnic conflict. By contrast, in those societies where ethnic divisional 
lines between the main population segments run vertically, it is likely that 
a functional relationship between economic differentiation and the increase 
of interethnic (horizontal) solidarities, such as those based on economic 
position, will emerge. These foster intercommunication and may serve to 
mitigate existing ethnic antagonisms. The two patterns of ethnic division are 
conceptually linked to the two different types of plural society – the hierarchic 
plurality (based on differential incorporation) and segmental plurality (based 
on equivalent or segmental incorporation). A society may combine both these 
modes of incorporation and form a complex plurality. Smith (1986: 198) noted 
that the segmental and differential modes of incorporation generate quite 
distinct ethnic tensions and problems. Hoetink (1973: 146-7) linked the two 
different patterns of ethnic division to the stability of multiethnic societies:
It is interesting that the modern societies that often are put forward as 
examples of reasonably well-functioning cultural heterogeneity, such as 
Belgium, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, all have vertical 
cultural boundaries, to the point that their cultural segments even have 
territories of their own with a certain degree of cultural and sometimes 
political autonomy. Although European history shows many cases of 
repression, expulsion, or political elimination of such territorially limited 
cultural minorities, and although it would be naïve to underestimate the still-
existing cultural and political tensions in countries like Belgium or Great 
Britain, it is correct to assume that a minimum of horizontal interpenetration 
and communication gives these systems a certain viability.
To this list, Hoetink added Suriname, Guiana and Trinidad. 
9.  Xinjiang and Tibet: Perception of Interethnic Power Shift in the   
 Ethnic Regions
Nevertheless, symmetrical power relationship between groups in a society 
is rare and even if it emerges, tends to be transient, as observed by Hoetink, 
cited in the preceding section. For various reasons ranging from demographic 
growth to economic ethos to social mobility, one of the groups usually 
achieves dominance in the long run, thus pivoting the vertical lines of ethnic 
division into horizontal ones, as illustrated in Figure 15 which represents the 
relative positions of ethnic and class categories, but not their relative sizes, 
and expresses a combination of the horizontal and vertical principles of social 
differentiation – similar to that presented by Warner (1936) in his caste-class 
configuration for the US Deep South.
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The diagonal boundary A-B incorporates the status gap and divide ethnic 
group I from ethnic group II (Warner’s “castes”). The two double-headed 
vertical arrows indicate that movement up and down the class ladders within 
each group can and does occur, but there is no movement across the ethnic 
boundary A-B (Warner’s “caste line”). Han Chinese penetration into Xinjiang 
and Tibet under the CCP rule would have at first created a temporary vertical 
ethnic boundary positioned at d-e, indicating a system of combined equality 
and separation – the upper class of one ethnic group (Uyghur/Tibetan) would 
be equivalent to that of the other (Han), while the lower classes in each of the 
parallel groups would also be of the same social status. However, a possible 
perception of the non-Han nationalities is that the tilting of the ethnic boundary 
as shown in Figure 15 into the position A-B would have occurred somewhere 
along the timeline as, being an extension of the politico-economic power of 
the Han-dominated central State, Han economic dominance in these ethnic 
regions grew due to various factors including political, economic and cultural 
environmental preconditions, initial endowments, long-established networks, 
etc.34 With the ethnic line tilted in the way shown in the diagram, within each 
class level to which they have risen, members of group II (Uyghur/Tibetan) 
are thought of as socially inferior to members of group I (Han) of the same 
class, until as individuals they become assimilated (Sinicized) by the latter. It 
is a perception of the non-Han ethnic people that they are often looked upon 
as backward, dirty, lazy and superstitious by the dominant Han who pride 
themselves on assiduity and having a “5000-year culture”. Marginalized by 
Figure 15 Vertical  Horizontal Ethnic Division
Upper class
Lower class
Middle class
Upper class
Middle class
Lower class
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centuries of Han Chinese imperial expansion, China’s ethnic minorities have 
historically been viewed as manyi 蠻夷, i.e. “barbarians”, and it was only after 
the revolution that the “dog” radical 犭– implying sub-humanity – in most of 
the Han Chinese names given to the ethnic minority groups was eventually 
replaced with a “human” radical 亻. Paradoxically parts of the CCP’s 
affirmative action policies for minorities such as exemption from the one-
child policy, employment quotas and in particular legal leniency on minority 
offenders (in non-political cases) have added to the negative stereotyping of 
ethnic minorities in the eyes of the dominant Han population.
Returning to the configuration in Figure 15, it should be noted that a 
substantial degree of horizontal interpenetration and communication across 
the ethnic line is indeed possible and in fact necessary for the viability of 
the system, thus compromising the sharpness of the line A-B as a boundary. 
On the other hand, if the ethnic boundary is pushed further round its axis 
(C) towards a horizontal position, one group then becomes unequivocally 
dominant and the other, subordinate – the exact power distribution and extent 
of dominance depend on the skewness, i.e. the angle of slant of the ethnic 
boundary. The test of the existence of a superordinate-subordinate relation-
ship is to verify a group’s dominant behaviour towards the other within the 
same class.
Alternatively, as Marden and Meyer (1962: 42) did for the United 
States, the structure of differentiation can be comprehensively expressed by 
superimposing the class pyramid of the subordinate ethnic group upon that of 
the dominant community (Figure 16). The former is then dropped less than a 
full horizontal segment to express the inferior position of each class segment 
of the subordinate group to others within the class. Such a representation could 
of course be just a simplification of a real-world phenomenon, as the latter is 
often complicated by the phenomena of class compromise and clientelism35. 
However, a rejection of race and class reductionisms should provide a more 
rational theoretical foundation to analyze the complex relationship between 
the variables of ethnic diversity, class structure, and the role of the State.
 Seen from another angle, in contrast to the vulgar Weberian perspective 
which argues that the increased ability of a bureaucratic State to realize 
internally generated goals will reduce the power of all societal groups 
“outside” the State, Poulantzian neo-Marxism posits that an “autonomous” 
State, capable of wide ranging and coherent interventions in socioeconomic 
relations, increases the social power of the dominant class, whose objective 
and needs it necessarily functions to meet (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 
1985). A dominant ethnic faction (Han) whose emergence in the ethnic regions 
is depicted earlier as inevitable in Figure 15, thus, in line with the latter theory, 
would be served by a powerful State (the country’s Han-dominated one-party 
central State) whose interests it concurs in.
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Meanwhile, interethnic socioeconomic inequalities in ethnic regions 
like Xinjiang and Tibet are playing an important role in accentuating 
interethnic resentment and discord through expanding social distance, while 
contradictions, as illustrated in Figure 17, generated between incompatible 
class fractional identity and ethnic allegiance tend to breed discontent and 
instability. With D denoting the dominant ethnic group, S subordinate ethnic 
group, E élite and M masses respectively, the vertical division in Figure 17 
shows the dominant-subordinate ethnic grouping, while the horizontal one 
indicates the élite-masses socioeconomic class grouping. Three types of 
relations are evident here: ertical relations, between dominant élite and their 
masses (a), and subordinate élite and their masses (b); horizontal relations, 
between dominant élite and their subordinate counterpart (c), and dominant 
masses and their subordinate counterpart (d); diagonal relations, between 
dominant élite and subordinate masses (e) and subordinate élite and dominant 
masses (f). Intra-ethnic relations are shown by vertical arrows, interethnic 
ones by the horizontal and diagonal. While intra-ethnic relations in Xinjiang 
between the dominant (Han) élite and dominant (Han) masses (DE-DM) 
represent an extension of the overall intra-Han relations of the country, the 
SE-SM relations are between the ethnic minority élite (Uyghur cadres and 
Figure 16  Marden and Meyer’s Model of Dominant-Subordinate Relations and
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other Uyghur élites co-opted by the State) and the ethnic minority (Uyghur) 
masses who may perceive the former as cronies of the Han-dominated 
central State, as reflected in the Uyghur economics professor Ilham Tohti’s 
accusation against Nur Bekri (Baikeli 白克力), chairman of the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region, in the former’s blog “Uighur Online” before he 
was taken away on 7th July 2009.36 On the other hand, relations between the 
dominant (Han) élite and the ethnic minority (Uyghur) élite (DE-SE) could be 
perceived by the latter as being characterized by cronyism and clientelism37, 
while those between the dominant (Han) masses and ethnic minority (Uyghur) 
masses could be perceived by the latter as representing a projection of the 
general biases, stereotyping and mistrusts as illustrated earlier in Figure 15. 
Similar configuration is also applicable to the case of Tibet.
The configuration presented in Figure 17 is in fact based upon Bonacich’s 
(1979: 56-57) configuration of class and ethnic relations resulting from 
imperialism (Figure 18). While segments A and C in Bonacich’s model 
represent the “imperialist (white) bourgeoisie” and “workers in the imperialist 
nation” (and segments B and D refer to their non-white counterparts in the 
colonies and semi-colonies), in the present context they may well be the 
dominant ethnic bourgeoisie and proletariat whose existence is a direct 
consequence of internal colonization and closely linked to the interests of 
the dominant central State and its ruling regime. While Bonacich’s model 
refers to classes in the Marxian sense of the word, Figure 17 refers to “élite” 
instead. According to Brass (1985: 49), the term “élite” is not a substitute for 
“class”, but refers to formations within ethnic groups (e.g. the aristocratic 
class) and classes (e.g. the secular élites) that often play critical roles in ethnic 
mobilization. Each of these élites may choose to act in terms of ethnic or class 
appeals. What determines their action is neither their ethnicity nor their class, 
but rather their specific relationship to competing élites in struggles for control 
Figure 17 Ethnic and Class Relations
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over their ethnic group, or in competition with persons from other ethnic 
groups for scarce political and economic benefits and resources.
An editorial of a US daily38 relates the tourists’ perception of Lhasa, 
Tibet: roadside sellers are Tibetans, shopkeepers are Han; manual labourers 
are Tibetans, clerical workers are Han; trishaw pullers are Tibetans, taxi 
drivers are Han; Tibetans or Hui might become mayor or chairperson of the 
“autonomous region” but the municipal or district secretary is almost always 
a Han; the Han people frequently get rich whereas the Hui people in the cities 
are mostly in the process of looking for a job or unemployed nongmingong 
农民工 (rural-to-urban migrant workers). Seen in terms of such stratification 
and the rigidity in social mobility, the visibly ethnic patterns of employment 
and the strong identification of ethnicity with class as exist in China’s ethnic 
regions could lead to a displacement of class-based frustrations by ethnic 
ones. Furthermore, while class mobilization may act to override ethnic 
distinctions, ethnic mobilization can obliterate internal class distinctions 
(Brass, 1985:23):
Elites who seek to gain control over or who have succeeded in gaining 
control over the state must either suppress and control [...] or establish 
collaborative alliances with other elites. When elites in conflict lack the 
bureaucratic apparatus or the instruments of violence to compete effectively, 
they will use symbolic resources in the struggle. When elites in conflict come 
from different cultural, linguistic, or religious groups, the symbolic resources 
used will emphasize those differences.
(Brass, 1985:29-30)
Figure 18  Bonacich’s Model of Ethnic and Class Relations Resulting from
  Imperialism
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Bonacich’s purpose was mainly to show how imperialism complicates 
class struggle by dividing classes along ethnic lines, and how her “split 
labour market theory” (Bonacich, 1972) could be invoked to explain such 
complications. However, the latter may not necessarily emerge in the form of 
conspicuous ethnic conflict. For instance, not only could élite members of the 
different ethnic groups who are appointed leaders of the ruling class share a 
desire to minimize conflict among themselves, but each group could also try 
to accommodate members from the other group into their respective spheres 
of predominance.
It is notable in this regard that the championing by former billionaire 
(China’s number eight richest person in Forbes’ list of 1995 with wealth worth 
two hundred million yuan) Rabiyä Qadir, who was once a CPPCC member, 
of the Uyghur cause has been doubted by some quarters of the exiled Uyghur 
community who regard her “being persecuted” to be in reality the result 
of uneven spoils sharing from government-business collusion (guan-shang 
goujie).
Observations have been made that members of China’s ethnic minorities 
are appointed to leadership positions in the ethnic regions, for instance, in the 
following comments by Tan (2004):
Contrary to the bash-China writers’ portrayal, the minority policy of China 
is better than most countries, and in fact better than that of the U.S. (in 
relation to the American Indians) and Malaysia (in relation to the Orang 
Asli). China’s constitution requires minorities to be represented in the local 
government. Thus, in a Yi majority area the county head has to be a Yi, and 
a Tibetan in the Tibetan autonomous region. In the one-person one-vote 
system of democracy practiced in Malaysia that is still largely ethnically 
based, it is almost impossible for an Orang Asli to be elected in a state or 
national election. Even where positions are bureaucratically appointed, it is 
rare, if any, for an Orang Asli to be appointed to such a position. In fact, the 
main officials of the Department of Orang Asli Affairs are not Orang Asli. 
Whereas in China there are many nationalities affairs commissions, these are 
mostly run by cadres who are minorities themselves, although in sensitive 
regions, government-trusted Han officials may hold the real power. Of 
course, China has more security concerns over certain minorities in certain 
regions, especially Xinjiang and Tibet.
To fully comprehend Tan’s assertion in the context of the political economy 
of ethnic relations, it should be noted that the dominant group may perceive 
a subordinate group as “exotic” rather than “real” (Hoetink, 1973: 177-91). 
Another example of such an “exotic” minority in Malaysia, besides the Orang 
Asli (i.e “aborigines”) is the small Gente Kristang community (autoglossonym, 
from Portuguese “Gente Cristã”) in the state of Melaka, descended from the 
16th century Portuguese settlers and occupiers. Defined as “deviating in 
somatic and/or cultural respects, without being conceived subjectively as a 
IJCS 1-2 combined PDF 25-10-10.i607   607 10/25/2010   1:08:08 AM
608      Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh  
menace to the existing social order” (Hoetink, 1967), “exotic” groups (or 
Cox’s (1948) socioracial “strangers”) are not perceived as “real”, because they 
are not subjectively comprised within the “societal image” of the dominant. 
Thus they do not attract the latter’s hostility, as do “real” subordinate groups 
viewed as a menace. The case of the Ainu アイヌ and the Burakumin 部
落民 in Japan and that of the Amerindian natives and Afro-Americans in 
the United States today are good examples of these two polar subordinate 
situations – the Ainu and Amerindians being in some way viewed as “exotic” 
is-à-is the other two “real” minorities; instead of bitterness and hostility, 
they are met with “a mild benevolence, a condescending philanthropy” on the 
part of the dominant society (Hoetink, 1973: 179). Such distinction between 
the two types of subordinate groups was vividly described by DeVos in his 
study of the Burakumin: “The basic attitudes held [by the dominant Japanese 
society] toward the Ainu are not as pejorative as towards the outcastes [i.e. 
the Burakumin] [...] the Ainu have been treated ambivalently very much as 
the American Indians have been, in contrast to the caste distinctions which 
underlie the treatment of American blacks.” (DeVos, 1972: 326) Paradoxically, 
China’s largest minority, the Zhuang, could actually be more “exotic” 
than “real”. Being the most assimilated of minorities, the Zhuang’s ethnic 
consciousness was virtually created by the Han-dominated central Communist 
Party-State in the early 1950s (see, for instance, Kaup, 2000).
By the same token, appointment to leadership positions begs the question: 
exotic or real? Whether members of an ethnic minority are appointed to 
leadership positions could ultimately be perceived by the ethnic community 
concerned as irrelevant, as it does not reflect the extent of autonomy and self-
determination which the community may regard as crucial for the preservation 
of communal interests – be they political, socioeconomic or cultural – or in 
short, who holds the real power? For instance, at the time of the riots, while 
the chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Zizhiqu is Nur Bekri, a Uyghur, in the 
eyes of the Uyghurs real power is allegedly in the hands of the Party secretary 
Wang Lequan 王乐泉, a Han.39
10. Class or Ethnicity? – The Rise of Peripheral Ethnonationalism
The well-being of freedom makes up for many wounds […] If your pupils 
have fewer bruises, they are always hindered, always enchained, always sad.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), 
Émile, ou De l’éducation, Book II, Para. 20940 
Rex (1986: xiii), in his remark that “what we call ‘race and ethnic relations 
situations’ is very often not the racial and ethnic factor as such but the 
injustice of elements in the class and status system”, emphasized the 
economic, political and social balance of power rather than biological or 
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cultural characteristics of groups. Differences in power and the dynamic 
change of power resources over time are seen as the key to explaining racial 
and ethnic conflicts. Such a perspective enables parallels to be drawn, for 
instance, between the “religious” conflict in Northern Ireland and racial 
violence in the British urban areas, which at first sight may not seem to share 
much similarity. As Stone (1985: 38) argued:
It is true that the sectarian gunman who enters a public house in Belfast 
and demands to know the religion of the drinkers before deciding who to 
murder has an identification problem not faced by the white racialist intent 
on attacking blacks in the streets of Brixton or Bradford. However ... [both] 
incidents of violence take place against a background of differential group 
power, perpetuated over the years in customary patterns of social relations 
and institutions, and both are to some degree a legacy of colonialism. 
Such a focus upon power differentials and the conceptual problem associated 
with “race” and “ethnicity”41 have led to the argument that the notion of 
“minority” is central to the analysis of race and ethnic relations (see the 
earlier discussion on the concept of “minority” in Section 7). Nevertheless, 
it is useful to compare Rex’s remark with Cox’s thesis (1948) that perceives 
race relations as mainly proletarian-bourgeois, and hence political-class, 
relations. For Cox, racial prejudice is a weapon to exploit others rather 
than a defensive reflection of group solidarity. Racial categories exist in the 
social life of capitalist societies because they serve the interests of the ruling 
class; the contradictions in these economies have not yet reached the point 
at which the actual character of the underlying system is apparent to workers 
(Banton, 1983: 88). Such reductionist Marxist legacy of perceiving ethnic 
problem as class problem, coupled with the fact of the absolute demographic 
dominance of the Han Chinese dwarfing the minorities out of a critical mass, 
could be clouding the CCP regime from effective understanding of China’s 
ethnic problem, including that in the volatile ethnic regions of Xinjiang and 
Tibet. On the contrary, Wolpe, in his critique of reductionist Marxism which 
conceives classes as unitary entities, posited a different view:
[...] classes exist in forms which are fragmented and fractured in numerous 
ways, not only by the division of labour and, indeed, the concrete organisation 
of the entire system of production and distribution through which classes are 
necessarily formed, but by politics, culture, and ideology within that division 
of labour, for example, gender, religion, the mental-manual divide and racial 
differentiation. Classes, that is, are constituted, not as unified social forces, 
but as patchworks or segments which are differentiated and divided on a 
variety of bases and by varied processes [...] Race may, under determinate 
conditions, become interiorised in class struggles in both the sphere of the 
economy as well as the sphere of politics. 
 (Wolpe, 1988: 51-52)
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Such a broadened understanding could serve to lead to a more balanced 
analytical framework on the trichotomy of polity, society and economy 
and in particular the political economy of State and ethnicity by taking 
into consideration both the two major dimensions of ethnopolitics – ethnic 
politics which includes both government responses to challenges from ethnic 
communities and the efforts of ethnic organizations seeking to influence State 
policy, and the politics of ethnicity which views ethnicity as a consequence of 
political action (Gheorghe, 1991), the latter “inverted paradigm” as we have 
observed earlier in Section 5 being exemplified by the waves of reethnicization 
in the Eastern European countries after the fall of the Communist Party 
totalitarianism and the phenomenon of ethnogenesis in Andalucía and among 
some highly Sinicized ethnic minorities of China such as the Zhuang and the 
Hui, as well as in the new-found ethnic intensity of the ethnoterritorial groups 
like the Uyghurs and Tibetans. Besides, in this regard, it is also instructive 
to compare Cox’s thesis with the theories developed by Bonacich (1972) and 
Kuper (1974). Bonacich’s “split labour market theory” is essentially a theory 
of ethnic relations which emphasizes the material bases of ethnic antagonism. 
It refers to labour markets which are divided along ethnic lines, so that higher-
paid groups of workers are distinguished from cheaper labour by their ethnic 
characteristics. Although Bonacich described it as a “class” theory of race and 
ethnicity (Bonacich, 1979: 17) and located the origin of ethnic antagonism 
within the development of capitalism, her theory differs significantly from 
Cox’s approach in that it attributes ethnic antagonism to the competition 
which arises from a differential price for labour, rather than to the strategy of 
the ruling class to keep two sections of the working class separate. 
In his study of the revolutions in several African countries, Kuper (1974) 
found that, despite the existence of class differences, once revolutions started 
they developed along ethnic rather than class lines. Although class conflict 
is the source of revolutionary change in many societies, Kuper observed that 
in plural societies “it is the political relations which appreciably determine 
the relationship to the means of production, rather than the reverse, and the 
catalyst of revolutionary change is to be found in the structure of power, 
rather than in economic changes which exhaust the possibilities of a particular 
mode of production” (Kuper, 1974: 226). While Cox attributed the main 
forms of alignment and conflict, including ethnic ones, to the relation of 
groups (classes) to the means of production, political relations in plural 
societies, according to Kuper, influence relations to the means of production 
more than any influence in the reverse direction. Thus, conflicts developed 
in plural societies tend to follow the lines of ethnic cleavage more closely 
than class division. Such trend of development is apparent in the Eastern 
European countries after the collapse of Communist Party totalitarianism 
including the strife-torn Balkans as well as the increasingly the volatile ethnic 
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regions of China exemplified by the troubled Xinjiang and Tibet, and the 
potential impact on the long-simmering peripheral ethnonationalism in Inner 
Mongolia from the recent rise of increasingly anti-Han-Chinese ethnocentrism 
of the neo-Nazis in the Republic of Mongolia42, that first country in Asia 
to come under Communist Party dictatorship and also first country in Asia 
to release herself from that yoke. A relatively high-profile case related to 
peripheral ethnonationalism in Inner Mongolia, as highlighted by the Amnesty 
International, is that of Hada who was tried behind closed doors in the Inner 
Mongolia Zizhiqu in 1996 and sentenced to 15 years in jail for separatism and 
spying and his support for the Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance that 
sought greater rights for China’s ethnic Mongolians.
11. Uttering the “F” Word: Is Federalism the Solution?
The term “federation” was in fact never officially used in China or Spain 
or Indonesia – countries in search of a solution to ethnoregional problems. 
Such notwithstanding, post-Franco Spain has in reality evolved into an 
incipient federation, while in China, just like in Indonesia, the term “federal” 
is still very much a taboo, although the existence of the Chinese de facto 
fiscal federalism is irrefutable. In a sense, post-1981 Spain has outgrown 
the fear of both fiscal and political decentralization along federal lines being 
a prelude to territorial disintegration, but China and Indonesia have not. 
Nevertheless, the idea for the reorganization of a post-CCP China along 
federal lines has resurfaced amidst the anguish, agony and bitter frustration 
among the exiled Chinese intelligentsia in the aftermath of the 1989 tragedy, 
in combination with the continuing cross-Strait tension, the “Handover” of 
Hong Kong and Macau to China respectively in 1997 and 1999, and the 
recurrent Tibet crises. Suggestions vary in arrangement details, including a 
prominent confederation proposal by exiled dissident and federalist Yan Jiaqi 
嚴家其 (1992)43 encompassing the “loose republics” of Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Macau, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang (in an arrangement like that of 
the European Union) and “close republics” consisting of the rest of present-
day China (in an arrangement akin to the US’s). Yan obviously had in mind 
some sort of coexistence of federal and confederal systems within a single 
country – two systems such as those explained by Dorff (1994: 100): “[…] in 
a true federation, the central government can make decisions directly affecting 
individuals in the regional units without the formal compliance of the regional 
governments; in a confederation, the central government has authority over 
the regional governments, not over individuals, and hence must rely on the 
cooperation and support of the regions in order to exercise authority.”
Political federalization has come under the limelight again in the case of 
China with the arrest and jailing of prominent dissident writer Liu Xiaobo 刘
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晓波 for organizing the signing of “Charter 08” (Ling-ba Xianzhang 零八宪
章)44 that included an Item 18 “A Federated Republic” among its recommen-
dations on national governance, citizens’ rights and social development:
A Federated Republic. A democratic China should seek to act as a respon-
sible major power contributing toward peace and development in the Asian 
Pacific region by approaching others in a spirit of equality and fairness. In 
Hong Kong and Macao, we should support the freedoms that already exist. 
With respect to Taiwan, we should declare our commitment to the principles 
of freedom and democracy and then, negotiating as equals, and ready to 
compromise, seek a formula for peaceful unification. We should approach 
disputes in the national-minority areas of China with an open mind, seeking 
ways to find a workable framework within which all ethnic and religious 
groups can flourish. We should aim ultimately at a federation of democratic 
communities of China.45
While a nascent federalist structure has already been observed to be emerging 
in China as a result of rapid economic and fiscal decentralization, there 
could be inherent dangers to bring decentralization beyond the fiscal into 
the political along federal lines. Acute interregional economic inequalities 
could be viewed as incompatible with the very concept of federalism, and 
it is hence debatable as to whether federalization should come before or 
after sufficient interregional equalization in countries with high levels of 
interregional disparities such as contemporary China, taking into consideration 
the possibility of centrifugal forces triggered by interregional equalization 
efforts such as the tax revolts in modern federations like Belgium or would-be 
federations like Italy (ibid.: 274).
Though focusing on dyadic (or bicommunal) federations and con-
federations, Duchacek (1988: 15-18) identified four prerequisites for the 
possibility of federalism or confederalism as a cooperative framework 
which, for the present context, could also be considered applicable to non-
dyadic cases: 1) territorial diffusion of power; 2) pluralistic democracy; 
3) commitment to establish or maintain a composite nation; and 4) 
compound majoritarianism, all of which are not clearly evident in the case 
of contemporary China, especially in view of the recent ethnoregional 
disturbances. A line of thought similar to Duchacek’s is reflected in van 
Amersfoort’s (1978) typology of “majority-minority” relations via a 
combination of the orientations of dispersed and concentrated subordinate 
groups with three dimensions of dominant group aspirations. Using the 
terms “dominant” (or “superordinate”) and “subordinate” that convey more 
accurately the power dimension, instead of van Amersfoort’s “majority” and 
“minority” which can be semantically confusing when size and power do 
not coincide, Figure 19 illustrates a number of probable outcomes produced 
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by this configuration. Ethnic consciousness and ethnic intensity, which are 
associated with the homeland/immigrant dichotomy and territorial policies 
in countries with considerable degree of sectionalism, play a crucial role in 
determining public policy in a multiethnic society. From this perspective, 
the goals of the dominant and subordinate groups are of particularly great 
importance. Figure 19 clearly demonstrates that a stable relationship between 
the dominants and subordinates free of conflict is an exception rather than a 
rule, since only two out of a total of twelve cells formed by the interface of 
dominant-subordinate orientations – those marked “emancipation process” 
and “federalism” – suggest the prospect of a stable form of participation in 
society by subordinate groups. Federalism, as a “process and institutional 
framework for territorial management of power and resources […] 
appropriate for those communities that occupy geographically delineated 
areas and are both willing and able to preserve and exercise self-government 
within these areas” (Duchacek, 1988: 16), is thus far from a prevalent 
phenomenon even in the world context.
While democratization and the federalization process (the latter refers to 
the Comunidades Autónomas project, as the term “federal” is not officially 
used) of the Spanish polity after the death of Franco have been looked 
upon by many countries with ethnoterritorial problems undergoing political 
transition as a model to emulate, van Amersfoort’s model suggests that a 
federal solution may be an exception rather than a rule among nations given 
the different objective realities facing different countries.46 For instance, in 
China, unlike in Spain, the lack of a stable democratic political institution 
and the existence of economic deprivation can render intergroup compromise 
difficult or impossible. In short, variations in one or more of these socio-
politico-economic parameters can result in a drastically different form of 
State response to the objective exigencies presented by a country’s ethnic 
fractionalization and of societal reaction to State intervention.
While the present taboo against a federal arrangement with high regional 
autonomy47 has had deep roots from earlier times48, it is currently being 
further enhanced by CCP’s fear of losing its monopoly of political power as 
federalization would inevitably tend to go hand in hand with democratization. 
Adding to that is the enigma of Taiwan49 and the problem of Tibet with their 
perceived links with foreign, especially American and Indian, interests. With 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union50 always hanging like the sword of 
Damocles to remind the present leaders and people of China of the peril of 
democratization and regional autonomy, and the fact that federalization or 
reaffirmation of federalism in whether Russia, the East European countries or 
post-Franco Spain both followed the disgraceful dethronement of dictatorial, 
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, the present Chinese ruling regime’s 
reservation against such federalization by devolution is plainly understandable. 
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After all, the eventual disintegration of the Russian empire (the “prison of 
nations”, or in its modern form, the former Soviet Union) in December 1991 
has left China to be the world’s lone surviving former empire still remaining 
intact, having escaped that ignominious fate of dissolution that befell, besides 
the Russian empire, all in the 20th century, the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian 
and the Western maritime empires (ibid.: 276-277). Incidentally, one ethnic 
region did escape from China, namely Outer Mongolia that formed the 
independent Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924, with Russian support, 
though not recognized by China until 1946. Also, as we have seen earlier, the 
Uyghurs in fact established, with Russian help, a short-lived East Turkestan 
Republic in 1944, but it collapsed after the 1949 Communist victory in 
China’s civil war, and the region was reincorporated into China as the 
Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu in 1955. Besides these, the island province of Taiwan 
has been de facto independent since 1949, regardless of the fact that it is not 
diplomatically so recognized by most countries of the world for Realpolitik 
reasons and that the government of the island state continues to technically 
consider itself the legitimate “Republic of China” government-in-exile 
with jurisdiction over all China.51 Finally, adding to the federal taboo is the 
tendency to recycle the “black hand” (heishou 黑手) theory – the “shopworn 
conspiracy theories that blame mass protests primarily on the CCP’s foreign 
and domestic enemies, reflecting the classic Leninist insistence that social 
protest in a Communist country cannot just happen, it must be instigated” 
(Tanner, 2004: 143) – which seems apparent in the State’s response to the 
2009 Xinjiang crisis or the 2008 Tibet riots. Similar State response can be 
observed following the July Fifth Xinjiang riots when Nur Bekri, chairman of 
the Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu, declared on 18th July 2009 the source of the riots 
being “the triumvirate of terrorist, secessionist and extremist forces”52 and Wu 
Shimin 吴仕民, vice-chairman of China’s State Ethnic Affairs Commission, 
stated on 21st July 2009 that the July Fifth riots had absolutely nothing to do 
with China’s nationality (ethnic minority) policies. “In a world that is obsessed 
with vertical accountability we easily judge and label situations that appear to 
be in a crisis as dysfunctional, to be in a state of failure […],” Reeler (2007: 
15) noted, “Whilst this might be true in some situations […] developmental 
crises […] unconsciously and quite naturally evolve, often as a social system 
grows beyond the relationships and capacities that hold it together.” Not all 
crises are failures, Reeler further observed:
Take a pioneering organisation that grows in size and complexity beyond 
the ability of the pioneers to lead and manage […] The unavoidable and 
typical crisis of the pioneering organisation often manifests in a breakdown 
of relationships, of leadership legitimacy, of commitment, and signals the 
need and the opportunity to rethink its nature, its identity, structure or power 
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relationships, its functioning and culture, which, once done, can give way to 
a new lease on life, a new phase of growth and development. Transformation 
requires and is borne out of the ripening and surfacing of crisis.
(ibid.: 16)
This means, in other words, facing up to domestic realities and pondering the 
possibility of transformative change (see Figure 4 and Figure 21 in the special 
issue’s prologue on China’s social transformation), without which any solution 
to the root problems leading to either the 1989 tragedy or the recent Xinjiang 
and Lhasa riots would remain illusive.53
Buchanan (1995: 23), writing on the path dependency of constitutional 
reform towards competitive federalism (Figure 20), remarked that any reform, 
constitutional or otherwise, “commences from some ‘here and now,’ some 
status quo that is the existential reality. History matters, and the historical 
experience of a political community is beyond any prospect of change; the 
constitutional-institutional record can neither be ignored nor rewritten […]” If 
the “here” is a centralized and unitary political authority, constitutional reform 
must embody devolution – a shift of genuine political power from the centre 
to the separate constituent political units. 
Figure 20 Competitive Federalism: Constitutional Reform Schemata
Source: Buchanan (1995: 24), Figure 1.
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One of the basic features of a federal system, according to Bakvis and 
Chandler (1987: 4), is that it provides “incentives for structuring group/class 
conflicts along territorial lines”. When the territories concerned represent 
the centres of concentration of distinctive socioracial communities, ethnic 
conflicts are translated into territorial rivalries and the process of fiscal 
federalization becomes an arena of ethnic resource competition. Evaluating 
the role of asymmetrical federalism54 in explaining India’s ability to “hold 
together”, Tillin (2006: 62) noted that linguistic reorganization of the Indian 
states “involved the accommodation of linguistic differences, but not on a 
basis that allowed differential protection to any regional language, and not 
on a basis that formed otherwise coherent ‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ federal sub-
units.” Notably, Manor (1996) argued that ‘‘ethnic’’ identities in India tend 
to be crosscutting rather than compounding but once states were reorganized 
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along linguistic lines, their inhabitants discovered all the things that divided 
them55, which in our present context could be leading down the ominous path 
to the state of bellum omnium contra omnes, vindicating Thomas Hobbes’s 
portentous judgement in his 1651 treatise Leviathan, “The condition of man 
[…] is a condition of war of everyone against everyone.” This “state of 
nature” – the war of all against all, Hobbes argued in Leiathan, could only 
be averted by a strong central government. Such, just as for India, as we have 
observed so far, could also have the same resonance for the case of the other 
Asian giant, China.
Nevertheless, Dorff (1994), exploring the role played by federalism in the 
fragmentation of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, warned 
that federal structures, when not accompanied by federal process, could have 
contributed to the fragmentation of these countries. According to Dorff, the 
argument that federalism in USSR, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia ameliorated 
ethnic conflict “seriously understates the role of the center and the peculiar 
control mechanism offered by the centralized, hierarchical Communist party 
organization”. Citing Verdery (1993) and Roeder (1991), Dorff pointed out 
that these one-party states’ federalist structures, without federalist processes, 
initially used to suppress, not accommodate, ethnic differences, had actually 
helped to create a political environment ripe for disintegration via ethnic 
mobilization once decentralization began, as regional leaderships bent on 
protecting the interests of their territorial constituencies at the expense of other 
regions and the federation:
Strong central authority and a hierarchical Communist party structure 
militated against accommodative and cooperative processes. When the 
power of the center began to weaken, the political system shifted not toward 
a decentralized politics of accommodation but to a politics of cutthroat 
competition between the center and the periphery and among the units of 
the periphery.
(Dorff, 1994: 104)
Hence, the danger of fragmentation coming from democratization and 
federalization is real but not inevitable, as shown by the two examples 
illustrated in Figure 21.
In this regard, it could be highly equivocal to keep seeing the dis-
integration of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union as a sword of 
Damocles warning against federal structures. On the contrary, the fate of 
these disintegrated nations could be a lesson to take heed of at this juncture 
just passing the 20th anniversary of the 1989 tragedy, in particular after the 
foreboding events of last two years’ massive, deadly ethnoregional riots, 
to begin early the federal process. Definitely, a federal process is always 
full of pitfalls, especially for a country still facing the problems of high 
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incidence of poverty, ethnoterritoriality, sectionalism and ethnoregional 
socioeconomic disparities. Inevitably, it is also a process abounding with 
right and wrong options and choices. Again, consider the case of Spain whose 
regional structure bears substantial similarity to the Chinese – for instance, 
only three out of Spain’s seventeen Comunidades Autónomas, comprising 
less than 30 per cent of the country’s population, are non-Castilian ethnic 
regions, in contrast to countries like Belgium or the former Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia where the state is composed of constituent 
regions each of which populated predominantly with a differentiated ethnic 
community. As up to 1.5 million people walked the Gran Via, Diagonal and 
Passeig de Gràcia (Paseo de Gracia) boulevards in Barcelona on the eve of 
Spain winning in the 2010 World Cup final demanding greater autonomy 
and claiming nationhood for Catalunya (Cataluña), bringing again to the fore 
Spain’s dilemma in pondering her options whether to move on from the State 
of the Autonomies to a full-fledged federation – through a whole spectrum 
of scenarios as summarized by Brassloff (1989: 41-45) into the evolutionist 
minimalist regional autonomist, radically revisionist neo-centralist, radically 
European regionalist, nationalist particularist, mixed federo-regional and, 
lastly, the federalist maximalist in which the presently evolving State of the 
Autonomies may develop all its potential and end up operating as a federal 
state – it could also be timely for an Asian giant in astounding transformation 
to ponder new options other than a dictablanda56 or even a democradura with 
the perpetually uneasy coexistence of economic decentralization with political 
centralism or, as a former vice-premier pointed out, being constantly trapped 
in the perennial “cycles of decentralization and recentralization”57 that breed 
unending chaos and instability.
Figure 21 Federal Sustainability
Source: de Figueiredo, McFaul and Weingast (2007: 175), Figure 3.
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12. Conclusion
This paper has examined China’s ethnoregional disparity, ethnoterritoriality 
and peripheral nationalism as well as decentralization and the related, 
controversial issue of federalism by scrutinizing various crucial aspects 
including the political, economic, sociological and historical. More specific 
elements like the country’s seemingly paradoxical de facto fiscal federalism 
amidst political unitarism, ethnoterritoriality, poverty, interregional disparity, 
threat of centrifugal forces, ethnogenesis, reethnicization, and the fear of 
balkanization or spectre of “China deconstructs” have received particular 
attention. To summarize and conclude, as Tillin (2006: 45) noted:
There is considerable disagreement about the role of federalism in countries 
containing more than one territorially concentrated ethnic group or nation. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia led to 
renewed questioning of the desirability of federal systems in heterogeneous 
countries, even though their democratic shortcomings limited the federal 
character of their polities.
Similarly, Snyder (2000: 40) advised that “[w]herever possible, democratizing 
states should try to promote civic identities and guarantee rights at the 
individual level. For the same reasons, ethnically based federalism and 
regional autonomy should be avoided, since they create political organizations 
and media markets that are centred on ethnic differences.” Particularly 
notable for our present context is, as Bunce (2004) observed, that the way 
federal or quasi-federal systems were organized along the ethnic territorial 
boundaries in the Communist Party-ruled authoritarian countries contained 
the building blocks for later ethno-nationalist movements, making federalism 
undesirable in multiethnic, democratizing countries due to its potential for 
institutionalizing and politicizing ethnic differences. Yet, citing Stepan (1999: 
20) and Bermeo (2004: 475-477), Tillin (2006: 46) argued that “it has been 
shown empirically both that long-standing multinational democracies tend to 
have federal systems and that federal systems of government have been better 
than unitary systems at eliminating violent conflict”.
Nevertheless, for Chinese leaders, the Russian experience, as Konitzer 
and Wegren (2006: 503) succinctly related below, may provide a warning:
Among the political legacies bequeathed to Vladimir Putin were a decen-
tralized political system and a nascent federalist structure that successfully 
avoided the disintegration of the Russian Federation following the breakup 
of the Soviet Union […] However, some analysts argue that Yeltsin’s 
famous 1990 edict to Tatarstan and Bashkortostan to ‘‘take as much 
sovereignty as you can swallow,’’ and the ‘‘parade of sovereignties’’ that 
followed, meant that Russia’s decentralization went too far and threatened 
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Russia’s federal integrity […] Since Yeltsin left the political scene at the end 
of 1999, a major turning point in Russia’s political development has been 
political recentralization, with some analysts charging that Putin is trying 
to establish a ‘‘unitary state’’ by ‘‘aggressively pursuing an anti-federal 
policy’’ […]
Such fear might not be unfounded. Recalling Stepan’s (1999) observation 
that no successful federal unions were created by independent states since the 
19th century, and that by Lake and Rothchild (2005) that most recent attempts 
of territorial decentralization also failed or were viewed as mere transitional 
arrangements, Roust and Shvetsova (2007: 244-245) noted:
The problem is that federal arrangements are inherently unstable […] In order 
to succeed, federal constitutions (and schemes of political decentralization in 
general) require special safeguards to counter their tendency to move toward 
either extreme decentralization or overcentralization […] As it is difficult 
to implement credible safeguards, prospective member states cannot trust 
each other and thus seek to avoid the federal form and the risks associated 
with federal instability […] federal stability (robustness) requires for itself 
a well-functioning democratic process, which satisfies a fairly restrictive 
condition. The requirement to the democratic process is, of course, only a 
necessary, not a sufficient condition for the federal success. Yet […] only the 
states with well-developed (properly institutionalized) democratic electoral 
competition have a chance to form a resilient federal union and sustain their 
federal constitutional arrangements not just in form, but in their political 
practice as well.
Finally, on a brighter note, while admitting that the process of the 
institutionalization of authoritarian rule in China since reform began has 
generated limited momentum towards a more open political system, Pei 
opined that
Though little has been achieved thus far in the way of actual demo-
cratization, the institutional foundations for genuine democracy are slowly 
taking shape. The maturation of the rule of law, the NPC, and village 
self-government are important components of this evolutionary process 
[…] While centralized bureaucratic empires are extremely vulnerable 
to centrifugal forces and tend to collapse when the political authority of 
the center drastically declines, a federalized system with a well-defined 
division of political authority can create numerous political safety valves 
to reduce the stress on the center and limit its political liability. In China, 
genuine political decentralization founded upon an emerging economic 
federalist structure augurs well for future regional democratic break-
throughs.
(Pei, 1995: 77)
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It need not be reiterated that China is a highly decentralized country, at 
least economically or fiscally, and there will be continuing debate on the future 
need for and the direction of decentralization – in its various manifestations: 
political, fiscal, administrative – and the concomitant prospects for federalism, 
again in its various manifestations, which could be as sensitive and subversive 
in China as in Indonesia, would keep returning to haunt a colossal country 
in breathtaking transformation. To move beyond the present de facto fiscal 
federalism, any plan for federalization should no doubt be conducted with 
caution, and the very necessity, feasibility and all attendant hazards have to 
be considered in real earnest, as Saunders (1995: 78) noted:
Federalist elements are closely linked with other aspects of the system of 
government. They are likely to work differently, although not necessarily 
unsatisfactorily, when separated from them, or even from the historical, 
political, and economic setting in which they developed.
Yet, as Duchacek asked in the abstract of his 1988 article on bicommunal 
polities where permanent asymmetry makes a simple majoritarian formula for 
decision-making processes unacceptable: “What other decisional frameworks 
have a greater chance for success: federalism, federalism with a heavy dose 
of confederal ingredients, regional confederation, consociationalism or 
secession?” A confederal modification of federalism has so far appeared to be 
the answer, according to Duchacek (1988: 31):
Despite its obvious deficiencies, the confederal-consociational modification 
of federalism is more acceptable to two asymmetric and antagonistic 
communities than a concept of a federal overarching cultural political union 
with its promise of majoritarian decisionmaking. Despite a constant threat 
of veto and thus potential immobilism, both basic and current issues have to 
be negotiated and renegotiated time and again.
Though China is not dyadic in terms of ethnic composition, her ethnic Han 
absolute dominance in demographic make-up is-à-is her ethnic minorities 
does give her a certain similarity to a dyadic case. Moving forward along a 
more comprehensive federalist line may or may not be the only feasible or 
necessary or even correct step from her present stage of fiscal decentralization, 
but such doubt and reservation could inevitably be tempered by Duchacek’s 
(ibid.) disarming and familiar query in his observation on the prevalent 
reserved reaction to the confederal nonmajoritarian formula and its piecemeal 
and irritatingly slow implementation by compromise and consensus: “If not 
that, what else?”
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Appendix
Ethnic Fractionalization of 240 Countries/Regions
Rank  Country/Region EFI
 1 Congo, Democratic Rep. of the (formerly Zaire) 0.885 
 2 Uganda, Republic of 0.883 
 3 Kenya, Republic of 0.877 
 4 India, Republic of 0.876 
 5 South Africa, Republic of 0.873 
 6 Cameroon, Republic of 0.852 
 7 Mali, Republic of 0.844 
 8 Philippines, Republic of the 0.838 
 9.5 Nigeria, Federal Republic of 0.827 
 9.5 Tanzania, United Republic of 0.827 
 11 Cote d’Ivoire/IvoryCoast, Republic of 0.826 
 12 Lebanon, Republic of 0.821 
 13 Mauritius 0.814 
 14 Zambia, Republic of 0.813 
 15 Chad, Republic of 0.810 
 16.5 Guinea-Bissau, Republic of 0.806 
 16.5 Papua New Guinea, Independent State of 0.806 
 18 Yugoslavia, Socialist Fed. Rep. of (pre-Jan 1992) 0.795 
 19 Suriname, Republic of 0.789 
 20 Senegal, Republic of 0.788 
 21 Madagascar, Democratic Republic of 0.776 
 22.5 Sierra Leone, Republic of 0.771 
 22.5 Angola, People’s Republic of 0.771 
 24 Gabonese Republic 0.765 
 25 Gambia, Republic of The 0.764 
 26 Central African Republic 0.757 
 27 Ethiopia (pre-May 1993) 0.756 
 28 Indonesia, Republic of 0.754 
 29 Qatar, State of 0.746 
 30 Liberia, Republic of 0.745 
 31 Guinea, Republic of 0.742 
 32 Ghana, Republic of 0.741 
 33 Afganistan, Republic of 0.739 
 34 Bolivia, Republic of 0.735 
 35 Burkina Faso 0.734 
 36 Mozambique, Republic of 0.727 
 37 Cayman Islands (UK) 0.720 
 38 Ethiopia (post-May 1993) 0.717
 39 Sudan, Republic of the 0.715 
 40 Canada 0.714 
 41 Belize 0.711 
 42 Guam (US) 0.705 
 43 Eritrea 0.699 
 44 Malawi, Republic of 0.691 
 45 Togo, Republic of 0.689 
 46 Virgin Islands (US) 0.688 
 47 Congo, Republic of the 0.685 
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Appendix (continued)
Rank  Country/Region EFI
 48.5 Monaco, Principality of 0.684 
 48.5 Malaysia 0.684 
 50 Kazakhstan, Republic of 0.679 
 51.5 Kuwait, State of 0.675 
 51.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.675 
 53.5 New Caledonia (Fr.) 0.671 
 53.5 Niger, Republic of 0.671 
 55 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (former) 0.670 
 56 East Timor 0.667 
 57 Laos/Lao People’s Democratic Republic 0.665 
 58 Kyrgyzstan, Republic of 0.664 
 59 Namibia, Republic of 0.663 
 60 Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.661 
 61.5 Mauritania, Islamic Republic of 0.660 
 61.5 Benin, Republic of 0.660 
 63 French Polynesia (Fr.) 0.656 
 64.5 Micronesia, Federated States of 0.655 
 64.5 United Arab Emirates 0.655 
 66 Andorra, Principality of 0.651 
 67 Pakistan, Islamic Republic of 0.648 
 68 Guatemala, Republic of 0.645 
 69 Morocco, Kingdom of 0.643 
 70 Peru, Republic of 0.637 
 71 Trinidad and Tobago, Republic of 0.635 
 72 Nepal, Kingdom of 0.634 
 73 Guyana, Co-operative Republic of 0.628 
 74 Ecuador, Republic of 0.615 
 75 Latvia, Republic of 0.612 
 76 Colombia, Republic of 0.601 
 77 Cuba, Republic of 0.591 
 78 Djibouti, Republic of 0.585 
 79.5 Tajikistan, Republic of 0.583 
 79.5 Nauru, Republic of 0.583
 81 Fiji, Republic of 0.580 
 82 Belgium, Kingdom of 0.574 
 83 Macedonia, Republic of 0.573 
 84 Bahrain, State of 0.566 
 85 Yugoslavia, Federal Rep. of (post-Jan 1992) 0.561 
 86 Hawai’i (US) 0.560 
 87 Bhutan, Kingdom of 0.555 
 88 Christmas Island (Australia) 0.552 
 89 Cape Verde, Republic of 0.551 
 90 Liechtenstein, Principality of 0.550 
 91 Brazil, Federative Republic of 0.549 
 92 Moldova, Republic of 0.546 
 93 Georgia, Republic of 0.545 
 94 Mexico/United Mexican States 0.542 
 95 Thailand, Kingdom of 0.535 
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Appendix (continued)
Rank  Country/Region EFI
 96 Switzerland/Swiss Confederation 0.531 
 97 Estonia, Republic of 0.528 
 98 French Guiana (Fr.) 0.526 
 99 Brunei Darussalam, State of 0.525 
 100 Zimbabwe, Republic of 0.522 
 101 Burma, Union of 0.520 
 102 Gibraltar (UK) 0.517 
 103 Yemen, Republic of (post-May 1990) 0.507 
 104 Iraq, Republic of 0.502 
 105 Tonga, Kingdom of 0.500 
 106.5 Man, Isle of (UK) 0.498 
 106.5 Chile, Republic of 0.498 
 108 Venezuela, Republic of 0.497 
 109 Yemen Arab Republic (pre-May 1990) 0.495 
 110 Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) 0.493 
 111 Cocos Islands (Australia) 0.487 
 112.5 Nicaragua, Republic of 0.484 
 112.5 Uzbekistan, Republic of 0.484 
 114 Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of 0.481 
 115 Palau Islands (US) 0.480 
 116 Singapore, Republic of 0.479 
 117 Panama, Republic of 0.477 
 118 Bermuda (UK) 0.476 
 119 Svalbard (Norway) 0.468 
 120 Czechoslovakia (former) 0.464
 121 Albania, Republic of 0.460 
 122 Turkmenistan 0.455 
 123 Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of 0.452 
 124.5 Northern Mariana Islands (US) 0.444 
 124.5 Norfolk Island (Australia) 0.444 
 126 Spain 0.436 
 127.5 Dominican Republic 0.429 
 127.5 Sri Lanka, Democratic Socialist Republic of 0.429 
 129 Sao Tome and Principe, Democratic Republic of 0.420 
 130 Botswana, Republic of 0.418 
 131.5 Ukraine 0.417 
 131.5 Syrian Arab Republic 0.417 
 133 Oman, Sultanate of 0.406 
 134 Puerto Rico (US) 0.405 
 135 Northern Ireland (UK) 0.403 
 137 United States of America 0.395 
 137 Equatorial Guinea, Republic of 0.395 
 137 Jamaica 0.395 
 139 Algeria, Democratic and Popular Republic of 0.375
 140 Belarus, Republic of 0.373 
 141 Croatia 0.371 
 142 Cyprus 0.358 
 143 Lithuania, Republic of 0.345 
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Appendix (continued)
Rank  Country/Region EFI
 144 Western Sahara 0.343 
 145 West Bank (of the Jordan River) 0.339 
 146 Barbados 0.333 
 147 Turkey, Republic of 0.330 
 148 Cook Islands (NZ) 0.327 
 149 United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland 0.325 
 150 Aruba (Neth.) 0.320 
 151 Russian Federation 0.311 
 152.5 Grenada 0.308 
 152.5 Azerbaijan, Republic of 0.308 
 154 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.306 
 155 Israel, State of 0.303 
 156 Bangladesh, People’s Republic of 0.285 
 157 Rwanda, Republic of 0.275 
 158 San Marino, Most Serene Republic of 0.272 
 159.5 Quebec (Canada) 0.270 
 159.5 Egypt, Arab Republic of 0.270
 161 American Samoa (US) 0.269 
 162 Bulgaria, Republic of 0.264 
 163 Viet Nam, Socialist Republic of 0.262 
 164 Burundi, Republic of 0.258 
 165 Somalia 0.256 
 168 Bahamas, The Commonwealth of the 0.255 
 168 Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of 0.255 
 168 Argentina/Argentine Republic 0.255 
 168 Netherlands Antilles (Neth.) 0.255 
 168 Saint Helena (UK) 0.255 
 171 Slovakia 0.254 
 172 Lesotho, Kingdom of 0.253 
 173.5 Greenland/Kalaallit Nunaat 0.241 
 173.5 Comoros, Federal Islamic Republic of the 0.241 
 175 Cambodia, State of 0.238 
 176 Costa Rica, Republic of 0.237 
 177 France/French Republic 0.235 
 178 Uruguay, Oriental Republic of 0.218 
 179 New Zealand 0.217 
 180.5 Romania 0.202 
 180.5 El Salvador, Republic of 0.202 
 182.5 Italy/Italian Republic 0.196 
 182.5 Niue (NZ) 0.196 
 184 Mongolia 0.187 
 185 Swaziland, Kingdom of 0.186 
 187.5 Saint Lucia 0.185 
 187.5 Guadeloupe (Fr.) 0.185 
 187.5 Martinique (Fr.) 0.185 
 187.5 Honduras, Republic of 0.185 
 190 British Virgin Islands (UK) 0.180 
 191 Slovenia 0.170 
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Appendix (continued)
Rank  Country/Region EFI
 192 Hungary, Republic of 0.168 
 193 Sweden, Kingdom of 0.164 
 194 Antigua and Barbuda 0.150 
 195 Western Samoa, Independent State of 0.138 
 196.5 Germany, Federal Republic of (pre-Oct 1990) 0.134 
 196.5 Germany, Federal Republic of (post-Oct 1990) 0.134 
 199 Yemen, People’s Democratic Republic of (former) 0.133 
 199 Solomon Islands 0.133 
 199 Reunion (Fr.) 0.133
 201 Armenia, Republic of 0.128 
 202 China, People’s Republic of 0.125 
 203 Finland, Republic of 0.122 
 204 Libya/Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahi. 0.117 
 205.5 Seychelles 0.115 
 205.5 Saint Kitts and Nevis, Federation of 0.115 
 207.5 Czech Republic 0.114 
 207.5 Vanuatu, Republic of 0.114 
 209 Ireland, Republic of 0.113 
 210 Cyprus (Greek sector) 0.097 
 212.5 Macao (China) 0.096 
 212.5 Malta 0.096 
 212.5 Paraguay, Republic of 0.096 
 212.5 Australia, Commonwealth of 0.096 
 215 Haiti, Republic of 0.095 
 216 Japan 0.079 
 218.5 Montserrat (UK) 0.077 
 218.5 Iceland, Republic of 0.077 
 218.5 Netherlands, Kingdom of the 0.077 
 218.5 Tuvalu 0.077 
 221 Greece/Hellenic Republic 0.068 
 222.5 Denmark, Kingdom of 0.059 
 222.5 Dominica 0.059 
 224.5 Marshall Islands, Republic of the 0.058 
 224.5 Norway, Kingdom of 0.058 
 226 Poland, Republic of 0.047 
 227 Cyprus (Turkish sector) 0.045 
 230 Tunisia, Republic of 0.039 
 230 Kiribati 0.039 
 230 Taiwan (Republic of China) 0.039 
 230 Hong Kong (China) 0.039 
 230 Falkland Islands (UK) 0.039 
 234.5 Gaza Strip 0.020 
 234.5 Saint Pierre and Miquelon (Fr.) 0.020 
 234.5 Mayotte (Fr.) 0.020 
 234.5 German Democratic Republic (former) 0.020 
 237 Portugal, Republic of 0.019 
 238 Austria, Republic of 0.012 
 239 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 0.004 
 240 Korea, Republic of 0.002 
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1.   As Lijphart (1977: 56) remarked, “The notion of a multiple balance of power 
contains two separate elements: (1) a balance, or an approximate equilibrium, 
among the segments, and (2) the presence of at least three different segments.” 
However, cooperation among groups becomes more difficult, as the number 
participating in negotiations increases beyond three or four. On the other hand, 
a moderately multiple configuration is preferable to a dual segmentation as the 
latter entails a constant tension between “a [majority] hegemony or a precarious 
balance [and it leads] easily to an interpretation of politics as a zero-sum game” 
(ibid.). Bi-ethnic states are thus a special, problematic type of multiethnic state. In 
a bi-ethnic state, a gain for one ethnic group is easily perceived as a loss for the 
other. By contrast, in societies with more than two major ethnic groups it may not 
be apparent who loses when one ethnic group improves its position. This can lead 
to a logrolling situation, in which each group cares primarily about its own gains 
and nobody is conscious of the possible costs of a policy decision. The scenario 
is outlined in Steiner’s study on consociationalism in Switzerland (Steiner, 1974). 
It also implies that ethnic tension could be more easily aroused by preferential 
policies in bi-ethnic states than in those with more than two ethnic groups.
2.   According to the “critical mass” theory – advanced, among others, by Semyonov 
and Tyree (1981) – societies are considered multiethnic only if minorities 
constitute more than ten per cent of their population.
3.   Affirmative action and preferential treatment are “race-conscious” and “group-
centred” strategies in contexts where the dominant policy form, particularly in 
liberal democracies, is individual-centred and “colour-blind” (Edwards, 1994: 
55).
4.   For a detailed discussion of illiteracy, illness and the poverty trap in China 
especially in her ethnic regions, see Yeoh (2008a: 43-46).
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5.   Including that of the highly Sinicized Manchurian Qing (Ch’ing 清) dynasty.
6.   Year refers to publication date of English translation. Weber’s original manuscript 
was written between 1910 and 1914.
7.   Or in a different setting, take the case of Malaysia. According to Cheah (1984), 
the Malay ethnic identity (bangsa Melayu) was a creation after 1939 in response 
to the perceived threat from the increasingly politicized immigrants from China 
and India. The notion of a Malay race had therefore hitherto been absent, as 
Cheah elaborated: “[...] the Malays rose to confront what they considered threats 
posed by the immigrant races to their rights, but the Malays themselves had not 
been united as a race or a ‘bangsa’, and moreover they had not found a way to 
solve differences among themselves [... Such differences] were nurtured by the 
strong provincial feeling among the ‘provincial Malays’ (such as the Kelantan 
Malays, Perak Malays and so on), DKA Malays (those of Arab descent) and DKK 
Malays (those of Indian descent) [... There were also] tribal divisions, such as 
the Bugis, Minangkabau, Javanese, etc.” (translated from Cheah, 1984: 83) The 
first open suggestion of a “Malay people” (orang Melayu) came only in 1939 
when Ibrahim Yaacob (or I.K. Agastja by his Indonesian name) championed the 
notion of a unified Malay race across Malaya and Indonesia which he christened 
Melayu Raya (Great Malay) or Indonesia Raya. The boundary marker of ethnicity 
was thus mobilized to meet the rising need of identity investment for politico-
economic purposes. An even more blatantly political ethnicization came after 
the 1969 riots in the creation of the “Bumiputera” race (kaum Bumiputera). 
Bumiputera (a term of Sanskrit origin meaning literally “prince of the land; son 
of the soil”) became an official collective term grouping together the Malays, the 
aboriginals and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak (both on the Borneo island) 
after these two regions joined the Peninsula in 1963 to form Malaysia. It excludes 
“immigrant races” like Chinese, Indians and Europeans, but not Arabs and Malays 
from Indonesia.
8.   See Yeoh (2008b: 81). While emphasizing the importance of the ethnic factor 
in understanding the role of the State does not diminish the significance of 
contention between social classes, it serves to avoid the pitfall of reductionist 
Marxism, in which, as Wolpe (1988: 15) remarked, ethnicity “becomes merely 
an external instrument for the reproduction of class interests which are assumed 
to be entirely defined by the economic relation of production”.
9.   This contradistinction in proportion is apparent in the fact that “while the Han 
population in Sinkiang and Tibet was nil, in 1949 Han Chinese comprised more 
than half of the total population of all China’s national minority areas averaged 
together” (Moseley, 1966: 14).
10.  Did the completion in 2006 of the Qinghai-Tibet (Qing-Zang 青藏) railway, 
said to bring modernity and economic progress to Tibet, also signal a new 
phase of Sinicization of Tibet? This is a fear that the 14th Dalai Lama’s Tibetan 
government-in-exile has not been hesitant to voice.
11.  One of the most notable of such incidents, before the more recent riots in 
Lhasa and Ürümqi was the Han-Hui conflict in October 2004 that occurred 
in the Nanren 南仁 village and two other nearby villages in Henan province’s 
Zhongmou 中牟 county, which allegedly killed more than 100 people including 
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at least 15 policemen, and injured more than 400 people. Though the conflict 
was probably triggered by a local traffic accident and rooted in strong historical-
cultural factors including perceived overall Han dominance and backlash against 
certain preferential policies for the ethnic minorities, simmering tensions might 
have been exacerbated by China’s economic success that led to a growing gap 
between rich and poor, especially in the countryside. Other than the Nanren 
conflict, there was also the unconfirmed news of another serious Han-Hui 
conflict in August 2007 in the Shimiao 石庙 township in Huimin 惠民 county 
of Shandong province, close to the Hui county of Shanghe 商河, that resulted in 
at least a death and more than twenty injured. This was not the first such open 
conflict in Shandong which earlier experienced the well-known “Yangxin 阳信 
incident” in 2000 when six Hui were killed during a thousand-strong Hui protest 
against a “Qingzhen Zhurou 清真猪肉” [halal pork] shop sign.
12.  东方日报, 9th July 2009.
13.  东方日报, 30th July 2009.
14.  Yale professor Amy Chua, in her highly controversial book World on Fire: How 
Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability 
(2003) contended that the spread of free market democracy breeds ethnic violence 
in developing countries by simultaneously concentrating wealth in the hands of 
the ethnic minority and empowering the impoverished majority that resents the 
former. “The global spread of democratization reflects the powerful assumption 
in Western policy and intellectual circles that markets and democracy go hand 
in hand”, wrote Chua, “But in the numerous countries around the world with a 
market-dominant minority, just the opposite has proved true. Adding democracy 
to markets has been a recipe for instability, upheaval, and ethnic conflagration 
[…] As markets enrich the market-dominant minority, democratization increases 
the political voice and power of the frustrated majority. The competition for 
votes fosters the emergence of demagogues who scapegoat the resented minority, 
demanding an end to humiliation, and insisting that the nation’s wealth be 
reclaimed by its ‘true owners.’ […] As popular hatred of the ‘outsiders’ mounts, 
the result is an ethnically charged political pressure cooker in which some form 
of backlash is almost unavoidable.” (Chua, 2004: 124)
15.  The spectre of China’s disintegration has never ceased to haunt the generation 
of Chinese who have had the first-hand experience of China’s humiliation at the 
hands of the Western powers and Japan up to the Second World War, to whom 
the bainian guochi 百年国耻 (“hundred years of national humiliation”) is still 
crying out loud for redemption. This is the generation that today still makes up 
the leadership echelons in China, and leaders and respected intelligentsia in the 
overseas Chinese communities. This is the generation whose outlook having 
been shaped by their personal experience, among whom Beijing’s stance that 
the benefits of stability under one-party rule far outweigh the risky endeavour of 
democratization and decentralization and that the human rights of the 1.3 billion-
strong populace to be free from starvation and to be sheltered far outweigh the 
Western notion of freedom of speech and freedom of political choice would find 
resonance. This is a generation that the yearning and love for a great “Cultural 
China” (Wenhua Zhongguo 文化中国), and a China that could stand tall among 
IJCS 1-2 combined PDF 25-10-10.i629   629 10/25/2010   1:08:09 AM
630      Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh  
the community of nations, a China that is fast becoming a superpower, is all 
that counts in bestowing pride on one’s Chinese ethnicity. Probably little else 
matters.
16.  For instance, Mikhail Gorbachev may be a sinner blamed for the disintegration 
of the Russian-dominated Soviet Union in the eyes of the Russians, but could 
be remembered in history as the person who liberated the many long-tortured 
subordinate nationalities from the “prison of nations”, especially from the 
perspective of the non-Russian citizens of the Soviet Union, who have long 
languished under Leninist-Stalinist totalitarianism, not to mention particularly 
the horrors of the Stalin years, ever since the days their quest for national self-
determination was hijacked by the Bolsheviks: “According to history, the Empire 
of the czars was a ‘prison of the peoples’ and Lenin opened it. But history is 
never quite that simple. At the start of the twentieth century the empire was 
already showing signs of weakness; all its subject peoples were beginning to 
resent its domination and looking for ways to escape from it. Lenin’s genius lies 
in having grasped the breadth of these desires for emancipation, and in having 
understood that by utilizing those desires – which had nothing to do with the 
working class – he could assure the victory of the workers in his own country.” 
(Carrère d’Encausse, 1979: 13)
17.  China’s leaders, from Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao have been 
vehemently against adopting Western liberal democracy for China, both for 
the fear that the Communist Party will lose its political dominance or China 
might disintegrate like the former Soviet Union. The nightmarish scenario of 
China’s disintegration, and the most likely prospect of losing Xinjiang, Tibet, 
Inner Mongolia, probably also Qinghai and Ningxia, and of course Taiwan, and 
having China shrunk by half, alone is enough for the Communist Party leaders 
to convince many, not least among the overseas Chinese community leaders to 
shun the idea of democratization and regional political autonomy. The death of 
the Soviet Union hangs like the sword of Damocles to remind people that “[… 
when] Mikhail Gorbachev launched his radical political reform and initiated the 
process of political democratization in the former Soviet Union, scholars in the 
West argued that Gorbachev must be ‘right’ and China’s Deng Xiaoping must 
be ‘wrong.’ […] However, when Gorbachev’s reforms eventually led to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping was proven ‘right.’” (Zheng and 
Lye, 2004) The prevalence of such views that have fed into the collective fear 
somehow serves well in justifying the stance of China’s current regime despite 
the value-loaded nature of judging right and wrong in this case. Soviet Union’s 
disintegration is definitely wrong in the context of the preference for stability 
and territorial unity, but this is highly judgmental. Firstly, that a “nation” divided 
is destined to herald misery for the people might not be borne out by modern 
empirical evidence – the outstanding record of economic prosperity, political 
stability and human welfare of the many successor states of the former Austro-
Hungarian empire, the Kalmar Union (the Danish empire) and, closer home, 
even the success of Taiwan. Of course, to generalize such successes could be as 
empirically unsound as to be consumed by the combination of ethno-national 
pride and the morbid fear of losing territorial domination, but sometimes, as the 
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proverb goes, the best things might just come in small parcels. Schumacher, in 
his now classic Small Is Beautiful (1973) proposed the idea of “smallness within 
bigness” – a form of decentralization whereby for a large organization to work 
it must behave like a related group of small organizations. “Man is small, and, 
therefore, small is beautiful”, Schumacher might just have a point. Secondly, 
the aspiration for a unified nation under the Han Chinese domination from the 
point of view of the Han Chinese should be indisputable, but whether this is true 
from the perspective of other non-Han Chinese people – “Chinese” as defined 
as “China’s citizens” – especially those that are ethnoterritorial would deserve 
further investigation.
18.  See 2000 Population Census of China and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2007.
19.  It took a brutal campaign of ethnic genocide to deliberately exterminate the 
Dzungars and it has been estimated that more than a million people were 
slaughtered.
20.  These data were from the 2000 Population Census of China. Official data for 
the year 2006 gave the proportion of Uyghurs as 45.92 per cent and that of Han 
as only 39.62 per cent of the total population of Xinjiang. See Xinjiang Tongji 
Nianjian 2007, pp. 82-87, Figure 4-7, which gave the year 2006 figures of 
9,413,796 Uyghurs and 8,121,588 Han out of a total population of 20,500,000 
people of Xinjiang.
21.  Times (UK), 19th April 2009; 东方日报, 21st April 2009; Scientific American, 
July 2009; 东方日报, 1st August 2009. Not allowed into China, Takada obtained 
his results based on estimation by extrapolating his model with Xinjiang’s 
population density. Not allowed while in China to probe into the existence 
of disproportionate number of cases of malignant lymphomas, lung cancers, 
leukemia, degenerative disorders and deformed newborns, Enver Tohti, a Uyghur 
medical doctor who moved to Turkey 1998 ostensibly as part of his medical 
training and now works with Takada, claimed to have uncovered medical records 
showing Xinjiang’s higher-than-national-average cancer rates with a team of 
British documentary filmmakers whom he smuggled back into Xinjiang as 
tourists.
22.  See Xizang Tongji Nianjian 2007, pp. 33-34, Figure 3-4, which gave the year 
2005 figures of 2,549,293 Tibetans and 104,647 Han out of a total population of 
2,675,520 people of Tibet.
23.  Reference should be made here to the controversial hypothesis of Rabushka 
(1974) that a larger public sector makes ethnic conflict more likely.
24.  From its humble beginnings in the 1980s, the Northern League – complete name 
Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della Padania (North League for the Independence 
of Padania) – has since been transformed from a marginal protest force to a 
national movement strong enough to bring down the 1994 Centre-Right coalition 
by withdrawing from it. While having had its ups and downs over the years, the 
real or potential political force it represents could never be totally counted out in 
the Italian political arena. “Padania” (the ancient Italian term for the Po valley), as 
proposed by the Northern League, would contain the most powerful industries of 
Italy, its best agricultural land, almost all its financial wealth and its greatest cities 
including Venice (the proposed capital), Turin, Milan, Bologna and Genoa.
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25.  It is exactly the same sentiment that is threatening the Belgian nation, driving 
Flanders away from Wallonia.
26.  See, for instance, Katherine Palmer Kaup’s Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics 
in China (2000).
27.  A challenge that the unprecedented 2004 Han-Hui conflict in Henan had amply 
attested to. 
28.  Summarizing Shah and Qureshi’s (1994) findings, Bird and Vaillancourt (1998: 
18) noted: “[...] in Indonesia, Timor (one of the poorest provinces) has a per 
capita own-source revenue equivalent to 4 percent of Jakarta’s [...] however, 
owing to transfer from the central government, Timor’s per capita expenditures 
are 40 percent of those in Jakarta.”
29.  Referring to the 31 sheng (i.e. provinces of Anhui 安徽, Fujian 福建, Gansu 甘
肃, Guangdong 广东, Guizhou 贵州, Hainan 海南, Hebei 河北, Heilongjiang 黑
龙江, Henan 河南, Hubei 湖北, Hunan 湖南, Jiangsu 江苏, Jiangxi 江西, Jilin 
吉林, Liaoning 辽宁, Qinghai 青海, Shaanxi 陕西, Shandong 山东, Shanxi 山
西, Sichuan 四川, Yunnan 云南 and Zhejiang 浙江), zizhiqu (i.e. “autonomous 
regions” – each a first-level administrative subdivision having its own local 
government, and a minority entity that has a higher population of a particular 
minority ethnic group – of Guangxi 广西 of the Zhuang, Nei Monggol/Inner 
Mongolia 内蒙古 of the Mongols, Ningxia 宁夏 of the Hui, Xizang/Tibet 西藏 
of the Tibetans and Xinjiang 新疆 of the Uyghurs) and zhixiashi (municipalities 
under the central government – Beijing 北京, Chongqing 重庆, Shanghai 上海 
and Tianjin 天津).
30.  As Cook and Murray (2001: 126-127) succinctly summarized: “Three of China’s 
four largest coal fields are in this area, as well as four of the most important 
oil fields. Some 140 kinds of mineral ores have been detected along with large 
reserves of bauxite for processing into aluminium, and gold. The Qaidam 
Basin in the middle of Qinghai Province, home to a large Tibetan population, 
for example, is described by local officials as the province’s ‘treasure bowl’, 
containing proven oil reserves of 200 million tons, as well as 4.5 billion tons of 
mostly high-quality coal with low ash and sulphur content. Under the Kunlun 
and Qilian mountains are large proven caches of iron, manganese, chromium, 
vanadium, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, tin, molybdenum, antimony, mercury, 
gold, silver, platinum, beryllium and selenium. The iron reserves are estimated 
at 2.2 billion tons, and the province claims the country’s largest lead and zinc 
mines, and is a primary producer of asbestos. The Hui people in the Ningxia 
Hui Autonomous Region, meanwhile, are sitting on large proven reserves of oil 
and natural gas, along with mineral resources such as copper, iron, silver, gold, 
aluminium and nickel. The growing prosperity of Xinjiang is being built on the 
back of developments in the vast and inhospitable Tarim Basin, where experts 
reckon there are reserves of up to 100 billion barrels of oil and 8,300 billion 
cubic metres of natural gas.”
31.  “Bi-ethnic” in terms of major power structure and socioeconomic relations, 
though the region’s population consists of more than two ethnic groups.
32.  世界日報 (World Journal) (US), editorial on 16th July 2009, reprinted in 东方
日报, 18th July 2009.
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33.  See Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2007, pp. 82-87, Figure 4-7, which gave the 
year 2006 figures of 254,722 Uyghurs and 1,507,720 Han out of a total population 
of 2,018,443 people of the city of Ürümqi.
34.  In another setting, for instance, in a country like Belgium, the tilting of the ethnic 
line is evident, with Flanders overtaking Wallonia economically since the 1960s 
and bringing with it increasing politico-economic leverage on the part of the 
Flemish community. It is Wallonia’s fear of Belgium being slowly transformed 
into a Flemish-dominated country, coupled with the continued insecurity felt 
by the Flemish community over its new-found power, which is fuelling the 
interethnic discord of the country and threatening to tear the country apart.
35.  Gunther (1980: 223, 258) described public investment decision making in Spain 
during the Franco era as more closely conforming to the “clientelistic”, rather 
than “corporatist”, model. For more on the clientelist model, see Brown (1989) 
and Clapham (1982: 6-7).
36.  东方日报, 10th July 2009.
37.  Brown (1989) was of the opinion that while in some types of clientelist systems 
the patron-client networks may serve to cut across and weaken ethnic communal 
ties (especially where the patron-client relationship arises out of the competition 
for individual goods such as contracts or jobs), clientelism may also promote 
the politicization of regional and ethnic communalism, where the focus of 
competition is on communal goods such as public amenities and development 
projects. Anyway, the politicization of ethnicity tends to become the more likely 
result of clientelism where leaders at the state-level seek to mobilize popular 
support so as to promote their political positions. Appeals to ethnic solidarity 
provide a useful basis for such mobilization, while at the same time cutting across 
and inhibiting class alignments. A notable impact of the personalized politics of 
clientelism is “to promote the politics of competitive ethnicity, in which inter-
ethnic rivalry is pursued through the activities of entrepreneurs, patrons and 
brokers” (ibid.: 52). Factional instability which may ensue is minimized where 
one patrimonial leader and his entourage are able to acquire monopoly control of 
the State and thence of resource distribution, while ethnic communal clienteles 
are “politically mobilized by their communal influentials who act as brokers, 
delivering their communal group support to the patrimonial élites in return for 
the promise of state resources” (ibid.).
38.  世界日報 (World Journal) (US), editorial on 16th July 2009; reprinted in 东方
日报, 18th July 2009.
39.  东方日报, 8th July 2009.
40.  Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), Émile, ou De l’éducation, translated by Allan 
Bloom with introduction, New York: Basic Books, 1979.
41.  There is a tendency in academic circles to distinguish between socially defined 
and biologically defined races – “ethnie” and “race”. An ethnie or ethnic group 
is said to exist when three conditions are present – “a segment of a larger 
society is seen by others to be different in some combination of the following 
characteristics – language, religion, race and ancestral homeland with its 
related culture; the members also perceive themselves in that way; and they 
participate in shared activities built around their (real or mythical) common 
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origin and culture [and] a nation [is] an ethnic group that claims the right to, 
or at least a history of, statehood” (Yinger, 1986: 22). In contrast with “racial 
groups” which are biological categories based on immutable, physical attributes 
fixed at birth, “ethnic groups” are defined by a much wider range of cultural, 
linguistic, religious and national characteristics, with a more flexible form of 
group differentiation. Therefore, the term “racial” should more appropriately be 
used to describe group distinction on the basis of phenotypical (i.e. physical) 
characteristics, while “ethnic” refers to those based solely or partly on cultural 
characteristics (Yeoh, 2003: 26). The term “ethnic” can also be generalized to 
be a blanket concept (Hoetink’s attribute “socioracial”) to cover both the above 
distinctions. The term “cultural” here mainly covers the ascriptive attributes 
“ethnolinguistic” and “ethnoreligious”. The emphasis on language and religion 
in empirical research is due mainly to the fact that they are the relatively less 
vague factors in the fourfold categorization of ascriptive loyalty (Hoetink, 
1975: 23-4). While “racial” – meaning phenotypical – differences is only skin 
deep, ethnic boundary as a process (à la Barth, 1969) tends to be tenacious and 
uncompromising, the manifestation of the age-old fourfold ascriptive loyalty of 
race, territoriality, language and religion (Yeoh, 2006: 224). However, racial and 
ethnic characteristics thus defined often overlap in any one group while extremely 
deep divisions are often found between groups whose racial as well as ethnic 
differences are actually imperceptible, e.g. the Burakumin, the so-called “invisible 
race” of Japan.
42.  光华日报 (Kwong Wah Yit Poh, Malaysian Daily), 4th August 2010.
43.  Yan Jiaqi 严家其 (严家祺) was a political advisor of Zhao Ziyang during the 
1980s and a prominent intellectual supporting the student-led pro-democracy 
movement of 1989. Fled to Paris after the June Fourth massacre, he participated 
in forming the Federation for a Democratic China of which he was elected first 
president. Yan’s confederation proposal was for a Chunghua Lienpang Kunghekuo 
中華聯邦共和國 (“Federal Republic of China”), a “Third Republic” – the first 
republic being the Chunghua Minkuo 中華民國 (Republic of China) and the 
second, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 中华人民共和国 (People’s Republic of 
China).
44.  Charter 08, signed in December 2008 by over three hundred prominent Chinese 
citizens, was conceived and written in emulation of the founding of Charter 
77 in former Czechoslovakia in January 1977 by over two hundred Czech and 
Slovak intellectuals, including the future Czech president Václav Havel. Charter 
08’s number of signatories, local and overseas, later increased to about 7000 by 
March 2009 (东方日报, 14th March 2009). Liu Xiaobo, the leading dissident 
arrested and jailed, also played a prominent role in the 1989 Tiananmen 天安门 
demonstrations and hunger strikes. Liu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 
8th October 2010.
45.  Translated from the Chinese by Perry Link. <http://crd-net.org/Article/Class9/
Class10/200812/20081210142700_12297.html>
46.  Ethnic division may be territorial in some countries but not in others, thus 
making it difficult for federalization along ethnic lines. An ethnic faction can be 
a homeland group while the other or others may be immigrants, giving rise to 
imbalance in ethnic intensity, national legitimacy and power of negotiation.
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47.  For instance, the 14th Dalai Lama’s proposal for Tibetan autonomy has always 
been accused by Beijing as a disguise for his alleged Tibetan independence 
agenda. 
48.  One of the earliest proposals in China of decentralization along federal lines 
is probably that found in the oath of the Hsing Chung Hui 興中會 (Revive 
China Society), founded in 1894 by Sun Chung-shan 孫中山/Sun Wen 孫
文/Sun I-hsien 孫逸仙 (leading revolutionary, founder of republican China, 
more popularly known outside China as Sun Yat-sen) – the establishment of 
a hechung 合眾 government, i.e. government of a “union of many”. In fact, 
with fourteen provinces proclaiming independence from the Ch’ing 清 dynasty 
to reunite as the Republic of China/Chunghua Minkuo 中華民國 during the 
Hsinhai 辛亥 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen in 1912 took the title “President of the 
Provisional Government of the United Provinces of China” – liensheng 聯
省 (“united provinces”) presumably suggesting a less regionally independent 
arrangement than lienpang 聯邦 (“federation”) or the US-style hechungkuo 合
眾國 (“united states”), partly reflecting reservation against earlier liensheng 
tzuchih 聯省自治 (“united autonomous provinces”) proposals since the 1920s, 
lest too much regional autonomy might jeopardize the country’s badly needed 
ability at that time to resist foreign aggression as well as might legitimize the 
hated rule of the regional warlords. Regional autonomy has in fact not really 
always been a no-no as was usually presumed in the political discourse within 
the People’s Republic of China. In fact, a soviet federal republic, modeled after 
the union republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was obviously on 
the cards, with autonomous constituent republics planned for the ethnic regions 
like Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang/Eastern Turkestan, at the time when a 
Chinese Soviet Republic was established in Jiangxi province and then during the 
changzheng 长征 (“Long March”) a small autonomous republic for Tibetans was 
set up in Sichuan province. By the time of Yan’an 延安, such nationality policy 
had undergone a transformation, and in 1947 the Inner Mongolia “Autonomous 
Region”, the first of its kind in China, was created, not “Autonomous Republic”. 
Before the complete consolidation of power, the PRC which was established 
in 1949 consisted of six semi-independent “greater administrative areas”. The 
central government in Beijing, just transferred from the People’s Government 
of North China, in effect only had direct control of northern China and Inner 
Mongolia, while other “greater administrative areas” enjoyed a substantial level 
of autonomy, all of which but ended by 1954.
49.  The Republic of China (ROC), controlling only the Taiwan 台灣 province, 
is today recognized by 23 mostly small countries. The ROC lost most of her 
diplomatic allies after she was expelled from the United Nations in 1971, as 
many countries dropped her to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
including Costa Rica, one of Latin America’s most democratic countries, on 7th 
June 2007 – a bitter irony, according to Taiwan – within four days of the year’s 
anniversary of the 1989 tragedy.
50.  Judgement on the event, positive or negative, of course depends on from whose 
point of view, e.g. the Great Russians or the peoples of the captive nations of the 
former USSR.
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51.  For Taiwan’s ratings on political rights and civil liberties is-à-is China, see 
Figure 16 in this issue’s prologue on social transformation. En passant, probably 
also noteworthy is that with the collapse of the Ch’ing Dynasty that led to the 
repatriation of the imperial troops from the region, Tibet (today China’s Xizang 
Zizhiqu) was in every respect virtually on her own from 1911 to 1950.
52.  东方日报, 20th July 2009.
53.  The State’s difficulty to face up to domestic realities is probably manifested 
in the continued repression in the aftermath of the riots including the arrest of 
ethnic Uyghur economics professor Ilham Tohti of China’s Central Nationalities 
University and founder of the “Uighur Online” on 7th July 2009 and the 
revocation of licenses of civil rights lawyers who took up cases related to the 
Xinjiang riots (东方日报, 10th July 2009, 15th July 2009 and 17th July 2009). 
After a storm of protest from Chinese intellectuals and academics against the 
arrest, Ilham Tohti was finally released on 23rd August 2009 (东方日报, 11th 
September 2009).
54.  There are two types of argument, normative and functional, noted Tillin (2006: 
46-47), made in favour of asymmetrical federalism: “The normative case rests 
on a moral argument about the desirability of cultural group rights and the 
politics of recognition in multinational liberal democracies. Crudely, this theory 
of federalism elevates asymmetry to a system-wide attribute of a federation 
that reflects the acceptance and recognition of difference across a polity. The 
functional case relies instead on arguments about what exists and what works. 
This argument often uses the adjective ‘asymmetrical’ interchangeably with 
‘creative’ or ‘flexible’ to denote individual instances in which solutions have 
been sought (successfully or otherwise) within a federal constitution to one-off 
problems of governance. The functional argument is sometimes underdeveloped, 
but used simply to code India as a case of asymmetry for comparative 
purposes.”
55.  Citing Manor’s argument, Tillin opined that an emphasis on asymmetry as a 
normative concept in India could “lead to a sidelining of other factors in the 
country’s nationalist discourse, and historical inheritance, which downplay 
the significance of subnational differences”, for, citing Nandy (1992), Indian 
public culture “does not have space for the Other, instead it has an open, blurred 
definition of the self which allows it to accommodate Others with which it might 
be in conflict” (Tillin, 2006: 62).
56.  O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 9) opined that a transition from authoritarian rule 
could produce a democracy, but it could also terminate with a liberalized authori-
tarian regime (dictablanda) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (democradura) 
(cited in Diamond, 2002: 24).
57.  Bo Yibo, the former Chinese vice-premier, was in fact expressing the 
reformers’ feeling towards the lessons of the multiple cycles of administrative 
decentralization and recentralization in China: “A [more] important and 
fundamental lesson of the [1958] attempt to improve the economic management 
system is: We only saw the vices of overcentralization of power, and sought to 
remedy the situation by decentralizing powers to the lower levels. When we felt 
too much power had been decentralized, we recentralized them. We did not then 
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recognize the inadequacies of putting sole emphasis on central planning (and in 
particular a system dominated by mandatory planning) and totally neglecting 
and denying the role of the market […] As a result over a long period of time 
(after the 1958 decentralization) we were trapped within the planned economy 
model. Adjustments and improvements could only work around the cycles of 
decentralization and recentralization. Moreover the recipients of more powers 
are invariably the local governments, rather than enterprises.” (Bo Yibo 薄一
波, Ruogan Zhongda Juece yu Shijian de Huigu 若干重大决策与事件的回顾 
[Looking back at some important decisions and events], 1993, p. 804, cited in Li, 
2003: 1.)
    
58.  
    
  where n = the number of members of the ith group and N = the total number of 
people in the population. The index is constructed through the computational 
procedure of Rae and Taylor’s index of fragmentation (F), defined as the 
probability that a randomly selected pair of individuals in a society will belong 
to different groups (Rae and Taylor, 1970: 22-3). The index varies from 0 to 
1. The value is zero for a completely homogeneous country (the probability 
of belonging to different groups is nil). The value 1 occurs in the hypothetical 
society where each individual belongs to a different group. The fragmentation 
index is identical to Rae’s measure of party system fractionalization (Rae, 1967: 
55-8) and Greenberg’s measure of linguistic diversity (Greenberg, 1956):
  
  where P = the proportion of total population in the ith language group.
  For data sources of the computation of EFI for this appendix table, see Yeoh 
(2003: 33-36), Table 2.
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INtRODuCtION 
Reform, Governance and Sociopolitical Change in 
Contemporary China
In various ways this 2011 special issue of the IJCS, Reform, Governance 
and Equity: Exploring the Sociopolitical Implications of Contemporary 
China’s Transformation, represents a follow-up to the earlier, 2010 special 
issue China in Transition: Social Change in the Age of Reform which began 
the journal’s exploratory focus on indeed the most fundamental and critical 
issue in contemporary China’s astonishing transformation, especially if one 
takes social changes as to encompass both socioeconomic and sociopolitical 
transitions. As the contents of each of the papers collected in this special issue 
have been summarized in the respective abstracts, this introduction will not 
attempt to purvey the synopses of these articles but to contemplate each as 
part of the whole exploration on reform, governance and sociopolitical change 
within the context of a transforming China.
Professor David McMullen’s paper “Devolution in Chinese History: 
The Fengjian Debate Revisited” aptly begins the issue under the section 
Historical Proem by bringing us on a journey to the Kaiyuan Tianbao 開元
天寶 period (years 713-756 of the Common Era) of medieval China’s Tang 
dynasty and various other periods in pre-modern China to critically examine 
the pre-modern debate on political or administrative devolution, contending 
that one of the main headings under which this long-running issue about 
the degree of centralization was discussed is the subject of fengjian 封建. 
Schneider (2003: 33) hypothesizes three core dimensions of the concept of 
decentralization: (1) fiscal decentralization referring to the extent of a central 
government’s ceding of fiscal impact to non-central government entities, 
(2) administrative decentralization referring to the extent of autonomy non-
central government entities possess relative to central control, (3) political 
decentralization referring to how much a central government allows non-
central government entities to undertake the political functions of governance 
such as representation, and while political decentralization has usually been 
observed to go hand in hand with democratization, McMullen urges caution 
against the over-simplistic argument that fengjian even in its final phase 
involved a demand for a sophisticated civil society at local levels free of 
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domination by the State, as the most that can be said about fengjian is its 
call for a localism free from excessive central government exploitation 
and control, a common theme that has in various ways permeated through 
the many articles selected for this special issue. Such is, under the section 
Governance, Democracy and Decentralization, when Professor Brantly 
Womack in his paper “Modernization and the Sino-Vietnamese Model”, which 
analyzes the distinctive model of political development in the contemporary 
“party-state survivors” of China and Vietnam and the challenges posed to 
modernization theory by the Sino-Vietnamese experience, talks about the 
increased local transparency and accountability and articulation of local 
interests while the Communist Party, being disillusioned with “socialist 
transformation” but still firmly in power, places its dogma “on a remote altar 
while [it] preserves and justifies itself by tending to the pastoral duties relating 
to the welfare of the flock”. Such is also when Professor Huang Weiping and 
Dr Chen Jiaxi in their paper “China’s Grassroots Democracy: Development 
and Assessment”, which studies the practice and logic of the evolution of 
grassroots democracy during the reform era, talk about the importance of 
“inborn democracy” (neishengxing minzhu 内生型民主), within the context of 
the development of grassroots democracy and inner party democracy, which 
includes villagers’ self-governance, independent participation in grassroots 
people’s congress elections, the property owners committee, and the people’s 
congress representative workstation, all having strong support from the public 
and are led by effective local opinion leaders yet facing restrictions from local 
authorities which fear social instability and the threat to the authority of the 
ruling party.
Such contradictions between the central State power and a growing 
civil society seeking greater autonomy free from the former’s tight control 
also constitute the subject matter of various papers under the section Social 
Stratification, State and the Civil Society which focus respectively on issues 
ranging from socioeconomic inequalities, interregional disparities, rural-urban 
divide, plight of social minorities and marginal communities as well as the 
conflict between the central State and the ethnoregional minorities struggling 
for greater autonomy and rights to ethnic identity preservation, socioeconomic 
protection and self-determination. Among these are Dr Qian Forrest Zhang’s 
paper “Rethinking the Rural-Urban Divide in China’s New Stratification 
Order” that attempts to re-evaluate the rural-urban divide while calling for 
a re-definition of the concept of “rurality” in a new market economy where 
household registration is no longer a barrier to rural-urban migration and 
where the “proletarianized urban workers who are exposed to the brute forces 
of markets” are even more worse off than the agricultural petty-commodity 
producers in the rural areas, and Dr Zhong Sheng’s “Towards China’s 
Urban-Rural Integration: Issues and Options” which looks at the challenges 
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of China’s CURD (Coordinated Urban-Rural Development/chengxiang 
tongchou 城乡统筹) reforms that have been conducted with various local 
ramifications. Within this context, recalling the localism that McMullen’s 
paper highlighted above, it is noteworthy that in recent years, local and 
international organizations around the world are increasingly advocating 
decentralization to bring about more effective poverty reduction and hence the 
narrowing of socioeconomic gap, with both the direct effects on the regional 
targeting of transfers and the indirect effects of overcoming the inefficiency 
in local public services and hampered economic growth related to sub-optimal 
decentralization (von Braun and Grote, 2000: 2) and this is particularly 
pertinent for China given the context of the ethnoregional dimension of 
the poverty problem. Although theoretically there may not be a clear-cut 
functioning relationship between decentralization and poverty reduction, 
most research findings in recent years definitely pointed to the positive. 
According to von Braun and Grote (2000), political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralizations need to be considered simultaneously, and the sequencing 
and pace of these three aspects of decentralization seem to play an important 
role in impacting poverty reduction. While fiscal decentralization shows 
ambivalent effects for poverty reduction and administrative decentralization 
alone does not add power and voice to the poor, “political decentralization 
often benefits the poor, because involving civil society in planning, monitoring 
and evaluating public programs and policies is crucial to ensure steady 
progress and that is facilitated in a decentralized system” (ibid.: 25-26), 
or, as Boex et al., referring to UNCHR’s statement “Poverty is local and it 
can only be fought at the local level” (UNCHR, 1999), pointed out in their 
research report “Fighting Poverty through Fiscal Decentralization” (January 
2006: 2), “if the increasingly accepted wisdom that ‘all poverty is local’ is 
correct, then decentralization policy and poverty reduction strategies could 
be closely intertwined and have synergetic positive effects on each other”. 
Kyei (2000), in his study on the case of Ghana, concluded that the rural poor 
in Ghana could only benefit with a much stronger commitment from the 
central government to decentralization, especially in terms of powersharing 
and financial provision. Vijayanand (2001), in his paper on the Kerala state 
of India, noted various advantages of decentralization in terms of poverty 
reduction including the greater reach of resources with earmarking of funds 
for the disadvantaged groups, less sectoralism in decentralized programmes 
with greater convergence contributing to the reduction in the ratchet effect 
of poverty, greater emphasis on locally appropriate and affordable solutions, 
greater realism in tackling problems of poverty, improved accountability, etc. 
while decentralization “affords opportunities to the poor to grow in strength 
by continuous participation (learning by doing), constant observation of 
the exercise of power (learning by seeing) and accessing more information 
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(learning by knowing)” (p. 23). Hence, given the crucial ethnoregional 
dimension of China’s poverty problem, it is pertinent that the poverty 
alleviation effort of the country should benefit from any possible progress in 
decentralization – fiscal, administrative, and most importantly, political – since 
decentralized governments, due to their closeness both institutionally (e.g. 
ethnically) and spatially to citizens in the regional/rural areas, could be more 
responsive to the needs of the poor than the central government and hence are 
more likely to successfully formulate and implement pro-poor policies and 
programmes in these regions and areas.
As Dr Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh points out in his paper “Stratification, 
Social Action and Morphogenesis: Structures and Agents in Contemporary 
China’s Social Transformation”, the distribution of China’s poor is charac-
terized by “four concentrations”: (1) concentration in the mountainous areas, 
(2) concentration in the western region, (3) concentration in environmentally 
fragile areas, and (4) concentration in ethnic minority areas, hence reflecting 
a composite phenomenon made up of rural poverty, geographical poverty, 
ethnic poverty and frontier poverty, which has undoubtedly been playing an 
important role in the recent years’ ethnic riots in the country’s frontier regions. 
The issue of Uyghur urban unemployment amidst Han influx is also pointed 
out in David O’Brien’s paper, “The Mountains Are High and the Emperor Is 
Far Away: An Examination of Ethnic Violence in Xinjiang”, which focuses 
on the devastating outbreak of violence in Xinjiang in July 2009, the role of 
the hard-line party secretary Wang Lequan and the central State’s strategy 
and policy towards this restive ethnic region. While worsening interethnic 
relations especially in view of the surging Han influx and the relative 
economic backwardness of the local ethnic communities and environmental 
degradation especially in the form of receding grassland due to mining and 
overgrazing have been blamed for the escalating ethnic regional disturbances, 
both O’Brien and Yeoh, nevertheless, emphasize the overall political structure 
and State policy towards dissent as the major contributing factors for the 
increasing volatility of the ethnic regions, as manifest in recent years’ troubles 
in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. In this regard, O’Brien has focused 
on the widening gap between the central State’s official policy for ethnic 
regions and ethnic minorities policy and what is actually happening on the 
ground – a gap similarly emphasized by Yeoh in the form of the inability of 
a regime to face the unfolding political realities while continuing to recycle 
the shopworn Leninist conspiracy theories that blame mass protests primarily 
on the Party’s foreign and domestic enemies, especially the foreign forces 
hostile to socialism bending on fostering a process of “peaceful evolution”, 
as highlighted by Womack, exemplified in recent years by the high-profile 
Charter 08 in China in 2008 and 2006’s “Manifesto on Freedom and 
Democracy for Vietnam”.
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The 1989 Beijing-Tiananmen upheaval and tragedy, the purge of Zhao 
Ziyang and the obliteration of the one and only political reform package in 
the history of the Chinese Communist Party which attempted to introduce 
the most far-reaching political structural reforms such as the separation of 
power between Party and State, proposed by Zhao earlier at the 13th Party 
Congress in October 1987, undeniably formed the watershed that serves 
to define subsequent State-civil society interactions and the concomitant 
development in China’s political and socioeconomic structure, as well as 
central State-ethnic regional relations (Yeoh, 2010: 278-280). Continued 
survival of one-party rule became the paramount concern, as Yeoh highlights 
in this special issue, as the prime directive of “stability above all else” and 
the ruthless “dissent-harmonizing” maintenance of a “harmonious society” 
delineated a safe zone wherein political “seemers” are parading administrative 
innovations as political reforms and political fudge (zhengzhi huyou 政治
忽悠) as visionary leadership. As Dr Jay Wysocki comments in his paper 
“Efficiency, Value and the 21st-Century Developmental State: The Transition 
of China”, which examines the origin and role of efficient industrialization 
as the vector of social change and how rapid industrialization confronts 
China with the social value for efficiency forcing accommodation by the 
society, the “capitalism of a different sort shapes a state of a different 
sort with non-transparent interest groups and decision making” facilitated 
internally by “strong” Asian Value which encourages a weak civil society, 
with a State sufficiently authoritarian to satisfy its élite. It is within such a 
setting that the modern-era Chinese Communist Party in a fast-transforming 
Chinese economy is itself being transformed, as pointed out in Dr Ngeow 
Chow Bing’s paper “Community Party Building in Urban China”, which 
analyzes the community party building programme in urban China in the 
transformation of the Chinese Communist Party from a “revolutionary party” 
to a “governing party” and the relationship between the party organization and 
local democratic development, by co-opting, integrating and monitoring the 
interests of all elements of the society which it ironically would not tolerate 
to form the basis of political pluralism, in a process of turning itself into a 
party that exhibits certain features of probably a so-called “catch-all” party. 
Meanwhile, having been disillusioned with the once-revolutionary vision 
of socialist transformation while still maintaining the monopoly of political 
power, as Womack observes, the Party now “attracts risk-avoiding careerists 
rather than risk-taking revolutionaries”. Such “post-revolutionary syndrome” 
may not only afflicts new recruits, as Yeoh observes, when instead of 
statesmen with conscience and prescience, holding the helm are but visionless, 
overcautious political careerists resplendent in hollow, sentimental rhetoric 
and showmanship, being both the products and survivors of the yesteryear 
of Maoist horror and still reeling from the shock of the perceived political 
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debacle of 1989. Meanwhile, as Émile Durkheim (1895) said, “The air does 
not cease to have weight, although we no longer feel that weight”, brewing 
social forces bringing along subliminal emergent changes continue to threaten 
to subvert the stability of well laid-out projectable changes envisaged by the 
ruling regime (Yeoh, 2010: 241-245), aided in no small measure by the advent 
of the Internet Age, as Dr Chin-fu Hung observes in his paper “The Politics 
of Electronic Social Capital and Public Sphere in Chinese Lala Community: 
Implications for Civil Society” which explores the politics of cyber-networks 
and cyber social bonds in the Chinese lesbian community as well as its wider 
implications for the Chinese civil society, and Professor Joseph Tse-Hei Lee 
notes in his review article in this volume, “Media and Dissent in China: A 
Review”. While Hung emphasizes that the Internet has effectively empowered 
individuals, including the marginalized and once-persecuted homosexual 
community, and the society as a whole “by diversifying newer sources of 
alternative/dissenting information and channels for civic association and 
engagement”, in the repressive, authoritarian China, Lee comments in his 
review that no authoritarian regime or leader, who not only rules by fear but 
also rules in fear, is capable of imposing absolute control without challenge 
and compromise amidst the current global electronic network transformation, 
as evident in the astounding “Jasmine Revolutions” that are sweeping the Arab 
world and reverberating in the nightmares of the Chinese leaders. Such is the 
impact of globalization.
In fact, comprising one fifth of humanity and having risen to be the 
world’s second largest economy in terms of gross domestic product, China’s 
economic and political development is today no longer solely a matter of her 
own domestic concern, but is increasingly acquiring new dimensions that 
have a powerful impact across her borders, as Professor Solomon Cohen 
notes in his paper “Leadership Displacement and the Redesign of Global 
Governance: The Race of China and India” which analyzes the unique catch-
up trends of China and India in the context of leadership displacement in 
global governance, substantive redesigns of whose rules are deemed required 
given that the systemic differences in the case of China and India vis-à-vis 
the current firm-dominated leading countries such as US and EU are likely 
to accentuate externality problems at the global level. Returning to the issue 
of State-civil society relations within the context of such a globalizing world, 
Phoebe Luo Mingxuan, Dr John Donaldson and Dr Qian Forrest Zhang in 
their paper “The Transformation of China’s Agriculture System and Its Impact 
on Southeast Asia”, which examines the impacts on the poor and vulnerable 
Southeast Asian farmers from the investment of Chinese agribusinesses, 
note that the civil society may be able to fill the void left by the government 
in protecting the interests of poor farmers in the negotiations for better 
contractual terms with the investors, including those from China, though 
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governments often resort to repress the NGOs, “fearing the creation of a 
public space that they cannot control”, as the political forces behind issues 
that on the surface seem to be voluntary exchanges should not be ignored. 
Such forces are at work too even in international sports events such as the 
Beijing Olympics of 2008, as pointed out by Professor Brian Bridges in 
his paper “Beyond The Olympics: Power, Change and Legacy” that begins 
the section Social Change, Power Configuration and Global Governance. 
Focusing on the expectations, immediate results and potential longer-term 
legacies of the Beijing Olympics, the paper has paid due attention to their use 
by the government both for domestic economic and political purposes and as 
an instrument of foreign relations. While noting the limitation of the success 
of the Beijing Olympics in extending China’s “soft power” and winning over 
the hearts of the Western public, Bridges also highlights the complexity of 
what Jeffrey Wasserstrom calls “transitology” – effectively the transitions 
away from one-party rule – by observing the lack of the intention on the part 
of the Chinese leaders, in contrast to the South Korean precedent, to use the 
sports mega-event to pave the way for democratization, citing the irony in the 
arrest in early 2011 of Ai Weiwei, one of the key designers of the iconic Bird’s 
Nest stadium for the Beijing Olympics.
As McMullen notes in his paper that begins this special issue, statism 
tended to overwhelm the discussion of political issues and hence eclipse the 
recognition of any incipient development of a civil society in the statecraft 
discourse of late imperial and Republican China, the analyses presented in 
the research papers collected in this volume have thus revealed the complex 
nexus involved in the arduous journey of sociopolitical transformation and 
development of State-civil society relations in the current Chinese context 
of reform and governance. This volume ends with Yongqiang Li, Professor 
Anona Armstrong and Professor Andrew Clarke’s policy comments and 
research notes “Governance of Small Businesses in China: An Institutional 
Perspective” and Professor Joseph Tse-Hei Lee’s book review article “Media 
and Dissent in China: A Review” that critically analyzes Johan Lagerkvist’s 
2010 book After the Internet, Before Democracy: Competing Norms in 
Chinese Media and Society. As this is a special issue, an index is added to 
facilitate referencing.
Earlier versions of many of the papers in this special issue were 
presented at the international conference “Growth, Governance and Equity: 
Exploring the Social Implications of China’s Economic Transformation” 
organized by the Institute of China Studies (ICS), University of Malaya, in 
June 2011. The selected papers by McMullen (originally the keynote to the 
conference), Huang and Chen, Ngeow, Bridges, Wysocki, Zhang, Zhong, 
Hung, Yeoh, and Li, Armstrong and Clarke are new versions of their earlier 
papers presented at the said conference, duly revised by incorporating critical 
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peer feedback received at the conference and from other reviewers. The 
editor and the Institute of China Studies would like to thank these conference 
presenters who have taken great effort to revise their papers for inclusion in 
this special issue, and the other authors who have contributed some great 
new papers to this issue as well as the anonymous reviewers who have given 
invaluable assistance in providing critical comments on the earlier versions 
of these papers.
Finally, I would like to thank Miss Susie Yieng-Ping Ling 林燕萍, 
editorial manager of the journal, for her impeccable administrative help in 
making the publication of this 2011 special issue Reform, Governance and 
Equity: Exploring the Sociopolitical Implications of Contemporary China’s 
Transformation on time possible. I am also grateful to Mr Lionel Wei-Li 
Liong 梁偉立 for his technical help in cover design, Miss Susie Yieng-Ping 
Ling and Dr Chan Sok Gee 陳淑儀 for their assistance in indexing, Mr Ivan 
Foo Ah Hiang 符亞强 for his excellent typesetting, Dr Ling Tek Soon 林德
順 for his help in checking the final proofs, Dr Ngeow Chow Bing 饒兆斌 for 
his editorial assistance with the Governance, Democracy and Decentralization 
articles, and Dr Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada for first introducing us to Professor 
Solomon Cohen’s works. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies 
that remain is of course fully mine.
Dr Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh 楊國慶
Special Issue Editor
International Journal of China Studies 
Volume 2, Number 2
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Stratification, Social Action and Morphogenesis: 
Structures and Agents in Contemporary 
China’s Social transformation
Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh*
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Abstract 
The process of social change typically involves a combination of four different 
components: context, institutions, agents and events. Upon the praxis between 
operating structures and purposely acting human agents, agency is constantly 
shaped by structure which in turn is being reshaped in the process. Amidst 
the dynamic interplay of such an array of critical socioeconomic factors that 
underlie the surging currents of social change, the role of the individual as a 
catalyst for change cannot be underestimated, even if the long-term impact 
of the individual’s action is not immediately explicit and the lone crusade 
involved does not receive adequate sympathy of the wider public. Such is the 
tragedy of the commons. Beginning with the problem of increasing inequality 
and ethnoregional dimension of poverty which together constitute the epitome 
as well as the root of China’s social ills resulted from her recent decades of 
continuous, astounding economic tour de force, this paper examines contem-
porary China’s social transformation as a phenomenon that is neither simple 
nor unidimensional, wherein social and in particular sociopolitical change 
could be said not to be a multiattribute concept, but a multiconcept construct. 
Due attention is paid to various different dimensions of such changes, both 
positive and negative, including socioeconomic inequalities, socioracial strati-
fication, ethnoregional disparities and State-civil society relations, in particular 
the structure-agency interface in the challenge of ACES (active citizenship and 
effective State) evolvement. At any one time, certain dimensions may increase 
in severity, while others remain constant or decline. Certain dimensions or 
variables are considerably more difficult to measure than others but their 
inclusion is essential to provide a comprehensive view of the challenges of 
China’s social transformation in her contemporary reform era.
Keywords: State, inequality, élite, dissent, structure, agency, morphogenesis, 
morphostasis, civil rights, activism
JEL classification: H11, H12, Z10, Z13
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1. Introduction
In the government document “Scientific Concept of Development and 
Harmonious Society” that formed the theme of China’s 17th National 
Congress of the Communist Party, 2007 (15th–21st October 2007), it was 
reiterated that “[t]o coordinate development among different regions, we 
should promote the common development of all regions. Regional gaps are 
not only found between eastern China and western China, but also between 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central 
government. This problem should be gradually addressed in the course of 
industrialization, urbanization and market development.”1 While brief, this 
statement reflects the probably understated concern of the ruling regime of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the widening gap in economic 
development between eastern and western China, between rural and urban 
population, and between different social strata. In spite of the astounding 
economic performance – nothing short of a miracle – over the past few 
decades, China is undeniably facing acute problems on various fronts. For 
instance, agriculture accounted for only about 14.6 per cent of China’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2003 but 49.5 per cent of her labour force, 
while up to 59.5 per cent of the country’s total population is rural. This is in 
addition to the fact that only 13 per cent of China consists of arable land and 
the country has 40 per cent less arable land per capita than anywhere else in 
the world. Hence, with more people and less arable land in rural areas, the 
country has a lower comparative advantage in agriculture, and investments 
have therefore been concentrated in the cities and industries and this has 
led to increasing rural-urban disparities in socioeconomic development and 
income distribution (Bi, 2005: 114), as well as the increasingly alarming 
socioeconomic disparity between the country’s eastern, coastal regions and 
the inland, especially western, regions.
To place them in the proper perspective, such problems in development 
that China is facing today could be said to be by nature the same ones that 
many other developing countries were experiencing in the second half of 
the last century and now at the beginning of this century. Woo et al. (2004) 
found that of United Nations’ 15 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)2 
relevant for China (targets 1-12, 15, 17-18), the country has already achieved 
1.5, made above-average progress in 6, and attained satisfactory progress in 
1. In summary, China is on-track for 8.5 targets, off-track on 4, and has made 
unknown progress on 2.5. In general, China’s amelioration of the poverty 
problem has been nothing less than remarkable. In 1978, China’s population 
in poverty totaled 250 million. Entering the new millennium, poverty has 
been reduced to 29.27 million in 2001, 28.2 million in 2002 and 29 million 
by 2003, with the incidence of poverty having declined from 30 per cent to 
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just 3.1 per cent, according to official figures. (IDE Spot Survey, 2001, p. 54, 
Table 1; Chen, 2006: 174)
In fact, with rural poverty rate declining from 31.3 per cent in 1990 to 
10.9 per cent in 2002, China had greatly exceeded MDG’s Target 1 which 
only requires that the poverty rate be halved in the 1990-2015 period (Woo 
et al., 2004). However, as Woo et al. (2004) noted, the number of China’s 
rural residents below the poverty line of US$1 a day (at 1985 PPP) in 2002 
was still 102 million, which was more than one third of the United States of 
America (USA)’s population, making “Impoverished China” the 10th largest 
“country” in the world (the other countries with populations exceeding 102 
million in 2002 were Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Russia, and the USA).
Beginning with the problem of increasing inequality and ethnoregional 
dimension of poverty which together constitute the epitome as well as the 
root of China’s social ills resulted from her recent decades of continuous, 
astounding economic tour de force, this paper will examine contemporary 
China’s social transformation as a phenomenon that is neither simple 
nor unidimensional. Like Rose’s claim with respect to the institution of 
government (Rose, 1983: 159), social and in particular sociopolitical change 
could be said not to be a multiattribute concept, but a multiconcept construct. 
Hence, due attention should be paid to various different dimensions of such 
changes, both positive and negative, including socioeconomic inequalities, 
socioracial stratification, ethnoregional disparities and State-civil society 
relations, in particular the structure-agency interface in the challenge of 
ACES (active citizenship and effective, accountable State) evolvement (Yeoh, 
2010a: 271-272), which will be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections 
of this paper. At any one time, certain dimensions may increase in severity, 
while others remain constant or decline. Certain dimensions or variables 
are considerably more difficult to measure than others but their inclusion 
is essential to provide a comprehensive view of the challenges of social 
transformation of China in her contemporary reform era.
2. Poverty Reduction and Rising Inequality
One of the most important changes in recent years in China’s poverty 
eradication efforts is the switch of focus from absolute poverty to relative 
poverty. Even while the overall proportion of population in poverty dropped 
impressively from 30.7 per cent in 1978 to 3.4 per cent in 2000, according 
to government statistics, income inequality was increasing, with the Gini 
coefficient reaching 0.415 in 1995 and continuing to rise (Chai et al., 2004: 
2). Hence, while China’s reforms have been successful in giving many 
people higher incomes and producing more goods and services, they also led 
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to increasingly acute inequality in income and wealth among the populace. 
From one of the most egalitarian societies in the 1970s, China has turned into 
one of the most unequal countries in the region and even among developing 
countries in general. Bert Hoffman of the World Bank noted in 2006 that 
China’s Gini had risen from 0.25 – equal to that of Germany – in 1980 to 
about 0.45 today, as the country becomes less equal than Russia or the USA. 
Yan (2010), on the other hand, gave a “conservative” Gini estimate of 0.475 
for the year 2007. In the 1980s the richest 10 per cent of the people of China 
earned 7 times the income of the poorest 10 per cent, today they earn more 
than 18 times as much.3 Or as another observer put it, “Ever since the early 
years of reforms, the divide between the rich and the poor had been emerging, 
and it is now getting to the stage of ripping the entire society apart.” (Zhou, 
2006: 286).
2.1. Income Disparity in Chinese Society
Computing using disposable income and excluding welfare payments, Huang 
and Niu (2007) found that China’s urban Gini coefficient since 1998 hovered 
between 0.4 and 0.5, showing a clear tendency towards increasing income 
inequality. The encouraging sign was that after peaking in 1998, Huang and 
Niu actually found a slow gradual decline, albeit slight, in Gini from 1998 to 
2003 (see Table 1). 
Observing that Gini is relatively sensitive only to income changes of the 
middle-income group while the Theil index is sensitive to changes of the high- 
and low-income groups, Huang and Niu gave an interesting comparison over 
the 1999-2003 period of Gini with the Theil index (Table 1) which, reflecting 
income changes of the high-income group, continued to rise significantly, 
except for the decline in 2003, while the second Theil index L and the log 
variance V, which reflect the income changes of the low-income group, 
experienced continuous slight but steady increase, pointing to the remarkable 
transformation underway in the income distribution of the high-income and 
middle-income groups, reflecting the transformation in size and structure of 
the middle class in China’s rapid economic development. The peaking of 
Gini in 1998 was related to the rapid unbalanced economic growth of that 
period, while the significant decline of L and V during that period – especially 
L which was lower than 0.1 for quite long after 1996 – was an indication 
of the egalitarian tendency of the low-income group: a general widening 
impoverishment (Huang and Niu, 2007: 156).
However, Yan (2010) gave a high Gini for all China as early as in 1994 
at above 0.43, which had risen to a “conservative” estimate of 0.475 in 2007, 
which is of course a far cry from the Gini of below 0.3 (averages of 0.16 and 
0.22 for urban and rural areas respectively) before the economic reforms. This 
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alarmingly high Gini of 0.475 in 2007 represented a growth of 135 per cent 
from 1978, over a 29-year period in which GDP per capita (at constant prices) 
had grown by almost 10 times over the pre-reform level with an average 
annual growth rate of 8.6 per cent. Yan (2010: 176-177) divided this growth 
of inequality into four phases:
•  the “relatively egalitarian” (by international standard) period of 1978-
1984 with Gini between 0.2 and 0.3 and little urban-rural disparity, while 
the rural economy developed immensely under the full force of reform;
Table 1 Income Inequality amongst China’s Urban Population
 Index Gini  Theil’s entropy The second  Log variance
 coefficient  measure  Theil’s entropy  index
Year (G) (T) measure (L) (V)
1985 0.268 0.129 0.116 0.202
1986 0.265 0.131 0.116 0.202
1987 0.264 0.131 0.118 0.204
1988 0.275 0.138 0.124 0.214
1989 0.271 0.143 0.128 0.22
1990 0.272 0.139 0.125 0.215
1991 0.262 0.132 0.119 0.206
1992 0.272 0.16 0.131 0.224
1993 0.297 0.167 0.149 0.252
1994 0.234 0.177 0.158 0.266
1995 0.229 0.17 0.152 0.256
1996 0.449 0.296 0.049 0.253
1997 0.3 0.181 0.161 0.271
1998 0.494 0.081 0.073 0.245
1999 0.487 0.086 0.076 0.246
2000 0.4784 0.091 0.08 0.253
2001 0.476 0.097 0.086 0.263
2002 0.417 0.157 0.113 0.31
2003 0.41 0.133 0.12 0.315
Note:  Huang and Niu’s computation followed Lambert and Aronson (1993) 
with data from issues of the China Statistical Yearbook of the years 
1986-2004, noting that G was sensitive to the income changes of the 
middle-income class, L and V were sensitive to the income changes of 
the low-income class, and T was sensitive to the income changes of the 
high-income class.
Source:  Huang and Niu (2007: 157), Table 5-1.
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•  the “relatively justifiable” period of 1985-1992 with Gini hovering 
between 0.3 and 0.4 while the whole economy was expanding vibrantly 
with the emphasis of reform shifted to the cities since 1984, though the 
accompanying inflation and expansion of the income gap had begun to 
overshoot people’s psychological expectation threshold, resulting in rather 
serious social instability;
•  the worrying period of 1993-2000 of yearly increasing Gini index, 
with increasingly rapid reform and marketization pushing Gini over the 
international alarming line of 0.4 in 1993, and further over 0.43 in 1994, 
before the coefficient dropped back below 0.4 in 1995 and 1996 but rose 
again with increasing urban-rural, employment, intercommunal and inter-
stratum differentiation amidst the intensifying marketization and growth 
of the private-sector economy following the 15th National Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)4;
•  the high interest polarization period since 2001 to the present wherein the 
globalization of China’s growing economy and the wealth effect of the 
capital market have led to the continuous expansion of the income gap, 
with Gini reaching 0.475 in 2007, even by “conservative” estimation.
Besides the disparity shown in Table 1 that was based on the individual 
as unit of analysis, Huang and Niu also computed the disparity index (D), the 
Ahluwalia index (A) and the Kuznets index (K) with household as unit based 
on the categorization of the China Statistical Yearbook (see Table 2).
Huang and Niu’s indices in Table 2 bring us to the fact that the urban 
income disparity has been getting more and more noticeable, with the D 
index showing that the gap between the highest 20 per cent and lowest 20 
per cent income groups continued to expand rapidly, from 2.3 times in 1985 
to 5.4 times in 2003. On the other hand, the Ahluwalia index (A) shows that 
the share of the poorest 40 per cent has dropped by 38 per cent over the two 
decades, from 0.296 in 1985 to 0.185 in 2003, while the Kuznets index (K) 
indicates that the share of the richest 20 per cent has increased by 25 per 
cent over the same period, from 0.411 in 1985 to 0.549 in 2003 (ibid.: 158-
159). Nevertheless, Yan (2010: 177-178) pointed out that China’s rural Gini 
has always been higher than the urban, implying that the intra-rural income 
disparity is fueling the expansion of the national income disparity, while 
the urban-rural income disparity is almost the main cause of the continuous 
expansion of the national income gap. In fact, the 20 per cent urban highest 
income group’s income is shown to be 5.5 times the income of the 20 per 
cent urban lowest income group whereas the 20 per cent rural highest income 
group’s income is 7.3 times the income of the 20 per cent rural lowest 
income group.5 Besides urban-rural, such widening of income and wealth 
disparity is also manifest in various other aspects (Table 3). Yan’s analysis 
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shows further that changes in national Gini is positively related to changes in 
urban-rural income ratio, and concludes that China’s present Gini coefficient 
has reached a stage of too big a disparity and could be even higher if various 
informal incomes of the middle stratum and upper stratum are included in the 
calculation, even allowing for some scholars’ view that China’s Gini could 
be permitted to be higher, e.g. at 0.45, a line that had almost been reached as 
early as in 2001.
Table 2 Income Inequality amongst China’s Urban Population (Stratified)
 Index Disparity index (D) Ahluwalia index (A) Kuznets index (K)
Year
1985 2.294 0.296 0.411
1986 2.340 0.293 0.416
1987 2.322 0.294 0.416
1988 2.422 0.288 0.423
1989 2.489 0.284 0.428
1990 2.451 0.286 0.424
1991 2.332 0.294 0.418
1992 2.535 0.281 0.430
1993 2.771 0.268 0.451
1994 2.981 0.258 0.457
1995 2.878 0.263 0.451
1996 2.869 0.263 0.451
1997 3.120 0.252 0.462
1998 3.246 0.246 0.468
1999 3.378 0.241 0.475
2000 3.610 0.232 0.483
2001 3.817 0.225 0.494
2002 5.151 0.190 0.539
2003 5.388 0.185 0.549
D –  Ratio of the income share of the highest-income 20 per cent of the population 
to the income share of the lowest-income 20 per cent of the population
A –  Income share of the lowest-income 40 per cent of the population, with 
maximum value = 0.4
K –  Income share of the highest-income 20 per cent of the population, with 
minimum value = 0.2 
Source: Huang and Niu (2007: 62-63, 158), Table 5-2.
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In terms of income ranking, the social stratum that is rising fastest 
since the beginning of the “reform and open” policy is that of the private 
entrepreneurs, followed by managers, State and social administrators, skilled 
professionals, and business and industry getihu 个体户6 (Table 4). The inter-
stratum income gap has indeed been expanding with the differential between 
the highest average monthly income stratum (that of the State and social 
administrators up to 1980 and that of the private enterprise owners after 1980) 
and lowest income stratum (always been that of the agricultural labourers) 
spiraling from 3.8:1 during the 1971-1980 period (52.8 yuan) to 19.9:1 by 
2005 (754.4 yuan) (Table 5).
Huang and Niu’s analysis also found that, in 2003, provinces/zizhiqu/
zhixiashi7 whose Gini coefficients (Gi) are lower than the national figure (G) 
of 0.45 totaled 20 (Table 6).
The poor zizhiqu of Tibet was rather egalitarian, with Gini lower than 0.3. 
Other provinces/zhixiashi with a reasonable level of 0.3-0.4 were Shandong, 
Jiangxi, Hubei, Guizhou and Chongqing. The majority of provinces/zizhiqu/
zhixiashi, totaled 23, had Gini levels between 0.4 and 0.5, showing the 
inclination towards widening gap between rich and poor. Two provinces, 
the economically advanced Jiangsu and Zhejiang, had Gini greater than 0.5 
(ibid.: 162).
At his first press conference in 2003 as China’s premier, Wen Jiabao 
summarized the coming headaches in his new post in a group of figures, 
including China’s labour force of 740 million vis-à-vis the Western advanced 
countries’ total of just 430 million, and China’s annual additional labour force 
of 10 million, xiagang 下岗 and unemployed figure of about 14 million, 
and the rural-to-urban migrant labour of about 120 million – all giving rise 
to the huge employment pressure the country was facing (Liu, 2010). In 
Table 5  China: Average Monthly Income of Ten Major Social Strata and
  Differential
 Before  1971-80 1981-90 1991-99 2000-01 2005
 1971
Mean value of the  42.0 52.8 145.3 465.3 641.1 754.4
strata’s average 
monthly incomes
Income differential  2.7 3.8 13.8 21.7 19.4 19.9
between highest and 
lowest stratum
Source: Yan (2010: 179), Figure 4-3.
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Table 6  Comparison of China’s Provincial Gini (Gi) and National Gini (G)*,
  2003
 Gi < G Gi ≥ G (higher by)
Eastern Region
Beijing 北京 zhixiashi Fujian 福建 (1%-10%)
Hebei 河北 Guangdong 广东 (1%-10%)
Shandong 山东 Hainan 海南 (1%-10%)
Shanghai 上海 zhixiashi Jiangsu 江苏 (10%-15%)
Tianjin 天津 zhixiashi Liaoning 辽宁 (1%-10%)
 Zhejiang 浙江 (15%-29%)
Central Region
Heilongjiang 黑龙江 Anhui 安徽 (1%-10%)
Henan 河南 Jilin 吉林 (1%-10%)
Hubei 湖北 
Hunan 湖南 
Jiangxi 江西 
Shanxi 山西 
Western Region
Chongqing 重庆 zhixiashi Ningxia 宁夏 Hui zizhiqu (10%-15%)
Gansu 甘肃 Qinghai 青海 (1%-10%)
Guangxi 广西 Zhuang zizhiqu Sichuan 四川 (1%-10%)
Guizhou 贵州 
Inner Mongolia / Nei Monggol 内蒙古 
    Mongol zizhiqu 
Shaanxi 陕西 
Tibet / Xizang 西藏 Tibetan zizhiqu 
Xinjiang 新疆 Uygur zizhiqu 
Yunnan 云南 
* G = 0.45
zizhiqu 自治区 – “autonomous region”
zhixiashi 直辖市 – municipality directly ruled by the central government
Source: Huang and Niu (2007: 161-162), Table 5-3(2).
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terms of poverty and stratification, Wen pointed out that there were 900 
million peasants among the country’s total population of 1.3 billion, with 
about 30 million still being trapped in poverty – and the latter figure was 
derived based on annual income per capita of 625 yuan8 which was in fact 
too low a poverty line: if the line were to be more accurately placed at 825 
yuan, the rural poverty population would be about 900 million. In terms of 
interregional disparity, Wen pointed out that the GDP of the 5 or 6 provinces 
in eastern, coastal China had exceeded 50 per cent of the national total GDP 
(ibid.).
2.2. Ethnoregional Dimension of Poverty
In line with the now well-known fear of instability (luan 乱) on the part of 
China’s ruling Communist Party, the main objective of the country’s poverty 
alleviation policy is to prevent income and wealth inequality from growing 
out of political control, by attempting to improve the economic position 
Figure 1 China: Ethnic Diversity by Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi
Note:  For the computation of the ethnic diversity/fractionalization index (EFI), 
with a range of 0–1 from hypothetically complete homogeneity to 
hypothetically perfect diversity, see Yeoh (2003: 28). EFI for China as a 
whole is only 0.125, indicating high homogeneity (ibid.: 30-32, Table 1).
Source: Computed with data from the 2000 population census.
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of the poorest through considerably limited administrative intervention. 
Furthermore, discontent brewing in the areas resided by ethnic minorities9 
is taken seriously because these areas are also places that show a relative 
concentration of poor people.
Just how the western region populated by the non-Han peoples10 has 
been left behind in China’s economic development is clearly indicated by 
the poverty problem. Any political or social instability in this ethnic minority 
region could have grave ramifications throughout the economy that would 
threaten the development efforts of the central government especially in regard 
to the development of the regional cores. The Green Book of China’s Rural 
Economy 2008-2009 gave the rural Gini coefficients (year 2007) of 0.3, 0.3 
and 0.4 respectively for the western, central and eastern region (Sheng and Bo, 
2009: 131, Table 10-2). Related to this, the China Development Report 2007 
that specially focused on poverty elimination gave the regional distribution 
of rural absolute poverty as shown in Table 7 and Table 8.
Table 7 shows that of the 23.65 million rural poor of China in 2005, the 
eastern region, central region and western region contributed 3.24 million 
(13.7 per cent), 8.39 million (35.5 per cent) and 12.03 million (50.8 per cent) 
respectively, with incidence of absolute poverty of the central region and 
western region being respectively 3.1 times and 6.5 times that of the eastern 
region. Compare this with the 1993 figures of 19.5 per cent, 31.1 per cent 
and 49.4 per cent for the eastern region, central region and western region 
respectively (Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao 2007, p. 37), it is obvious that the 
changes in the regional distribution of the rural population in absolute poverty 
were mainly reflected in the decline of its proportion in the eastern region, 
increase of that in the central region, while that in the western region had 
remained largely unchanged, with the implication that the extent of decline 
of the number in absolute poverty in the eastern region actually surpassed the 
national average, that in the central region was obviously below the national 
average, and that in the western region was the same as the national average 
(ibid.).
Table 8 shows the interregional differentials in rural poverty incidence. 
Those provinces/zizhiqu with incidence of poverty above 5 per cent (i.e. 
double the national average) in 2005 were Inner Mongolia, Guizhou, Yunnan, 
Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang which were all in the western 
region. The only province/zizhiqu/zhixiashi of the western region that had 
incidence of poverty below 5 per cent were Chongqing, Guangxi, Sichuan 
and Ningxia – the last one, Ningxia, having experienced a steep decline in 
rural incidence of poverty from a height of 14.5 per cent in 2000 to just 3 
per cent by 2005. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and 
Guangdong which are all provinces/zhixiashi in the eastern region have 
basically eliminated absolute poverty, with incidence of poverty at just 0.2 
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Table 8  Incidence of Absolute Poverty of the Provinces/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi,   
 1998-2005 (%)
 Year 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
CHINA 4.6 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.5
Eastern       
Beijing 1.6 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fujian 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Guangdong 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Hainan 2.7 1.9 1.7 3.0 2.1 1.9 2.2
Hebei 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.5
Jiangsu 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2
Liaoning 3.1 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.6 2.5 2.2
Shandong 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.3
Shanghai  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tianjin 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.0
Zhejiang  1.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2
Central       
Anhui 3.2 2.5 1.8 2.0 3.3 2.7 2.4
Heilongjiang 8.2 5.6 4.6 3.4 5.6 3.6 3.2
Henan 4.0 3.0 2.1 1.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
Hubei  4.4 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.8 3.3 3.1
Hunan 5.0 2.3 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.8
Jiangxi  6.5 2.8 2.8 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.5
Jilin 4.2 4.1 3.1 2.6 3.0 2.0 1.5
Shanxi 6.0 6.8 6.6 5.0 3.9 3.1 2.3
Western       
Chongqing 6.6 4.2 4.0 3.0 3.0 2.2 1.6
Gansu 11.5 9.7 9.6 9.2 8.6 8.4 8.1
Guangxi  5.5 5.0 3.4 2.7 3.6 3.5 3.2
Guizhou 12.9 10.8 10.4 10.7 10.1 9.7 9.0
Nei Monggol 6.4 8.2 13.3 9.8 9.4 7.5 6.6
Ningxia  12.6 14.5 13.6 8.9 8.4 3.8 3.0
Qinghai 14.0 18.6 16.9 16.1 15.6 13.6 11.5
Shaanxi 9.0 7.9 7.8 6.2 8.3 7.8 7.2
Sichuan  5.5 3.7 3.3 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.0
Xizang (Tibet)  19.0 19.8 15.2 15.6 14.0 8.8 7.2
Xinjiang 8.9 10.0 6.5 6.9 5.7 5.7 5.1
Yunnan  12.2 8.2 7.9 11.1 7.9 7.5 7.0
Source: Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao 2007, p. 39, Table 2.3.
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per cent and below in 2005. Shandong also had incidence of poverty below 1 
per cent. Hainan, Hebei and Liaoning were the only provinces in the eastern 
region that still had incidence of poverty above 1 per cent in 2005. On the 
other hand, all provinces in the central region – Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, 
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin and Shanxi – had rural absolute poverty incidence 
from 1.5 to 3.5 per cent in 2005.
There are four characteristics typical of the distribution of poverty 
population in China:
1.  Concentration in the mountainous areas.
2.  Concentration in the western region.
3.  Concentration in environmentally fragile areas.
4.  Concentration in ethnic minority areas.
For instance, out of the 29 million people in absolute poverty in 2003, 15.5 
per cent were in the eastern region, 35.5 per cent in the central region, and 
49 per cent in the western region. Areas with incidence of poverty less than 
1 per cent were all located in the eastern region. Guangxi, Sichuan and 
Chongqing were the only places in the western region with incidence of 
poverty between 1 and 5 per cent. Inner Mongolia, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Ningxia and Xinjiang were places in the western region with incidence of 
poverty between 5 and 10 per cent. All areas with incidence of poverty above 
10 per cent were in the western region, viz. Guizhou, Tibet and Qinghai. 
Rural population with income from 637 to 882 yuan per annum are officially 
classified as the low-income group. In 2003, those in the low-income group 
totaled 29.46 million just within the poverty counties alone. (Chen, 2006: 
175, footnote 1) Combining the rural poverty population and the low-income 
group, the number in 2003 totaled 85.17 million, of which 40.14 million 
(47.1 per cent) were in the western region, 31.2 million (36.6 per cent) in the 
central region and 13.83 million (16.2 per cent) in the eastern region. (ibid.: 
176, Figure 7-2)
In 2000, of the 592 officially designated poverty counties11 – including 
257 ethnic minority poverty counties – 62 per cent were concentrated in the 
western region. Of the 32.09 million poor in 2000, more than half were among 
the ethnic minorities (i.e. non-Han) or in the ethnic minority areas, totaling 17 
million people. Not much had changed in the subsequent years. For instance, 
out of the national figure of 29 million people in poverty in 2003, 16.98 
million or 58.55 per cent were in the 12 zizhiqu and provinces of the western 
region. (Zhongguo Minzu Fazhan Baogao, 2001-2006, p. 235) Hence, it is 
discernable that there is a trend of gradual concentration of the poor towards 
the western region and the frontier areas, and towards the ethnic minorities. 
Estimation of the extent of absolute poverty among the ethnic minorities 
ranges from 40 per cent of the total population as estimated by researchers 
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in China to 60 per cent as estimated by Nicholas Stern of the World Bank. In 
view of the fact that ethnic minorities only constitute 8.41 per cent of China’s 
total population, that 40 to 60 per cent of China’s poor come from them is 
indeed alarming. (ibid.)
One of the most crucial aspects of China’s poverty problem hence is 
the very fact that the dominant component of the rural poor is the ethnic 
minorities – as mentioned above, out of the 592 poverty counties, 257 (44 
per cent) are ethnic minority counties. Among the poor of the 592 poverty 
counties in 2003, 46.7 per cent were in ethnic minority areas, with incidence 
of poverty of 11.4 per cent that was higher than those of the mountainous 
areas (10.1 per cent), hilly areas (7.1 per cent), old revolutionary base areas 
(7.7 per cent) and the plains (7.8 per cent). Eighty per cent of the 4.59 million 
poor of Guizhou were ethnic minorities, and almost all of the 3.1 million hard-
core poor of the province were ethnic minorities. In the mountainous areas of 
southern Ningxia, 60 per cent of the 520 thousand poor were Hui. Eighty-five 
per cent of Yunnan’s 4.4 million poor and more than 90 per cent of Tibet’s 
250 thousand poor were also ethnic minorities. (Chen, 2006: 177) In fact, out 
of the country’s 29 million poverty population, 45 per cent or more than 13 
million were in the ethnic minority areas. Among the 630 thousand people 
of 22 ethnic minority groups each with population less than 100 thousand, 
394 thousand were in absolute poverty or in the low-income category. (Wu, 
2006: 15)
Ethnic minority areas’ rural absolute-poverty population constituted 47.7 
per cent of the national total, according to official figures (end of 2004), 
while the incidence of poverty was 5 percentage points higher than the 
national figure, population with low income constituted 46 per cent of the 
national total, proportion of low-income population in rural population was 9 
percentage points higher than the national figure, absolute-poverty population 
plus low-income population constituted 46.6 per cent of the national total, 
and the proportion of absolute-poverty plus low-income population in rural 
population was 14 percentage points higher than the national figure. Almost 
80 per cent of China’s ethnic minorities are found in the country’s western 
region, especially the rural areas. China’s northwest with about 20 different 
ethnic minorities and total minority population of more than 15 million and 
southwest with more than 30 ethnic minorities and total minority population 
of more than 29 million being the country’s two areas with the most complex 
ethnic composition and the largest number of and most concentrated ethnic 
minorities, the geographical correlation of ethnic minority distribution 
(largely populating the frontier areas) and poverty population distribution is 
unmistakable, hence reflecting the composite phenomenon made up of rural 
poverty, geographical poverty, ethnic poverty and frontier poverty. (Nie and 
Yang, 2006: 153)
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According to the Green Book of China’s Rural Economy 2008-2009, the 
western region’s rural disposal income per capita was 2,281 yuan (year 2007), 
compared to 3,054 yuan of the central region and 4,375 yuan of the eastern 
region (Sheng and Bo, 2009: 131, Table 10-2). As China is experiencing a 
continuous expansion in urban-rural income gap, such interregional rural 
income disparity has in fact been widening since economic reform began, 
as can be observed in Table 9. The ratio of eastern to central to western 
rural income has been expanding from 1:0.83:0.79 in 1980 to 1:0.75:0.63 by 
1990 and further to 1:0.68:0.52 by 2005. An example of such widening gap 
is the regional GDP per capita differential between Zhejiang Province (in 
the eastern region) and Guizhou Province (in the western region), with the 
former’s 37,411 yuan versus the latter’s meager 6,915 yuan (year 2007), as 
highlighted in the 2010 Blue Book of China’s Society (Yang and Chi, 2009: 
239) – Guizhou’s figure being just 18.48 per cent of Zhejiang’s.
According to official figures shown in Table 10, western regional to 
national GDP ratio appears to be stable, with slight increases in later years, 
and there was steady increase in western regional GDP per capita, though it 
still lagged behind the national level by a very large differential. Even official 
figures admitted that the gap between the ethnic regions and the advanced 
eastern region was expanding, with Shanghai’s and Guangdong’s respective 
annual average growth rates of 13.11 per cent and 13.97 per cent for the 2000-
2004 period exceeding the 13.05 per cent of the ethnic regions, and the annual 
average growth rate of Guangdong’s total import-export surpassing that of the 
ethnic regions by 9 percentage points for the same period (Zhongguo Minzu 
Fazhan Baogao (2001-2006), p. 64). The disadvantage of the western region 
is even more glaring in terms of public revenue, where the differential has 
been expanding over the years.
Table 9 China’s Rural Annual Average Net Income per Capita by Region (yuan)
 Region Eastern Central Western
Year
1980 217.6 181.0 171.6
1985 452.2 377.8 313.4
1990 847.6 632.9 533.8
1995 2127.2 1402.7 1060.7
2000 3063.3 2077.1 1592.7
2005 4416.6 2999.5 2300.4
Source: Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieceng Fenxi 2007, p. 212, Table 7-2 
(data from Zhongguo Nongcun Zhuhu Diaocha Nianjian 2006, pp. 72-
82). 
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3.  Environmental Degradation, Ethnoregionalization of Poverty and
  Social Instability
And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.
– Friedrich Nietzsche (1886), Beyond Good and Evil12 
As poverty and inequality constitute one of the most, if not the most, 
critical challenges China faces in her next phase of politico-socioeconomic 
development, and as has been noted earlier, poverty in China has the 
properties of being concentrated in the western region and in the ethnic 
minority areas, ethnoregionalization of poverty inevitably ensues, presenting 
China not only with economic challenges but also long-term sociopolitical 
security risks. Public protests in the ethnic “autonomous regions” lately have 
been growing alarmingly. For instance, over a thousand ethnic Mongolian 
herdsmen demonstrated in mid-July 2011 against alleged government-business 
collusion in an ethnic Han Chinese businessman’s low-price purchase of 
over ten thousand mu13 of grazing land, according to the New York-based 
Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center.14 The subsequent 
development of the purchased land had allegedly brought in hundreds of 
ethnic Han workers with trucks and bulldozers whose brutal intrusion into 
the ethnic Mongolian village concerned had resulted in the death and injury 
of over a hundred livestock and the injury of over 20 herdsmen who were 
trying to defend their rights. Another 20 more herdsmen were injured in the 
thousand-strong demonstrators’ clash with the police in mid-July.15 This, in 
fact, is not the first such incident in 2011. Earlier, on 25th May, over two 
thousand ethnic Mongolian students and herdsmen demonstrated in front 
of the government building in Xilinhot (Siliyinqota) following the death of 
a herdsman after being hit by coal truck on 10th May while protecting his 
grazing land against destruction by ethnic Han’s economic development drive 
that has caused increasingly acute resentment among ethnic Mongolians 
who see themselves as the oppressed people of Inner Mongolia, devoid of 
political power and falling prey to the insatiable rapacity of the Han Chinese 
migrants – an extension of the dominant central Han political power of 
the country – who are destroying their traditional economy, culture and 
environment. Also, in May, demonstrations erupted in the regional capital 
Hohhot (Kökeqota) ending with the arrest of 50 students and other citizens, 
and according the Southern Mongolian Information Center, by early June 
at least 90 students, herdsmen and other citizens had been arrested in Inner 
Mongolia’s demonstrations, with many students seriously injured in their 
clash with the police. The herdsman’s death was not an isolated case in 
Inner Mongolia. There was another case occurring also around that time that 
involved the death of an ethnic minority young man being hit by an excavator 
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in a fight with the miners over issues related to environmental pollution due 
to mining activities.16
The Inner Mongolia troubles came at a time when tensions were high due 
to the approaching anniversary of the June Fourth 1989 Beijing massacre, 
and when this multiethnic nation17 is still reeling from the shock of the 14th 
March 2008 Lhasa riots and the 5th July 2009 Xinjiang ethnic conflict. There 
are indeed many similarities between the new incident in Inner Mongolia and 
the 2009 ethnic violence in Xinjiang, as shown in Table 11.18
While the Inner Mongolia trouble is more recent in origin and less 
volatile as compared to the long-running troubles in Tibet and Xinjiang, 
Beijing’s central government has not been any softer in its suppression of 
the slightest sign of organized dissent that it perceives as equivalent or a 
prelude to separatism. The most high-profile case of such suppression is the 
15-year jail sentence meted out to ethnic Mongolian dissident scholar Hada 
who founded the Southern Mongolian Democratic League in 1992 pursuing 
high autonomy for “Southern Mongolia” (i.e. China’s Inner Mongolia) 
and possible referendum for the unification of Inner Mongolia and Outer 
Mongolia (i.e. the Republic of Mongolia). He was sentenced in 1996 for 
subversion, separatism and espionage, and had since disappeared after his 
release in December 2010.
Table 11 “Mass Incidents” in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang: Comparison and
  Contrast
 Inner Mongolia, 11th May 2011 Xinjiang, 5th July 2009
Trigger Rights-defending herdsman  Uighur workers killed by Han
 killed by coal truck Chinese
Background Herdsmen’s livelihood in great  Poor development in Uighur 
 difficulty and poverty blamed on  areas leading to acute poverty
 mining activity on their grassland
Way of protest Peaceful demonstrations Violent Uighur backlash killing
   Han Chinese
Slogan of  “Remembrance of the killed! “Blood for blood! Han Chinese
protest Stop mining!” get the hell out of Xinjiang!”
Participants Mongolian students and herdsmen Uighur youths
State response Suppression with army and riot  Suppression with army and
 police; making arrests before  riot police; making arrests after
 situation worsened conflict
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What the Beijing central government might find perplexing is the fact 
that since 2002 Inner Mongolia has been China’s number one province/
zizhiqu (“autonomous region”) in terms of GDP growth rate, with a GDP 
of 972.5 billion yuan in 2009, mainly from mining, which also gave the 
prefecture-level city of Ordos a high GDP per capita of US$15,000.19 
While the rich deposits of Inner Mongolia’s minerals such as coal, rare 
earth, Glauber’s salt, trona, etc. have indeed brought wealth to the region, 
excessive mining has been accused by the locals as the main reason for the 
deterioration of grassland (receding grassland) for which the official media 
has also blamed on the herdsmen’s over-grazing their livestock. Of Inner 
Mongolia’s over 63.59 million hectares of useable grassland, as large as 38.67 
hectares, i.e. 60 per cent, has deteriorated. Horrific pollution and scarred 
landscape of the Inner Mongolian grassland environment have been caused 
by excessive mining due to recent years’ rapidly rising coal price which have 
attracted a huge influx of Han Chinese into this largest coal mining region 
of China, which is viewed by civil rights groups as tantamount to genocide 
of the Mongolian herdsmen whose life is so closely intertwined with the 
grassland for hundreds of years till today.20 The peaceful and harmonious 
society and interethnic relationship, vis-à-vis Tibet and Xinjiang, in this 
top-growth “autonomous region”, have been proven to be a façade hiding 
the simmering, suppressed anger of the ethnic Mongolians against the State-
capital collusion in exploiting and destroying their landscape and life for the 
benefit of Han Chinese migrants and the Han Chinese-dominated central 
Party-State.  Furthermore, the atrocities committed by the Maoist State 
during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, when hundreds of thousands of 
people were accused, through torture, to be members of the spurious seditious 
“People’s Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia”21, resulting in the death of 
tens of thousands of persecuted ethnic Mongolians, have also been a ghost 
haunting Beijing’s rule over Inner Mongolia to date, similar to the other 
volatile ethnic regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, that the cosmetic rehabilitations 
after the passing of the Maoist era and overall GDP growth have not been 
able to exorcize.
It is also crucial to take into consideration that for China as a whole, 
poverty is still very much related to ecological factors. For instance, the 
concentration of the poor in the western region which includes, among others, 
Inner Mongolia and the other ethnic “autonomous regions” like Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Ningxia and Guangxi, is related to the fact that, besides desertification, 
the poverty-stricken mountainous areas are concentrated in this particular 
region. The country’s 64.8 per cent of poverty-stricken mountainous areas 
(shanqu 山区) and 56.2 per cent of the hilly (qiuling 丘陵) areas are found in 
10 provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi of the western region, occupying 72.9 per cent 
of the total area of the region, with mountainous areas alone taking up 53.1 
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per cent. The most mountainous provinces are the three southwest provinces 
of Sichuan (including Chongqing), Yunnan and Guizhou, with mountainous 
areas taking up 72 per cent, 80.3 per cent and 80.8 per cent of the respective 
total areas of the said provinces. If inclusive of the hilly areas, the figure 
rises to 95 per cent for Yunnan and Guizhou, and 97.5 per cent for Sichuan.22 
(Chen, 2006: 176; original source: Zhongguo Shanqu Fazhan Baogao 2003, 
pp. 246-247) Out of the 592 poverty counties, 366 are in the western region, 
and out of these 366 counties, 258 are in remote mountain counties, occupying 
about 70 per cent of the western mountain counties. Most of these poverty 
counties are distributed over 6 major areas of fragile ecology, viz. Inner 
Mongolian plateau’s southeastern border area that suffers from desertification, 
Huangtu 黄土 plateau’s gully area that suffers from severe soil erosion, the 
environmentally deteriorating mountainous areas of the Qin Ba 秦巴 region, 
the ecologically endangered hilly areas of the karst plateau, the sealed-off 
mountain and valley areas of the Hengduan 横断 range and the severely 
cold mountain areas of the western deserts. Being ecologically fragile and 
sensitive, all these are areas extremely short of resources, with extremely bad 
environment for human habitation. (ibid.: 177) Thus, coupled with structural 
economic disadvantages, the western region populated by many of China’s 
ethnic minorities is trapped in the vicious cycles of developmental nightmare 
as depicted by Wu (2006) (see Figure 2).
There are three main issues in the western region’s environmental 
degradation: soil erosion, desertification and grassland deterioration. Major 
symptoms like the increasingly serious Huanghe 黄河 (Yellow River) drought 
since the 1990s, the severe flood of mid-Yangzi River (Chang Jiang) 扬子
江/长江 in 1998, and the almost yearly spring sandstorm since 2000 all point 
to the critical stage of environmental degradation of the western region. Take 
the typical example of year 2008. The first sandstorm came in March from the 
Gobi desert, affecting not only up to 110 million people in China’s 300 cities, 
towns and counties in 5 provinces/zizhiqu, but also adjacent nations including 
Korea, Japan and Taiwan, straining bilateral relations. Such sandstorms from 
China are costing, besides human lives, an estimated US$5.82 billion of losses 
in Korea alone.23
Up to 80 per cent of the country’s total area of soil erosion, 81.43 per 
cent of the area of desertification and 93.27 per cent of the area of grass-
land deterioration are in the western region. (ibid.: 19; original source: 
Zhongguo Quyu Fazhan Baogao 2000) As shown in Figure 3, of all the 
provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi (not including Chongqing), seven have areas of 
soil erosion exceeding 100,000 square kilometres. Other than Shanxi, all of 
these provinces/zizhiqu are in the western region: Sichuan, Inner Mongolia, 
Shaanxi, Xinjiang and Gansu. Soil erosion in the southwestern region is also 
serious (see Table 12).
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Source:  Chen (2006: 19), Table 1-3 (data from Zhongguo Shengtai Pohuai 
Xianzhuang Baogao, June 1997).
Figure 3 China: Area of Soil Erosion (km2) by Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi
Table 12 China: Soil Erosion in the Southwest
 Yunnan Guizhou Sichuan Chongqing TOTAL
Area of soil  14.69 7.4 22.0 4.35 48.44
erosion (’0000 km2)
% of total area of  38.3 42.0 45.0 52.8 42.8
province/zhixiashi
Volume of soil  5.5 2.7 6.0 2.0 16.2
erosion (hundred 
million tons per annum)
Source:  Chen (2006: 20), Table 1-4 (data from Zhongguo Quyu Fazhan Baogao 
2000, p. 207).
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The desertification of farmland in the western region involves a total 
area of up to 1.1 million hectares. While this is only 2.24 per cent of the 
total area of farmland in the western region, it contributes to 43.24 per cent 
of the national total area of desertification of farmland – that suffering from 
light- and medium-degree desertification is 87.95 per cent of the national total 
area and that suffering from high-degree desertification is 12.05 per cent of 
the national total area. Provinces/zizhiqu in the western region particularly 
severely hit by desertification are Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu and Tibet. (Chen, 
2006: 20) With the “Western Regional Development” (xibu dakaifa 西部大开
发) strategy inevitably aiming at exploiting the rich natural resources (water, 
nonferrous metal, petroleum, natural gas, etc.) of the western region, both 
to promote the region’s economic growth and enhance the living standard 
and welfare of the region’s inhabitants, and to meet the energy needs of the 
country as a whole, in time there could arise an inherent contradiction between 
ecological construction/environmental protection and the basic aim of xibu 
dakaifa that cannot be ignored. (ibid.: 33)
With 40 million hectares of grassland (41.7 per cent of the country’s 
total land area), China is one of the few countries in the world with the 
largest grassland. The country’s natural grassland is mainly distributed in the 
ethnic minority pastures in the western and northern frontiers. The area of 
pasturage totaled up to 3.6 million square kilometres, or 37 per cent of the 
country’s land area. However, the western region is also the country’s main 
region of grassland deterioration. Take the case of Xinjiang. According to 
Abliz Yusuf et al. (2009: 60-61), Xinjiang is the region of China with the 
Source: Chen (2006: 21), Table 1-5 (data from Deng, 2005: 122).
Figure 4 China: Deterioration of Natural Grassland
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largest area, widest distribution and most serious situation of desertification 
and grassland deterioration, a combined result of aridity, high temperature, 
over-farming, over-grazing and other man-made damages. Of Xinjiang’s 87 
counties and municipalities, as many as 80 counties and municipalities and 
more than 90 farms are affected by desertification. The total area of desertified 
land has reached 795,900 square kilometres, i.e. about half (49.71 per cent) 
of Xinjiang’s total land area, or 30.35 per cent of China’s total area of 
desertification. While the effective usable area of Xinjiang’s natural grassland 
totals 480,000 square kilometres, the size of the area that suffers from serious 
deterioration has reached 80,000 to 130,000 square kilometres. In fact, a 
Tian Shan Mountain grassland has a deterioration area reaching 450 square 
kilometres or over 48 per cent of the usable grassland. Such desertification in 
Xinjiang is still currently expanding at the rate of 350 to 400 square kilometres 
per annum. On the other hand, Table 13 shows that the pasturelands of Tibet, 
Gansu and Sichuan have been deteriorating very rapidly too. Tibet’s area of 
deterioration was 24.267 million hectares in 1980, with a deterioration rate of 
29.6 per cent. The deterioration area rose to 29.285 million hectares by 2000, 
with a deterioration rate of 35.7 per cent, i.e. an increase of 6 percentage 
points in 20 years. Gansu’s area of deterioration was 2.351 million hectares in 
1980, with a deterioration rate of 26.7 per cent. The deterioration area rose to 
4.405 million hectares by 2000, with a deterioration rate of 50 per cent, i.e. an 
increase of 23.3 percentage points in 20 years. Sichuan’s area of deterioration 
was only 1.333 million hectares in 1980, with a deterioration rate of only 9.8 
per cent. However, the deterioration area tripled within 20 years and rose to 
4.541 million hectares by 2000, with a rapid rise in deterioration rate to 33.3 
per cent. Qinghai’s area of deterioration was 4.398 million hectares in 1980, 
with a deterioration rate of 12.1 per cent. The deterioration area rose to 20.367 
million hectares by 2000, with deterioration rate increased tremendously to 56 
per cent, i.e. a shocking increase of 44 percentage points in 20 years.
Of course, oasisization does occur alongside desertification, as pointed 
out by Abliz Yusuf et al. (2009: 60-61) in the case of Xinjiang, and with 
diminishing buffer zone between the oasis and desert which are both 
expanding, the oasis environment is constantly under threat from saltization, 
desertification and pollution, as the environmental situation of mountains, 
plains and deserts outside the oases is still in disequilibrium and continuing 
to deteriorate. With oases constituting only 4.3 per cent of Xinjiang’s total 
land area and 11.1 per cent of total effective usable land area, overall 
deterioration is still much larger than improvement. Adding to that is the issue 
of soil erosion which has reached a total area of 103 square kilometres or 
28.1 per cent of national soil erosion area, making it Xinjiang’s number one 
environmental problem. As Abliz Yusuf et al. (2009: 63) further highlighted, 
with over 90 per cent of the rural population who are in poverty living in the 
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environmentally relatively appalling areas, Xinjiang’s severely worsening 
grassland ecology – with 85 per cent of the region’s grassland area suffering 
from various degrees of deterioration including up to 37.5 per cent from 
severe deterioration – is leading to intensifying soil erosion and frequent 
sandstorms, adversely affecting livestock husbandry and becoming the one 
of the main causes of deepening poverty.
Adding to these problems, there is an alarming degree of wastage and 
environmental damage in resource exploitation in the western region, the 
former being partly due to the fact that the right for exploitation is given 
by the government via administrative measures, hence does not feature 
in the enterprises’ cost structure. Furthermore, resource tax by production 
volume is as low as just 1.18 per cent of resource volume on average. Zero 
cost of access to resource and extremely low resource tax have thus led 
to tremendous wastage in exploitation. For instance, for some oil wells in 
northern Shaanxi, only around 100 kilograms could be extracted from every 
ton of crude oil reserve, the other more than 800 kilograms being completely 
wasted. (Zhongguo Xibu Jingji Fazhan Baogao 2006, p. 272) Such over-
exploitation and wastage, coupled with neglect in environmental protection, 
have also led to increasingly severe environmental degradation. For instance, 
in Shaanxi’s Shenmu 神木 county, over-exploitation by the county’s 216 
coal enterprises has resulted in a cavity of up to 99.12 square kilometres in 
size, leading to 19 cave-ins. Cave-ins, death of plant life due to the drying 
up of groundwater, and severe water and air pollution are making the mining 
regions increasingly uninhabitable. It was reported that while cave-ins are 
making land uncultivable for farmers and causing grazing problems for animal 
husbandry, and diminishing groundwater is drying up wells which households 
depend on for drinking water, the mining company is paying villagers a cave-
in compensation of just RMB20 cents for every ton of coal. (ibid.: 272-273)
4. Public Protests and Social Crisis
These are the times that try men’s souls […] Tyranny, like hell, is not easily 
conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, 
the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too 
lightly: it is dearness only that gives every thing its value.
– Thomas Paine (1776), The American Crisis, I24 
Poverty and inequality are among the key factors underlying social dis-
turbances. Various estimates have shown an increase in collective protest 
incidents from 8,700 in 1994 to 90,000 in 2006 and further to 127,000 in 
2008.25 According to official statistics, “illegal” quntixing shijian 群体性事件 
(or qunti shijian 群体事件, literally “mass incidents”) nationwide increased 
from 10,000 to 74,000 cases over the decade of 1994-2004, with an average 
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annual growth rate of 22.2 per cent, while the number of people involved in 
the qunti shijian went up from 730,000 to 3,760,000, with an average annual 
growth rate of 17.8 per cent (Hu, Hu and Wang, 2006). The figures continued 
to climb to 87,000 cases and about 4 million people by 2005 (Yeoh, 2010a: 
256, Figures 9 and 10). In general, the number of qunti shijian had been 
rising at an alarmingly increasing rate. From a growth of about 10 per cent 
from 1995 to 1996, qunti shijian was growing at an average annual rate of as 
high as 25.5 per cent from 1997 to 2004, i.e. higher than the average growth 
rate of 22.2 per cent during the decade of 1994-2004, with annual growth 
in certain years reaching as high as above 40 per cent; or with 1994 figure 
indexed 100, a steep increase of the index from 100 to 740 in terms of the 
number of cases during the decade of 1994-2004 (an increase of 6.4 times) 
and from 100 to 515 in terms of the number of people involved (an increase 
of 4.2 times) (ibid.).
4.1. Nature and Types of Public Protests
In terms of the participants’ profiles, while at the beginning the people 
involved in these “mass incidents” were mainly xiagang workers26 and 
peasants (reflecting land loss and corruption issues) but later on the list of 
participants expanded to include, besides xiagang workers and peasants who 
lost their lands, also workers, urban residents, private individual enterprise 
owners (getihu), teachers, students and a small number of ex-servicemen 
and cadres, etc. (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 143; Yeoh, 2010a: 257, Figure 
11), thus reflecting expanding and deepening popular interest conflicts and 
contradictions. The changing and expanding class structure is not only a 
society-wide phenomenon but also occurring within the particular social class 
itself, thus making the grievances of the class-within-class even more acute. 
Donaldson and Zhang, for instance, classified China’s farmers today into 
five categories based on their role as direct producers and their class relations 
with the agribusinesses – “commercial farmers” who work independently 
on allocated family land; “contract farmers” who work on allocated family 
land to fulfill company contracts, whose harvests are sold to the contracting 
companies, and while being dominated by the companies manage to retain 
some flexibility; “semi-proletarian farmers with Chinese characteristics”, 
mainly hired villagers who work on collective land rented to companies 
as company employees, whose harvests belong to the company, and while 
being dominated by the companies manage to enjoy a degree of entitlement; 
“semi-proletarian farm workers”, mainly hired migrant labourers who work 
on company land as company employees, whose harvests belong to the 
companies, and while being dominated by the companies do have family land 
at home as a fall-back option; and “proletarian farm workers”, mainly hired 
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landless labourers who work on company land as employees, whose harvests 
belong to the companies, and who, unlike the other four categories, suffer 
from complete domination by the companies (Donaldson and Zhang, 2009: 
99, Table 6.1).
On the other hand, Tong and Lei (2010) documented a total of 248 “large-
scale mass incidents” (those with more than 500 participants, according to 
China’s Ministry of Public Security)27 from 2003 to 2009 (Table 14).
Table 14 China: Large-scale Mass Incidents, 2003-2009
Year Total Number of Large-scale Mass Incidents
2003 9
2004 20
2005 9
2006 25
2007 63
2008 76
2009 46
Source: Tong and Lei (2010: 489), Figure 1.
Figure 5  China: Frequency of Large-scale Mass Incidents by Province, 2003-
 2009
Source: Tong and Lei (2010: 490), Table 1.
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While large-scale mass incidents come in various types, labour and land/
relocation disputes top the list (Figure 6), followed by social disturbances 
and riots usually triggered by isolated incidents but reflecting the people’s 
long-simmering distrust of local government officials with accusation of 
corruption and government-business collusion (guan-shang goujie 官商勾结): 
the well-known cases being the Weng’an 瓮安 incident of 2008, Shishou 石
首 incident of 2009 and the recent riots in mid-June 2011 involving thousands 
in Taizhou 台州, Zhejiang Province, in a series of latest large-scale riots 
that also included the disturbances in Guangdong Province’s Chaozhou 潮
州, Zhejiang Province’s Shaoxing 绍兴, Hubei Province’s Lichuan 利川 
and Xintang 新塘 township of Zengcheng 增城 City (of the metropolis of 
Guangzhou 广州, Guangdong Province).28 It is undeniable that underlying 
these large-scale public protests is the issue of rapidly growing economic 
inequality in the forms of widening income gap, lack of social safety net and 
perception of social and government injustice, as Tong and Lei commented, 
“[…] local governments and police force were generally perceived as corrupt 
and incompetent. The fact that the police force were often dispatched in favour 
of the capitalists who have close relationship with the government whenever 
there was a dispute between peasants and the companies reinforced the public 
perception. There was a profound distrust of the government.” (Tong and 
Figure 6 Large-scale Mass Incidents by Type (Total Number during 2003-2009)
Source: Tong and Lei (2010: 491), Table 2.
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Lei, 2010: 498) Such social disturbances and riots with no specific economic 
demands are seen as the most system-threatening because they are challenging 
rather then endorsing regime legitimacy:
The outburst of disturbances is often the product of broad and diffused social 
grievances over a variety of issues ranging from inequality, corruption and 
social injustice to increasing drug addiction. Disturbance is often triggered 
by poor local governance, especially the misconduct of chengguan [城管, i.e. 
staff members of the city management agency] or the police. In these cases, 
social anger, not economic demands, is directed at the authorities.
(ibid.: 501)
4.2. Distrust of Political Authority
The frequency and scale of the recent riots has undeniably been increasingly 
alarming to the government, giving rise to the allegation that the Xintang 
authorities were under the direct secret order of the Political Bureau of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to fabricate the image 
of the mid-June 2011 Xintang riots as purely clashes between the Sichuan 
migrant workers and the local Cantonese, even by enlisting the underworld to 
orchestrate attacks, in order to transform the protests against the government 
into inter-communal conflicts and to justify the suppression of public protests 
and demonstrations. On the other hand, the government media Renmin Ribao 
人民日报 (People’s Daily) has blamed the riots on cultural clash between 
migrant workers and the local people, while some scholars have attributed 
the recent Guangdong riots to the recession of an open economy, and the 
lack of security in the livelihood of the twenty million migrant workers in 
the province who are also suffering from discrimination and being bullied 
and harassed by the local underworld and other powers that be. On the other 
hand, Beijing sociologist Yu Jianrong 于建嵘 pointed to the alarming fact 
that the recent spate of social disturbances (see Table 15)29, e.g. in Lizhou 
(Hubei) and Inner Mongolia, were triggered by “sudden events/emergencies” 
(tufa shijian 突发事件) and their participants were mostly unrelated to the 
original cause and without clear interest demands.30 However, in venting 
their discontent towards society, the absence of “free-floating aggression” 
is notable (in contrast with, e.g., the recent summer riots across British 
cities in August 2011), and the government and State authorities have been 
the main targets of attack. Widespread support has even been noted on the 
Internet for such attacks on government offices and even in the case of the 
killing of judges. During the spate of wanton killings of primary school and 
kindergarten children that shocked the nation in 2010, the sudden outbreak of 
fatal free-floating aggression against these young children across China that 
occurred from March to May 2010 which caused the death of a total of 17 
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Table 15 Spate of Social Disturbances in May-June 2011
Beginning  Place Details
date of riot
3rd May Shehong 射洪  After a secondary school teacher was mistaken as a 
 County, Sichuan  murderer and beaten up by plain-cloth policemen,
 Province  over a thousand people including teachers and
   students demonstrated and destroyed the police
   station and county government office.
13th May Tianzhu 天祝  A dismissed employee threw petrol bomb and
 County, Gansu  injured over 60 people.
 Province
23rd May Inner Mongolia Death of a herdsman after being hit by a coal truck
   led to demonstrations.
26th May Fuzhou 抚州  A shangfang petitioner detonated bombs at three
  City, Jiangxi  places including the city attorney’s office, killing 3
  Province  and injuring 9.
6th June Chaozhou 潮州  On 1st June, a 19-year-old Sichuan migrant worker
  City, Guangdong  Xiong Hanjiang 熊汉江 asking for unpaid wages
 Province  of 2,000 yuan was assaulted and had his hand and
   leg muscles severed, leading to a 10000-people
   riot, with 18 injured. The badly injured Xiong had
   recovered in the hospital but could be handicapped
   for life.
8th June Shaoxing 绍兴  Seven thousand workers and villagers demon-
 City, Zhejiang  strated against a tin foil factory that had been
  Province  polluting the place for many years.
9th June Lichuan 利川  After former anti-corruption office director Ran
  County, Hubei  Jianxin 冉建新 died during interrogation, over a
 Province  thousand people who believed he was beaten to
   death walked on the streets and clashed with
   police.
10th June Xintang 新塘  A pregnant Sichuan woman and her husband who
 Township,  were roadside pedlars were beaten up by security
 Guangdong  personnel who were allegedly extorting protection
 Province  money from the couple, leading to a riot by over a
   thousand Sichuan migrant workers who destroyed
   the government office and police vehicles, 
   reportedly with 5 people killed, over a hundred
   injured and hundreds arrested. There are five
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people, including 15 children, and injured more than 80, in a string of five 
major attacks and four other cases that occurred from 23rd March to 12th May 
(including those that killed 8 and injured 5 in Fujian province, killed 2 and 
injured 5 in Guangxi, injured 19 in Guangdong, injured 32 in Jiangsu, injured 
5 in Shandong and killed 9 in Shaanxi), and another attack on 3rd August that 
killed 4 and injured more than 20 at a kindergarten in Shandong (Yeoh, 2010a: 
247), an iconic banner allegedly appeared at the gate of a kindergarten which 
read: “Yuan You Tou Zhai You Zhu, Qianmian You Zhuan Shi Zhengfu 冤有
头债有主 前面右转是政府” [there’s a real culprit responsible for any wrong 
or any debt; take a right turn in front you’ll find the government (offices)]. 
While this can be interpreted as a sarcastic advice to re-direct the free-floating 
aggression towards the real target of social grievances, the alleged State 
orchestration of the perception of Xintang disturbances as a clash between 
the migrant workers and local people would be tantamount to an attempt in 
re-channelling the anti-State sentiments into inter-communal scapegoating.31 
Stemming from profound distrust of the government, as Tong and Lei (2010) 
observed above, such social disturbances and riots with no specific economic 
demands are the most system-threatening as they are challenging rather than 
endorsing regime legitimacy.
Table 15 (continued)
Beginning  Place Details
date of riot
   million Sichuan migrant workers in Guangdong, of
   whom a hundred thousand are in Xintang.
12th June Zhengzhou  Over 400 residents of Waliu 洼刘 Village of
 郑州 City,   Shifo 石佛 Township demonstrated against the
 Henan Province  government over forced relocation and unfair
   compensation, after unidentified thugs beat up
   villagers protecting their homes.
13th June Changsha 长沙  Over 500 residents demonstrated against the
 City, Hunan  government over forced relocation.
 Province
14th June Loudi 娄底 City,  Residents demonstrated against the building of a
 Hunan Province  220,000-volt cable tower; many injured.
15th June Taizhou 台州  Believing that the village official of the Jiaojiang
 City, Zhejiang  椒江 District had been embezzling land acquisition
 Province  subsidies over the past nine years, thousands of
   villagers besieged and destroyed Sinopec’s petrol
   station.
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4.3. System-threatening Social Movements
Governments now act as if they were afraid to awaken a single reflection in 
man. They are softly leading him to the sepulchre of precedents, to deaden 
his faculties and call his attention from the scene of revolutions. They feel 
that he is arriving at knowledge faster than they wish, and their policy of 
precedents is the barometer of their fears […] Government by precedent, 
without any regard to the principle of the precedent, is one of the vilest 
systems that can be set up.
– Thomas Paine (1792), Rights of Man, Part the Second, Chapter IV
Such a distinction between system-threatening and non-system-threatening 
protests as Tong and Lei pointed out has always been important for explaining 
State response. Referring to Muslim marchers in 1989 protesting the 
publication of a Chinese book entitled Xing Fengsu 性风俗 [sexual customs] 
that they claimed denigrated Islam, Gladney drew a parallel with the other, 
more well-known, protest of 1989:
Just prior to the bloody suppression of the 1989 democracy movement in 
China, in the midst of the flood of protesting students and workers who, for a 
remarkably lengthy moment in history, marched relatively unimpeded across 
Tiananmen Square and the screens of the world’s television sets, another 
comparatively unnoticed, but nevertheless significant, procession took place 
[…] the protest began with mainly Hui Muslim students who were joined 
by representatives of all 10 Muslim nationalities in China, including some 
sympathetic members of the Han Chinese majority […] this procession was 
on its way to Tiananmen Square, the so-called “Gate of Heavenly Peace”, 
which soon opened on to a hellish nightmare of indiscriminate warfare in the 
streets of the terrorized city. This procession to the Square also made its way 
along Changan Jie, “the Avenue of Eternal Peace,” that shortly thereafter was 
to be renamed “Bloody Alley” by Beijing’s citizens […]
(Gladney, 1991: 1-2)
Gladney moved on further to draw an interesting picture of stark contrast 
in State responses between this case of “protest to the government” and the 
other case of “protest against the government” in those same days32 staged 
by the students and workers and their supporters from all walks of life around 
Beijing and other Chinese cities who eventually paid dearly by blood:
Remarkably, and in another dramatic contrast to the crackdown on the 
student Pro-Democracy Movement, the state took the following actions 
in response to this Muslim protest over an insignificant Chinese book: 
The government granted full permission for all the Muslim protests, often 
despatching police to close streets, stop traffic, and direct the marchers […] 
By stressing the legality of the Muslim protests, what Barbara Pillsbury 
noted as their “protest to the government,” rather than against it – the fact 
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that the Muslims had permission and were often escorted by police – the 
state-controlled press sought to juxtapose the legal Muslim protest with the 
illegality of the student protests.
(ibid.: 3-5, italics in the original)
These “illegal” student protests of 1989 in Tiananmen 天安门 Square, 
despite State disapproval, soon evolved into the now well-known broad-
based pro-democracy movement after being joined in by other demonstrators 
from all walks of life from Beijing to Hong Kong 香港, from Chengdu 成
都  to  Shenzhen 深圳,  and  was  sustained  against  all  odds  throughout 
the 100-day Beijing Spring33 that tragically ended up with, à la Asiaweek, 
the Rape of Beijing34 on that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989, when a 
besieged regime finally responded with a massacre to reclaim the capital 
from the unarmed peaceful protesters. While the official death toll stood at 
four hundred and forty-three, 223 of whom were soldiers and police officers, 
plus 5,000 soldiers and police officers and 2,000 civilians wounded in the 
crackdown, exiled dissidents estimated the number of civilians, workers and 
students killed in the crackdown during the night of 3rd-4th June 1989 to 
be from 2,000 to 3,000 (Yeoh, 2010a: 273). Soviet sources in 1989 put the 
number massacred in Beijing as 3,000, as cited by Mikhail Gorbachev at a 
politburo meeting in 1989.35
One of the most prominent student leaders who led the pro-democracy 
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square was Örkesh Dölet (Wu’erkaixi 吾尔
开希) who, together with Chai Ling 柴玲, Wang Dan 王丹, Feng Congde 
封从德 and other student leaders, had launched the Tiananmen Square 
demonstrations of 1989 against official corruption and political repression. It 
is interesting to note that Örkesh Dölet was then a Beijing Normal University 
student of the Muslim Uyghur nationality. However, unlike the protesters in 
the parallel State-permitted demonstration in Beijing at that time against Xing 
Fengsu, Örkesh Dölet’s involvement in leading the pro-democracy movement 
since the Tiananmen days till today transcends ethnicity, and it was notable 
that his recent condemnation – jointly issued on 7th July 2009 with Taiwan’s 
China Human Rights Association (中國人權協會) – of perceived government 
repression in the July 2009 Xinjiang disturbance was issued, while not 
denying his ethnic identity, as a civil rights activist36, in comparison with some 
pronouncements made by former Nobel Peace Prize nominee Rabiyä Qadir 
(Rebiya Kadeer), chairperson of the World Uyghur Congress37. Nevertheless, 
in the eyes of the Party-State during those turbulent days of 1989:
The students [demonstrating on Tiananmen Square in 1989 against cor-
ruption and for democracy], as an unrecognized voluntary association, were 
considered unlawful, riotous, and a threat to the state’s order. For that they 
were met by a military crackdown. The actions of the Muslims [marching 
against the book Xing Fengsu], as members of state-assigned minority 
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nationalities and believing in a world religion approved by the state, were 
considered permissible. For that they were inundated with state-sponsored 
media and assisted in their demands. The difference, from the Chinese state’s 
standpoint, was one of order and disorder, rationality and confusion, law and 
criminality, reward and punishment.
(Gladney, 1991: 5-6)
However, ultimately, as Fang (1991: 254-255) warned, “There is no rational 
basis for a belief that this kind of dictatorship can overcome the corruption 
that it itself has bred. Based on this problem alone, we need more effective 
means of public supervision and a more independent judiciary. This means, 
in effect, more democracy.”38 Nevertheless, the path towards a North Atlantic 
liberal democracy as envisaged by Fang has seemed increasingly forlorn as 
the CCP regime has in the post-June Fourth era led the country to economic 
miracle and hence, in the eyes of many, has successfully reasserted its 
legitimacy.39 Describing China as “doubtless a post-totalitarian regime ruled 
by a ruthless Party”, Béja (2009: 14-15) ruminated on the 20th anniversary 
of the Beijing massacre:
Twenty years after the 4 June 1989 massacre, the CCP seems to have 
reinforced its legitimacy. It has not followed the communist regimes of the 
Soviet bloc into oblivion. Its policies of elite cooptation, subtle response to 
social contradictions, and instrumental support for the “rule of law” have 
become major complements to its continued control over the press and 
the political system. It has made concessions to prevent discontent from 
crystallizing into social movements that might challenge its rule, and it has 
sent in the police to silence dissidents. Over the course of the same two 
decades, the opposition has had to wrestle with the trauma of the June 4 
Massacre and the huge difficulties that it has raised for anyone who would 
challenge the CCP’s primacy.
4.4.  State Response to Social Movements and the Shopworn Conspiracy 
Theories
Successful it might seem to be, the CCP regime’s reassertion of its legitimacy 
and unassailability has in reality not been immune to a series of challenges, 
some rather severe and unexpected, since June Fourth, exemplied by the 
horrific events of March 2008 in Tibet and July 2009 in Xinjiang. Regrettably, 
in facing such challenges, the regime has never been able to grow out of the 
tendency to recycle the “black hand” (heishou 黑手) theory – the “shopworn 
conspiracy theories that blame mass protests primarily on the CCP’s foreign 
and domestic enemies, reflecting the classic Leninist insistence that social 
protest in a Communist country cannot just happen, it must be instigated” 
(Tanner, 2004: 143) – which is unfortunately so apparent in the ruling regime’s 
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response to the Xinjiang crisis or the Tibet riots. For this “black hand” theory, 
Tanner gave an example from the 1989 Beijing massacre:
In the days after the Tiananmen demonstrations, this Leninist conspiratorial 
worldview was typified in a report on the protests issued by Gu Linfang, 
the Chinese vice minister of public security who was in charge of “political 
security.” To document a conspiracy in 1989, Gu painstakingly listed dozens 
of allegedly nefarious contacts among protest leaders; reformist Communist 
officials; foreign academics; and, of course, Western and Taiwanese 
intelligence agencies. The vice minister railed against party reformers for 
coddling schemers who fomented rebellion. A Leninist to his marrow, Gu 
refused to concede any acceptance of what social scientists have known for 
decades, that whenever a society grows and changes as rapidly as China has, 
an increase in political protests is a normal development.
(ibid.)
Similar State response can be observed following the 5th July 2009 Xinjiang 
riots when Nur Bekri, chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu, declared 
on 18th July 2009 the source of the riots being “the triumvirate of terrorist, 
secessionist and extremist forces”40 and Wu Shimin 吴仕民, vice-chairman 
of China’s State Ethnic Affairs Commission, stated on 21st July 2009 that the 
July Fifth riots had absolutely nothing to do with China’s nationality (ethnic 
minority) policies. Without the courage to face up to domestic realities, any 
solution to the root problems leading to either June Fourth or July Fifth would 
remain illusive. The ruling regime’s inability to face domestic realities is 
further manifested in the continued repression including the arrest of ethnic 
Uyghur economics professor Ilham Tohti of China’s Central Nationalities 
University and founder of the “Uighur Online” on 7th July 200941 and the 
revocation of licenses of civil rights lawyers who took up cases related to 
the Xinjiang riots.42 In the case of the Tibetans, over 300 Tibetan monks 
were reportedly arrested during the night of 21st-22nd April 2011 in Sichuan 
Province’s Ngawa 阿坝 Zizhizhou 自治州 (“autonomous prefecture”) of 
the Tibetan/Zang 藏 and Qiang 羌 nationalities, the site of that devastating 
earthquake on 12th May 2008 which killed at least 68,000 people. Among the 
civilians holding a vigil outside the temple concerned, two elderly Tibetans 
were reportedly killed and various others injured during the police attack 
which was believed to be linked to the earlier demonstrations after a young 
Tibetan burned himself to death in self-immolation on 16th March 2011 at the 
3rd anniversary of the 14th March 2008 Tibetan riots.43
4.5. Federalization and the Fear of Disintegration
Coupled with the shopworn conspiracy theories is the federal taboo, in which 
federalization is inevitably seen as a prelude to disintegration – prominent 
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Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 was arrested for organizing the signing 
of Charter 08 that included an Item 18 “A Federated Republic”44 for which 
he was ostensibly charged – though how far that threat is genuinely believed 
remains dubious as liberal democracy could be the ultimate fear since 
democratization tends to go hand-in-hand with federalization. However, the 
danger of fragmentation coming from democratization and federalization is 
real but not inevitable.
One of the basic features of a federal system, according to Bakvis and 
Chandler (1987: 4), is that it provides “incentives for structuring group/class 
conflicts along territorial lines”. When the territories concerned represent the 
centres of concentration of distinctive socioracial communities, ethnic conflicts 
are translated into territorial rivalries and the process of fiscal federalization 
becomes an arena of ethnic resource competition. Nevertheless, Dorff (1994) 
warned that federal structures, when not accompanied by federal process, 
could have contributed to the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia 
and the Soviet Union, and these one-party states’ federalist structures, without 
federalist processes, initially used to suppress, not accommodate, ethnic 
differences, had actually helped to create a political environment ripe for 
disintegration via ethnic mobilization once decentralization began, as regional 
leaderships bent on protecting the interests of their territorial constituencies at 
the expense of other regions and the federation.
It could hence be highly equivocal to keep seeing the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union as a sword of Democles 
warning against federal structures. On the contrary, the fate of these dis-
integrated nations could be a lesson to take heed of at this juncture just 
past the 22nd anniversary of June Fourth, in particular after the foreboding 
event of 5th July 2009, to begin early the federal process, before it becomes 
too late when eventually the moment of truth arrives for a China ripe for 
democratization45 it turns out also to be the moment for a China ripe for 
disintegration. Definitely, a federal process is always full of pitfalls46, 
especially for a country still facing the problems of high incidence of poverty, 
ethnoterritoriality, sectionalism and ethnoregional socioeconomic disparities. 
Inevitably, it is also a process abounding with right and wrong options and 
choices.
The Chinese regional structure bears substantial similarity to the Spanish 
– for instance, only 3 out of Spain’s 17 Comunidades Autónomas, comprising 
less than 30 per cent of the country’s population, are non-Castilian ethnic 
regions, in contrast to countries like Belgium or the former Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslokia where the state is composed of constituent 
regions each of which populated predominantly with a differentiated ethnic 
community. As Spain is pondering her options whether to move on from 
the State of the Autonomies to a full-fledged federation – through a whole 
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spectrum of scenarios as summarized by Brassloff (1989: 41-45) into the 
evolutionist minimalist regional autonomist, radically revisionist neo-
centralist, radically European regionalist, nationalist particularist, mixed 
federo-regional and, lastly, the federalist maximalist in which the presently 
evolving State of the Autonomies may develop all its potential and end up 
operating as a federal state – it could also be timely for a China in astounding 
transformation to ponder new options other than a dictablanda or even 
a democradura47 with the perpetually uneasy coexistence of economic 
decentralization with political centralism or, as a former vice-premier pointed 
out, being constantly trapped in the perennial “cycles of decentralization and 
recentralization”48 that breed unending chaos and instability.
4.6. Ethnicity, Political Mobilization and Social Unrest
Among the types of large-scale mass incidents listed in Figure 6 earlier, Tong 
and Lei (2010: 495) observed that ethnic differences “are the most difficult 
to reconcile and are therefore the most persistent cause of social frictions 
and the most effective means in political mobilization” and ethnic conflicts 
“are usually not caused by economic grievances, as economic cleavages 
cross-cut ethnic lines”. As seen earlier, more recent cases of such public 
order disturbance were alarmingly on the rise in a series of serious incidents 
including, for example, year 2008’s high-profile conflicts of 28th June (in 
Guizhou), 5th July (Shaanxi), 10th July (Zhejiang), 17th July (Guangdong) 
and 19th July (Yunnan). Yet these constitute but just a small sample of the 
overall rise in social unrest across China in recent years, some of which 
involved ethnic conflicts49. Adding to these are the long-running Tibet 
conflicts including the March 2008 Lhasa riots and the March 2009 conflict 
in Qinghai Province’s Guoluo 果洛 Tibetan Zizhizhou50, as well as the July 
2009 Ürümqi riots.
With the memory of the 1989 tragedy constantly hanging like the sword 
of Damocles, the ruling regime is again facing a dire dilemma, as described 
by Tanner (2004):
[…] the struggle to control unrest will force Beijing’s leaders to face riskier 
dilemmas than at any time since the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations. 
Experiments with less violent police tactics, economic concessions to 
demonstrators, and more fundamental institutional reforms all risk further 
encouraging protest in an increasingly restive society. Nevertheless, these 
challenges must be navigated if the party wants to avoid the ultimate 
dilemma of once again resorting to 1989-style violence or reluctantly 
engaging in a more fundamental renegotiation of power relations between 
the state and society.
(Tanner, 2004: 138)
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5. Dilemma of Political Reform and State Response to Dissent
You will do me the justice to remember, that I have always strenuously 
supported the right of every man to his own opinion, however different 
that opinion might be to mine. He who denies to another this right, makes 
a slave of himself to his present opinion, because he precludes himself the 
right of changing it.
– Thomas Paine (1794), The Age of Reason, Part First51 
Such renegotiation of power relations between the State and the civil society, 
however, inevitably faces critical restriction given that the CCP regime is 
in no way prepared to take the risk of having to relinquish its monopoly of 
power in the process of free multi-party elections. Indeed, while promoting the 
rural elections in 1987, Peng Zhen 彭真 had already argued that such elections 
were to be used to help the Chinese Communist Party govern the country’s 
rural areas and perpetuate the Party’s rule (Zheng and Lye, 2004).
5.1. “Rights-defending” Activism and the State
Hence, any perception that such electoral initiatives are implying that the 
Party is loosening its stranglehold over China’s politics could be illusory as 
the signals conveyed by the ruling regime regarding the tolerance threshold 
for dissent remain unmistakable, not least highlighted in recent years by the 
relentless arrest and jailing of dissidents, including civil rights lawyers Gao 
Zhisheng 高智晟, Zheng Enchong 郑恩宠 and Chen Guangcheng 陈光诚, 
researcher Zhao Yan 赵岩 and Straits Times (Singapore) journalist Ching 
Cheong 程翔. Other cases included the arrest of Hu Jia 胡佳, an AIDS and 
environmental activist, in December 2007, on subversion charges, and Wang 
Dejia 王德佳, a cyber dissident, in the same month, also on subversion 
charges for criticizing the government over human rights abuses ahead of 
the Beijing Olympics (Lye, 2009: 239), and many other civil rights activists 
including the latest case of well-known rights defender Wang Lihong 王荔
蕻 who was arrested on 21st March 2011 in Beijing for her protesting the 
government’s charge against three bloggers in April 2010 outside the court 
of Fuzhou 福州 City, though the authorities had still seemed to be unable 
to settle down to a convincing charge against her by the second half of 
the year52. Wang’s arrest and the State’s struggle to convict her show the 
increasing uneasiness of the State over the rising use of the Internet for 
weiquan-related social movements. The 56-year-old Wang has been a long-
term activist involved in fighting for the rights of the disadvantaged, including 
the case of Deng Yujiao 邓玉娇, the Hubei girl who killed an official who 
was trying to rape her, and the murder of the girl Yan Xiaoling 严晓玲. 
Wang was finally sentenced on 9th September 2011 to 9 months in prison 
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on the charge of provocation and disturbance.53 In another case of 2011, a 
Sichuan dissident writer, Ran Yunfei 冉云飞, was arrested in mid-February 
on accusation of “jasmine revolution” sedition, later released in August but 
still under virtual house arrest.54 He was charged on 17th August with sedition 
to subvert State power, placed under house arrest pending court hearing, at 
the time when two other Sichuan dissident intellectuals, Ding Mao 丁矛 in 
Chengdu 成都 and Chen Weiyin 陈卫因 in Suining 遂宁, were also arrested 
pending similar indictments.55
In the case of Hu Jia, he was charged with “inciting subversion of 
State power” and sentenced on 3rd April 2008 to three and a half years in 
prison for his voicing out on social problems and human rights and on the 
case of Gao Zhisheng. Hu was released on 26th June 2011 but continued 
to be under tight surveillance. To avoid possible house arrest, his wife 
and daughter moved to Shenzhen just before his release but were evicted 
by the houseowner citing heavy pressure from the top.56 During Hu Jia’s 
imprisonment, his 3-year-old daughter Hu Qianci 胡谦慈 became probably 
China’s youngest political prisoner when she was put under house arrest 
together with her mother Zeng Jinyan 曾金燕. With Hu Jia ending his 
jail term, according to Amnesty International, there are still at least 130 
rights-defending activists in China who continue to be incarcerated, forced 
“disappeared”, harassed or held under house arrest.57 For instance, civil rights 
lawyer Gao Zhisheng who first disappeared in August 2006 was later charged 
with subversion of State power and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment 
with a five-year probation. He disappeared again in February 2009 after 
being taken away by the government from his Shaanxi home but reemerged 
briefly in March/April 2010. In a press interview at that time he revealed that 
he had been tortured. He disappeared again a month later after he returned 
home, escorted by government security agents, to pray to his late mother 
during the Qingming 清明 (traditional day of remembrance for ancestors) 
of April 2010.58
The most high-profile case in recent years is, however, that of the 
Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波, who played a prominent role in the 
1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and hunger strikes, who was remanded 
in police custody on 8th December 2008 for organizing the signing of 
Charter 08 (Ling-ba Xianzhang 零八宪章) that managed to gather over 300 
signatures of prominent Chinese citizens on the eve of the International 
Human Rights Day. Charter 08 was conceived and written in emulation of 
the founding of Charter 77 in former Czechoslovakia in January 1977 by 
over two hundred Czech and Slovak intellectuals, including the dissident 
playwright and future Czech president Václav Havel. The number of sig-
natories to Charter 08, local and overseas, later increased to about 7,000 by 
March 200959 and continued to rise. After being taken away for half a year, 
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Liu was “formally” arrested on sedition charges on 23rd June 2009 and later 
sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment.60 Liu was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize on 8th October 2010.
About the time Liu was handed the harsh sentence, China’s civil rights 
issues were also thrust into the limelight with the release of dissident Yang 
Zili 杨子立 after eight years of imprisonment for advocating political reform 
on the Internet, while his fellow dissidents Jin Haike 靳海科 and Xu Wei 
徐伟 were still languishing in prison.61 Yang, Jin and Xu, together with 
Zhang Yanhua 张彦华 and Zhang Honghai 张宏海, were members of the 
Xin Qingnian Xuehui 新青年学会 (New Youth Study Group) they set up 
in 2000 for the exploration of China’s political and social reforms. The case 
of a former People’s Liberation Army (PLA)62 soldier Zhang Shijun 张世军 
who was taken away by the authorities in 2009, as the year’s 20th anniversary 
of the 1989 Beijing massacre was approaching, after writing an open letter 
to President Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 through the Internet citing the “unspeakable 
atrocities” he witnessed committed against civilians and students twenty 
years earlier on that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989 while serving in a 
unit that was involved in the bloody crackdown – a rare eyewitness account 
from inside the PLA – is another reference point for reading civil rights 
development in China.63 Besides these high-profile cases, there are also many 
other little observed arrests and imprisonments that rarely raise an eyebrow 
beyond the border.
Further developments saw the government closing down the Open 
Constitution Initiative (OCI) (Gongmeng 公盟) on 17th July 2009 ostensibly 
for tax offenses, subsequent to the 5th July 2009 Xinjiang riots and with the 
60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic approaching. OCI 
is a legal research centre set up in 2003 which has been involved in various 
sensitive cases in recent years – including the case of the blind civil rights 
lawyer Chen Guangcheng, the melamine-contaminated baby milk scandal, 
and various other civil rights and press freedom cases – and published critical 
reports on China’s human rights and minority policies. The suppression of 
OCI came after the revoking of the licenses of 53 Beijing lawyers, many of 
whom being well-known personalities active in civil rights cases.64
In the 2011 Freedom House’s Annual Global Survey of Political Rights 
and Civil Liberties (ratings reflect events from 1st January 2010, through 
31st December 2010), China was rated 7 (i.e. the worst rating) on political 
rights and 6 (next to worst) on civil liberties (see Figure 7), making her one 
of the 19 “worst of the worst” countries in terms of political rights and civil 
liberties (Puddington, 2011: 4), just marginally better than North Korea, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Libya, Sudan, Burma65, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea 
and Somalia that were all rated 7 on both political rights and civil liberties 
(Freedom House, 2011).
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5.2. Predators of the Press
According to the advocacy group Reporters Sans Frontiers (Reporters without 
Borders), there are more journalists in prison in China than anywhere else in 
the world.66 A report of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) at 
the end of January 2009 accused China of reneging on her promise of press 
freedom during her bid for hosting the Olympics and called for the country 
to immediately release imprisoned journalists and halt the repression of 
journalists with the current national security and other laws – and this came 
amidst reports that a new series of rules and regulations would be launched 
in 2009 to strengthen the control on journalists and news reporting ostensibly 
for maintaining quality and authenticity in news reporting.67
Freedom House in its Freedom of the Press 2010 issued on the World 
Press Freedom Day of 3rd May 2011 covering 196 countries and regions 
recognized 68 as having press freedom, 65 partially free and 63 unfree. 
Among them, China is without press freedom, being ranked 184th, while 
Hong Kong is partially free, ranked 70th, and Taiwan is free, ranked 47th.68 
Notes:  1 is the best rating, 7 the worst. Ratings reflect events from 1st January 
2010, through 31st December 2010.
 *  Xizang (Tibet) Zizhiqu (“autonomous region”), China
 +  Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), China
Source:  Data from Freedom House (2011).
Figure 7 China, Taiwan and ASEAN: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 2010
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In her comments to the Voice of America, the 1997 UNESCO/Guillermo Cano 
World Press Freedom Prize laureate, Chinese reporter Gao Yu 高瑜 accused 
that other than being without press freedom, today’s media milieu in China 
could not even be compared to the 1980s, with the current atmosphere of 
severe self-censorship and constant fear of being persecuted.69 Press freedom 
has apparently also been further curtailed after the recent spate of jasmine 
revolutions-inspired incidents which were swiftly nipped in the bud, with 
officials going all out to enforce self-censorship to protect their own careers. 
Earlier, Lye (2009: 215, 237) also cited Reporters Sans Frontiers ranking 
China number 167 out of a total of 173 countries in its 2008 Worldwide 
Press Freedom Index and considering the number of arrests and cases of 
news surveillance and control by China’s political police and Department of 
Propaganda to be very high, and Human Rights Watch asserting that China’s 
extensive police and State security apparatus continued to impose upon 
civil society activists, critics and protestors multiple layers of controls that 
included “professional and administrative measures, limitations on foreign 
travel and domestic movement, monitoring (covert and overt) of the Internet 
and phone communications, abduction and confinement incommunicado, and 
unofficial house arrests [and] a variety of vaguely defined crimes including 
‘inciting subversion’, ‘leaking state secrets’ and ‘disrupting social order’ 
[which] provide the government with wide legal remit to stifle critics”. 
Another development saw the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China – an 
organization with more than 260 members from 33 countries – issuing a 
statement in August 2009 accusing China of reneging on her 2008 Olympics 
promise of freer foreign press reporting, based on a member survey in the 
previous month that reported 100 cases of driving away reporters at public 
places, 75 cases of tailing reporters, 16 cases of physical violence against 
reporters, 45 cases of threatening interviewees and 23 cases of calling in 
reporters for questioning.70
The persecution of conscientious reporters also includes the threat of 
dismissal, e.g. the recent dissolution of Zhongguo Jingji Shibao 中国经济
时报 [China Economic Times]’s special reports department and the sacking 
of its head Wang Keqin 王克勤 who has been dubbed “China’s number one 
dark-side exposing (jiehei 揭黑) reporter” with his track record of being 
the journalist who brought to the public’s attention the notorious cases of 
the Lanzhou 兰州 securities black market, Beijing taxi monopoly scandal, 
Dingzhou 定州’s horrific homicide, Shanxi’s vaccine scandal, the Li Gang 李
刚 case, etc.71 Another reporter, Qi Chonghuai 齐崇淮, who revealed official 
corruption in the case of the ultra-luxurious government complex in Shandong 
Province’s Tengzhou 滕州 City, was thrown into jail in 2007. Upon his release 
in September 2011, the court sentenced him to another 9 years based on 
“missing charges” (louzui 漏罪).72
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On the other hand, in its annual global list of government leaders accused 
of suppressing press freedom issued on 3rd May 2011, Reporters Sans 
Frontiers included Chinese president Hu Jintao as one of these “Predators 
of Press” (“politicians, government officials, religious leaders, militias and 
criminal organisations that cannot stand the press, treat it as an enemy and 
directly attack journalists”), citing the secret arrest and disappearance of over 
30 dissidents, lawyers and rights-defending (weiquan 维权) activists this year 
so far by April/May 2011.73 In fact, in trying to control the power of the pen 
by drawing blood with their swords, these predators’ official policy towards 
dissent could be chillingly Orwellian, as related in Poole (2006: 203): “In 
June 2005, users of Microsoft’s newly launched Chinese weblog service were 
banned from using words and phrases such as ‘democracy’ or ‘democratic 
movement’: attempts to type these terms invoked an error message that 
read: ‘This item contains forbidden speech.’” The attempt by the Chinese 
government in 2009 to enforce the compulsory installation of a “lüba 绿
坝” (Green Dam)74 Internet filtering software was widely interpreted to be 
yet another similar assault on dissent in cyberspace.75 The list of forbidden 
words on the Internet has been growing lately, covering terms that could be 
even merely remotely related to dissent, including ludicrously moli 茉莉 
[jasmine], pangzi 胖子 [fatty – nickname of the persecuted artist Ai Weiwei 
艾未未], etc.76
6. Structure and Agency
There is a tide in the affairs of men / Which, taken at the flood, leads on to 
fortune; / Omitted, all the voyage of their life / Is bound in shallows and in 
miseries.
– William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act IV, Scene III
Causes of social changes can usually be categorized into three groups, viz. the 
economic, the political and the cultural factors. Economic factors, especially 
the impacts of industrial capitalism, form the core of the Marxist approach 
to social changes. Such Marxist emphasis on economic factors, whether for 
ideological reasons or for the convenience of power maintenance, still forms 
the basis of the Chinese Communist Party’s fundamental definition of human 
rights as the people’s rights to be fed, to be sheltered, to be educated and to 
be employed. Nevertheless, straying from this orthodox Marxist tenet is the 
neo-Marxist expansion of sources of social contradictions, which are inherent 
in social structures, to the political, religious, ethnic and ideological factors of 
conflicts and also the importance of culture not least as a marker for political 
mobilization. Adapting Buckley (1967: 58–59)’s concepts of morphostasis 
referring to “those processes in complex system-environment exchanges that 
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tend to preserve or maintain a system’s given form, organization or state” 
and morphogenesis referring to “those processes which tend to elaborate 
or change a system’s given form, structure or state”, Archer (1995), on the 
other hand, posited that humanity had entered the stage of the morphogenetic 
society and spoke of the central importance of the role of the human agency 
that generates both the social segments’ morphostatic and morphogenetic 
relationships which, in turn, are not able to exert causal powers without 
working through human agents.
Nevertheless, the cautious but pragmatic approach to reform, whether 
economic or political, of post-Mao Zedong 毛泽东 and post-Deng Xiao-
ping 邓小平  China seems to reflect the neo-Marxist view that total 
system or revolutionary change is not inevitable and a stalemate or Reeler 
(2007)’s cold stuckness could be the preferred outcome of social conflicts 
– the stance of “stability above all else” (wending yadao yiqie 稳定压倒
一切) which reaffirms dominance maintained by gradualism in reform and 
piecemeal changes. Pluralized conflicts, one of the possible major patterns of 
conflicts from the point of view of neo-Marxists, help in such maintenance 
of dominance, characterized by the distinctive feature of “fragmentation 
and absence of a feeling of commonality” of current Chinese extra-Party 
politics (Benton, 2010: 322), partly as a result of the relentless crackdown on 
generalist dissent that the CCP regime perceived as most threatening, which 
has recently intriguingly escalated into a wider crackdown on civil right 
defenders and whistle blowers.
In addition to those mentioned in the previous section, also noteworthy 
is the sentencing of dissident Xie Changfa 谢长发 to 13-year imprisonment 
for his involvement in organizing the China Democracy Party since 1998, 
which came after the conviction of the civil rights activists Huang Qi 
黄琦, Tan Zuoren 谭作人 and Guo Quan 郭泉, who voiced out on the 
alleged school building construction scandal exposed by the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake that resulted in a huge number of student casualties due to the 
collapse of school buildings.77 The epitome of the prisoners of conscience at 
the moment, as mentioned earlier, is of course Liu Xiaobo, the key founder 
of Charter 08, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 8th October 
2010, in a year with a large number of the nominees for the prize being 
persecuted Chinese dissidents and civil rights activists including prominent 
figures like Wei Jingsheng 魏京生, Gao Zhisheng, Chen Guangcheng and 
Hu Jia.
The widening of persecution of civil rights lawyers and activists has 
seen the arrest or “disappearance” of 30 to 50 people in the first five months 
of 2011, including the arrest of civil rights activist and artist Ai Weiwei, 
and the continued persecution of the “melamine-contaminated baby milk 
scandal” activist Zhao Lianhai 赵连海 whose son was among the hundreds 
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of thousands of infant victims of the 2008 scandal.78 After being put under 
house arrest in 2005 following his involvement in the legal cases of women’s 
forced abortion and sterilization in the prefecture-level city of Linyi 临
沂 in Shandong Province, the blind rights-defending lawyer and activist 
Chen Guangcheng was formally charged in 2006 with the destruction 
of public property and traffic disruption and sentenced to four years and 
three months in prison. Though he was released on 9th September 2010, 
he and his family have since been under tight house arrest and complete 
seclusion. After the publicizing of an image recording he secretly made 
of his house arrest ordeal, Chen and his wife Yuan Weijing 袁伟静 were 
cruelly beaten up by seventy-odd people who broke into their house on 
18th February 2011, according to a letter sent out by Yuan. The terrorizing 
and intimidation continued, she said, with their windows being sealed up 
with iron sheets on 3rd March, television antenna broken on 7th, and the 
intrusion of forty-odd people who took away their computer and certain 
handwritten materials.79 According to another weiquan activist Liu Shasha 
刘沙沙, Cheng Guangcheng’s 6-year-old daughter Chen Kesi 陈克斯 was 
denied her right to schooling because of her parents’ house arrest although 
she had reached the school age.80
In the case of Ai Weiwei, he was arrested on 3rd April 2011 and accused 
by the official media of having committed economic crime and tax evasion. 
Li Fangping 李方平, the civil rights lawyer who had defended Ai Weiwei 
and Zhao Lianhai, was taken away on 29 April. He was released on 4th May, 
the day another civil rights lawyer Li Xiongbing 黎雄兵 disappeared.81 Four 
staff members of Ai’s studio also disappeared on 11th April. Ai was released 
on bail on 22nd June with the condition that he must not talk to the media 
or through twitter or other Internet social group for at least one year. The 
apparently less brutal treatment towards Ai compared to those meted out to 
other dissidents could probably be attributed to his “red family” background. 
His arrest represented a State warning that he had overstepped the line in 
his investigation into many incidents involving government corruption, 
such as the melamine-contaminated baby milk scandal, the “tofu dregs” 
schoolhouse scandal that causes a huge number of schoolchildren casualties 
during Sichuan’s Wenchuan 汶川 earthquake82 and his vocal support for 
the persecuted rights-defending dissidents. During his incarceration, Ai was 
allegedly placed in a windowless room of less than four square metres, and 
police interrogation had never touched upon the tax evasion issue but on 
subversion and “jasmine revolution” instead. The police allegedly told him 
that “you embarrassed the country, the country will embarrass you; this is 
what you deserve.”83
However, in comparison with the different waves of almost a century 
of Chinese dissent, as pointed out by both Benton and Wasserstrom, 
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today’s dissent in China lacks a unifying thread that connects the actions of 
different disgruntled groups (Wasserstrom, 2009), partly due to the actions 
of the regime, partly also being “a result of the increasing complexity, 
differentiation, and individualization of Chinese society, which is no longer 
monochrome and predictable but as diverse as other contemporary societies, 
and geographically even more diverse” (Benton, 2010: 322). This increased 
diversity has inevitably impacted on the increasingly complex structure of the 
agent-institution interface (see Green’s model of social change as applied to 
the Chinese case – Green, 2008; Yeoh, 2010a: 271, Figure 19) at the core of 
the circles of social transformation.
Archer’s double morphogenesis sees both structure and agency as 
cojoint products of interaction in which agency is both shaped by and 
reshapes structure (Archer, 1995; 1996; 2000; 2003). Operating structures 
and purposely acting human agencies (combinations of acting individuals) 
in combination forms the praxis and interface of social interaction that 
effects social change, wherein agencies are both creating and being limited 
by the structures, exemplified no doubt by the voicing of dissent and the 
corresponding crackdowns justified by the notion of “stability above all 
else”. However, social control, as ironically seen by Ralf Dahrendorf (1959), 
could be the broadest basis of social conflicts. In a sense, such coercion 
to extract conformity is normal, as all social systems exhibit association 
of roles and statuses that embody power relationships which tend to be 
institutionalized as authority, sometimes self-perpetuated, with normative 
rights to dominate.
On the macrosociological level, while conflict is an inevitable part of 
social life and not necessarily negative as it is the engine for social change 
from both Marxian and Weberian perspectives, the key question is ultimately 
who gains at whose expense – the question of equity – and this leads to 
the actions of the rights-defending activists. Indeed, from the interpretive 
perspective, social reality is ultimately a construction by people – interactions 
among people so that patterns and standards of behaviour emerge, how these 
people – be they the ruling political élite or the increasingly persecuted civil 
rights lawyers and activists, many of whom being the survivors of the 1989 
Beijing massacre, who unlike the also persecuted democracy movement 
organizers like Liu Xiaobo and Xie Changfa, seek instead “to protect and 
improve the rights of citizens within China’s constitutional constraints and 
legal framework with minimal political requests” yet not totally apolitical 
(Hung, 2010: 333-334).
From the perspective of interpretivism, change in the forms of inter-
action, process and negotiation is primal, while structure a by-product and 
temporary. In this context, both the pro-democracy and civil rights activists 
and members of the ruling political élite are human agencies engaged in 
IJCS 2-2 combined text final 04-456   456 10/4/2011   12:50:17 PM
Structures and Agents in Contemporary China’s Social Transformation      457
the constant creation, negotiation and re-creation of the social order. Within 
this process of social change there exists a negotiated consensus about 
what constitutes objective social reality – an outcome of the historical 
process of symbolic interaction and negotiation that is society as social 
construction because human agencies, be they State agencies, civil societal 
groups or organizations, become real only if the human agents believe that 
they are to be real, and in huge and complex societies with a multitude 
of contending realities whatever consensus on what constitutes objective 
social reality is at best partial. This can be seen in the context of interpretive 
understanding of social action (verstehen) – the Weberian focus on human 
agents’ interpretation, definition and shaping by cultural meanings well 
beyond overt behaviour and events wherein human agents define their social 
situations, while these definitions influence ensuing actions and interactions 
and such human interactions entail the negotiation of order, structure and 
cultural meanings. At the level of the individual human agent, Archer (2003) 
described the integration of subjective projects and objective circumstances 
in a viable modus vivendi linking structure with agency, through constantly 
examining one’s social contexts, asking and answering oneself in a trial-
and-error manner about how one can best realize the concerns that oneself 
determine, in circumstances that were not one’s own choosing (Archer, 2003: 
133).
While Archer’s theorizing has sometimes been criticized as focusing 
too much on internal conversation, conceptualized as a causal power that 
transforms both human agents and society, at the expense of intersubjective 
communication which is crucial for understanding the morphogenesis of 
structure through collective action and social movements – her emphasis 
that “[w]ere we humans not reflexive beings there could be no such thing as 
society’ (Archer, 2003: 19) – it could be unfair not to take into consideration 
the relevance of her theorizing to the latter and the great potential of extracting 
a theory of collective action from her work. Her “metareflexives” for instance, 
while – true to her assertion that private life is an essential prerequisite for 
social life – being idealists seeking self-knowledge and practicing self-critique 
for self-realization, are also driven by their personal missions to criticize their 
environment – Habermasian Meadian wertrationale social utopians constantly 
judging themselves and their societies in a critical manner from the point of 
view of the “generalized other” and the alternate “rational society” (Habermas, 
1987, 1992; Mead, 1934), showing concern for social injustice and refusing 
morphostasis or “cold stuckness” (Reeler, 2007) in the name of some cultural 
or political ideal or the preference for stability. Mead’s “generalized other”, 
after all, is the “organized community or social group which gives to the 
individual his unity of self” (Mead, 1934: 154), enabling the human agent to 
raise questions of justice and rights.
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7. State as Racketeer
Every Communist must grasp the truth, “Political power grows out of the 
barrel of a gun.”
Mao Zedong, Selected Works, Vol. II, “Problems of War and Strategy”,
6th November 1938
I told myself that no matter what, I refused to become the General Secretary 
who mobilized the military to crack down on students.
– Zhao Ziyang (2009a: 29; 2009b: 48; 2009c: 62)
Just a year prior to Mao’s passing, on the other side of the globe in 1975, in 
Spain which constitutes 85 per cent of the Iberian Peninsula, Generalísimo 
Francisco Franco y Bahamonde84 (the Caudillo) died. While repeatedly 
expressing confidence that he would leave Spain atado, y bien atado (“tied-up, 
well tied-up”)85, Franco’s death in 1975 was followed within two years by the 
dismantling of the structure of the whole Franquist regime, and the first free 
parliamentary elections in over 40 years were held on 15th June 1977. One of 
the most remarkable developments under the democratic transition had been 
the political decentralization of the State. Nevertheless, the controversy and 
confusion over the regional picture and the fear for the loss of Spain’s national 
identity, as well as the continued attacks by ETA, the Basque separatist group, 
continued to fuel right-wing discontent, led to a series of conspiracies against 
the democratic government and culminated in the almost successful military 
coup of 23rd February 1981. However, the result has not been to roll back 
reforms but to push the ethnoregional question even more firmly to the top 
of the political agenda.
Hence, going back to the 1970s, what we are seeing here is that at 
their respective critical structural junctures three decades ago, in 1975 and 
1976, fascist Spain and Marxist-Leninist China embraced different paths of 
reforms, with post-Franco Spain spurning overnight her fascist-corporatist 
past and embracing multi-party democracy and federalism, taking the risk of 
the disappearance of the central State, to hold the country together against 
potentially separatist ethnoregional conflicts, while post-Mao China has since 
followed a more cautious path that was to evolve later into an institutionalized 
relationship between the central State and the localities some would call 
“selective centralization” (Zheng, 1999).
7.1. From May Fourth to June Fourth to July Fifth
O ye that love mankind! Ye that dare oppose, not only the tyranny, but the 
tyrant, stand forth!
– Thomas Paine (1776), Common Sense
Across the globe in China, since the demise of Mao, another critical juncture 
arrived in 1989, with the 100-day peaceful Tiananmen demonstrations and 
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hunger strikes that received global sympathy probably other than those 
behind the high walls of Zhongnanhai 中南海 whose only known feedback 
mechanism for dealing with such “deviation-amplification”86 that could trigger 
systemic change was armed repression. These poignant lines from Howard 
Chapnick’s foreword to Beijing Spring (Turnley et al., 1989: 15) speak of 
June Fourth as a historical milestone:
[…] The martyrs of Tiananmen Square lie silent and still. They spoke for 
themselves throughout the tumultuous and chaotic weeks of the Beijing 
Spring of 1989. But now, in the aftermath of repression and intimidation, 
their symbolic Goddess of Democracy has been shattered, their banners have 
been removed, and their voices have been silenced […] We were incredulous 
spectators as the Chinese students dared to dream what became an 
impossible dream […] But certain events are so monumental, so symbolic, 
so glorious, and speak so eloquently to our highest ideals that they transcend 
the immediacy of the news. History demands that they be preserved.
Such poignancy results, in Archer (1988)’s explanation, from the disjunction 
between the system segments’ relations of contradictions and complementarity 
and those between human agents in terms of conflict and cooperation. Shock-
ing it might have been, it was not surprising that the 1989 Beijing Spring had 
ended in the tragic Rape of Beijing87 when the system segments’ relations 
did not mesh with those of the human agents – the same mismatch that is still 
manifesting itself today where the political élite in the life-world is adamant 
in holding ground against the masses’ demand for transformative political 
change amidst lively debate and consensus on universal values at the general 
level of the cultural system – thus nipping morphogenesis in the bud, leading 
to the subsequent protracted morphostasis.
While Spain’s 1981 failed coup had put the decentralization plan into 
more urgency by highlighting the peril in the management of decentralization, 
the threat from conservative forces, and the threat from regional reformers and 
secessionists, the Tiananmen demonstrations had instead ended in the spill 
of innocent blood and arrested the maturing of the political system with the 
purge of Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳, the arrest of Bao Tong 鲍彤 and the exile of 
other chief reformists and intellectuals who advocated democratization such 
as Yan Jiaqi 严家其 and Fang Lizhi 方励之 and the student leaders in the 
forefront of the mass protest.
Aspects of political reform have since been either rolled back or 
stalled. In view of the close link between political decentralization and 
democratization,88 the tragic end of the Tiananmen protests and democracy 
movement of June 1989 was a disaster for democratic pluralist development 
and ethnoregional accommodation. The post-June Fourth robust, even 
miraculous, economic growth has been used time and again rather successfully 
by the CCP for the ex post justification of the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, 
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that the brutal crackdown had been necessary to preserve China’s stability 
and economic progress, but if the blood-chilling words attributed to Deng 
Xiaoping89 – that it was worth killing 20 wan 万 (i.e. 200 thousand) people 
to ensure 20 years of stability for China – in ordering the brutal crackdown of 
June 1989 were truly his, then the continuing, even recently escalating, social 
unrest – including those more alarming incidents with ethnic or ethnoregional 
flavour – that culminated in Xinjiang’s July Fifth deadly riots of 2009, just 
a month past that year’s 20th anniversary of the Beijing90 massacre, look 
somehow like an omen that time might be running out. The student movement 
which snowballed into social protests of unprecedented scale is in many ways 
a return of May Fourth. While May Fourth of 1919 had eventually led to the 
triumph of Maoism-Leninism which in a way hijacked the early socialism 
of Chen Tu-hsiu (Chen Duxiu) 陳獨秀91, the violent suppression of the 
1989 mass protests represented a prelude to the subsequent hijacking of the 
Hu Yaobang-Zhao Ziyang administration’s initiative for politico-economic 
liberalization92 by the strengthening one-party authoritarian State corporatism 
preferred by Deng Xiaoping who once and again felt wary of and threatened 
by his protégés’ “bourgeois liberalism”. The conservative backlash had since 
worsened the uneasy coexistence of a highly decentralized economic structure 
with a highly centralized intolerant political regime which has, among 
other ramifications, stalled the more rational accommodation of ethnic and 
ethnoregional aspirations and precipitated the horrific events of 14th March 
2008 and 5th July 2009.
Yet, the 1989 Beijing massacre could be seen as a wake-up call for the 
CCP to embark rigorously on a path of continuing economic reform while 
rolling back the Hu Yaobang-Zhao Ziyang era of limited politico-cultural 
liberalization (a prominent symbol being the He Shang 河殇 [river elegy] 
documentary93) and the subsequent collapse of Communist Party rule in 
USSR and Eastern Europe from the end of 1989 to early 199094 had seemed 
to reaffirm the correctness of such a decision to crack down on the part of 
the CCP to ensure the survival of its one-party rule. June Fourth could also 
be seen as a catalyst for the single-minded determination to deliver on the 
economic front after Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” (nanxun 南巡) later in 
1992 to reaffirm the Party’s policy of moving forward with economic reform 
and liberalization, coupled with more determined repression of political 
dissent. Nevertheless, as Bao (2009) noted:
There are people who said that the crackdown has led to prosperity. What I 
know is: economic reform created prosperity. It is the people who have, with 
market economy, crushed the yoke of Mao Zedong to create prosperity. Now 
there are people who concluded that prosperity is the output of crackdown. 
Facing the global economic crisis, I do not know whether they are preparing 
to introduce the experience of crackdown to save the world economy. There 
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are people who applaud that a muzzled China – a China in Total Silence 
– has leapt forward to become the world’s second largest economic entity 
– just after the United States; I believe this is true. Under the brutal rule 
of Kublai Khan, China has so early already been the prosperous paradise 
witnessed by Marco Polo […] June Fourth opened up a new phase of Total 
Silence. After Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, the China in Total Silence 
reiterated economic reform and wealth redistribution. But who are the 
beneficiaries of such redistribution in a China in Total Silence?95 
Such worries are not unfounded. There is indeed little unique for a politically 
repressive country to achieve economic miracles. Many authoritarian and 
neo-authoritarian countries have done it before, such as Chiang Kai-shek 蔣
介石’s Taiwan and Park Chung-hee 박정희 / 朴正熙’s South Korea, or in a 
way even Augusto Pinochet’s Chile and Soeharto’s Indonesia. In fact, many 
such countries are among the models CCP’s China, in its search for a way 
forward after 1989, found attractive to consider for emulation.
This year 2011 is the 22nd anniversary of June Fourth. It is also the 92nd 
anniversary of May Fourth. There are indeed many similarities between May 
Fourth of 1919 and June Fourth seventy years later – the passion for social 
reform and national rejuvenation, the resentment against contemporary socio-
politico-economic injustice, the call for democracy, science, human rights 
and modernization (in 1989 very much symbolized by the hugely popular 
He Shang documentary), the forlorn challenge against the overwhelming 
power of a ruthless State. Like May Fourth of 1919 which, while inclusive 
of the liberal tradition, eventually turned Chinese intellectuals away from 
Western liberalism to Bolshevism, planted the seeds of Mao’s ascending the 
Tiananmen on 1st October 194996 and of the contradictions between national 
rejuvenation, modernization and radicalism, June Fourth of 198997, which 
happened to coincide with the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, 
70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement and 40th anniversary of 
Chinese Communist Party rule, in a way also sowed the seeds of escalating 
internal contradictions and tension in subsequent policy orientation.
Even not seen in ethnic and ethnoterritorial terms, such social contra-
dictions have manifested themselves in the alarmingly widening income gap, 
deteriorating socioeconomic inequalities and proliferating social unrest. The 
State’s neurosis towards the meaning of May Fourth, which was supposed to 
be a national pride, and its link to the spirit of June Fourth, for instance, was 
manifest in the quiet passing of the recent 92nd anniversary of the May Fourth 
movement in Beijing and Peking University, the birthplace of the movement. 
Besides the suppression of freethought and dissent and the ubiquitous 
“thought police” on campus, Peking University’s economics professor Xia 
Yeliang 夏业良 attributed the dire atmosphere to the government’s denial 
of the universal value of liberal democracy and freedom of expression and 
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political choice.98 In contrast with the students who participated and led the 
1989 democracy movement who dared to turn ideals into action, according 
to Professor Ye, today’s students tend to heed their parents’ advice to beware 
of the political minefield given the memory of the 1989 Beijing massacre 
and the subsequent two decades of relentless repression on dissidents, and 
increasingly, even civil rights activists and lawyers, which has been seen to 
be deteriorating recently partly due to the CCP regime’s fear of the spread of 
the tantalizing “jasmine revolutions” from the Arab North Africa and West 
Asia into this East Asian giant.
However, in the interplay between the State and the civil society, much 
like what Kristensen’s law in pubic choice theories postulates, the negotiation 
between human agencies as stated earlier in the previous section tends to be 
asymmetrical. In entrenching and expanding its power, the ruling regime as 
a rule would resort to exploit such power asymmetry not only by the overt 
repression of dissent in the preservation of stability as an ongoing stalemate – 
one of the possible results of social conflicts from the neo-Marxist perspective 
– but also by forging and re-forging alliances with societal groups based on 
common interest and the co-optation of the societal élite including segments 
of the intelligentsia. All these, of course, depend on the State’s ability to 
monopolize the concentrated means of coercion. In this, China is not unique, 
as Charles Tilly observed:
At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of 
war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears 
a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea 
of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies 
and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose 
shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government.
(Tilly, 1985: 169)
While that brings to mind Thomas Paine’s iconoclastic dictum that “govern-
ment even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an 
intolerable one”99, Tilly noted that apologists for a government usually argued 
that the government offered protection against local and external violence and 
these apologists called people who complained about the price of protection 
“anarchists”, “subversives”, or both at once. Tilly found an analogy of such a 
government with a racketeer:
But consider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a threat 
and then charges for its reduction. Governments’ provision of protection, 
by this standard, often qualifies as racketeering. To the extent that the 
threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary 
or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized 
a protection racket. Since governments themselves commonly simulate, 
stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive 
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and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest current 
threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate 
in essentially the same ways as racketeers.
(Tilly, 1985: 171)
Such racketeer governments basically perpetuate their power through violence, 
in one sense or another:
Back to Machiavelli and Hobbes […] political observers have recognized 
that, whatever else they do, governments organize and, wherever possible, 
monopolize violence. It matters little whether we take violence in a narrow 
sense, such as damage to persons and objects, or in a broad sense, such as 
violation of people’s desires and interests; by either criterion, governments 
stand out from other organizations by their tendency to monopolize the 
concentrated means of violence.
                   (ibid.)
7.2. From Megaghost to Megastar: A Party Reborn?
The mismatch between the system segments’ relations and those of the 
human agencies, coupled with power asymmetry and one-sided monopoly of 
violence, gives rise to a situation in which social structural stratification leads 
to even involuntarily placed agents being transformed into social actors during 
the process of transforming the structural conditions affecting them – Archer 
(1988)’s double morphogenesis – while they are endeavouring to realize their 
undertakings and/or to guard their vested interests, as poignantly struck home 
in the following diatribe by the observing media against the perpetrator of the 
June 1989 Beijing massacre:
Not only is Peking a nightmare streetscape awash in atrocity and anguish; 
the nation at large has become a haunted land. This howling, lurching mega-
ghost is the Chinese Communist Party. In one staggeringly brutal stroke, 
it shot itself through the heart. It will not recover. A regime that professes 
itself to be the distillation of popular will has turned on the Chinese people, 
committing the ultimate sacrilege of eating its own children. Hundreds 
of China’s brightest, most idealistic sons and daughters, their movement 
commanding wide public sympathy, were nakedly sacrificed to the cause of 
preserving an élite.
(Asiaweek, 16th June 1989, p. 16)
While Asiaweek in its 16th June 1989 editorial “The Rape of Peking” 
lamented a Goya-esque landscape, these lines seem today, by hindsight, a 
gross underestimation of CCP’s resiliency and the effectiveness of authori-
tarian power, and the importance of the constraints and enablements that 
depends objectively on the relative social position of the human agents and 
subjectively on the agents’ projects which to a certain extent being adjusted 
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to possibilities through Bourdieu’s “causality of the probable” (Bourdieu, 
1974), given the stark asymmetry in power relations and one-sided monopoly 
of violence.
Meanwhile, building upon the foundation set by the Hu-Zhao adminis-
tration’s audacious reformist programmes, Deng Xiaoping moved forward 
from where his purged former protégés have left by reinvigorating the post-
Tiananmen chilling politico-economic milieu through his nanxun in 1992, 
culminating lately in China first superseding Germany to become the world’s 
third largest economy in early 2008, ranked only after the United States of 
America and Japan, and finally superseding Japan in mid-2010.100 
According to Wang Qinfeng 王秦丰, the deputy head of CCP’s Central 
Committee Organization Department (中共中央组织部), from the 4.48 
million party member in 1949 at the founding of PRC, the Chinese Communist 
Party has grown to comprise over 80 million members by the end of 2010, of 
whom one quarter were below 35 years old. In fact, about 80 per cent of those 
who applied to join the party in 2010 were below 35 years old, with the party 
members with university or other high academic qualifications continuing to 
increase in number.101 CCP has also been intensively recruiting professionals 
in private enterprises as party members. For instance, of the 200 employees of 
the Beijing company Hengtai Shida 恒泰实达 about 10 per cent, mainly from 
the middle and higher echelons, are now CCP members.102 On the other hand, 
Chen Xiqing 陈喜庆, the deputy head of CCP’s Central Committee United 
Front Department (中共中央统战部), declared at a recent press conference 
that China’s “multi-party” system was already perfect, hence there was no 
need to establish new political parties.103 The CCP, according to Chen, has 
been absorbing the workers, peasants, soldiers as well as members of the 
intelligentsia as party members, while the eight existing “democratic parties” 
(minzhu dangpai 民主党派) are focusing mainly on recruiting people from 
the middle and upper social strata, including those in the fields of technology, 
culture and sports, as their party members. In China’s so-called “multi-party 
cooperation” (duodang hezuo 多党合作) system, these “democratic parties” 
are neither “non-ruling parties” (zaiyedang 在野党) nor “opposition parties” 
(fanduidang 反对党), but “participating parties” (canzhengdang 参政党). 
Besides that, according to Chen, there are also “party-less” (wu dangpai 无
党派) people in the system, comprising those who are not members of these 
nine political parties.
However, nomination of independent candidates for the county- and 
village-level elections this year (2011) has apparently been blocked on the 
ground that the nomination of such independent candidates has no legal basis, 
while official media are accusing these independent candidates as learning 
from the Western opposition, creating confrontation, being irresponsible and 
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causing political hazards in China’s society. These independent candidates 
are also warned not to touch the government’s “red line”.104 According 
to China’s electoral law, only the “official representative candidates” are 
legal candidates for the county and village elections, being nominated and 
recommended by the political parties, civil organizations and the electorate; 
hence, these “independent” candidates are considered illegal. For instance, a 
female xiagang worker in Jiangxi Province, Liu Ping 刘萍, was placed under 
tight police surveillance after she declared her intention to stand in Xinyu 新
余 City’s Yushui 渝水 District elections. A labour-rights activist, Liu has been 
arrested before for her shangfang-weiquan 上访维权105 activity and believed 
that she would be arrested again in the government’s attempt to stop her from 
standing in the coming elections.106
Hence, while many authors inside and outside China have been lauding 
the country’s “grassroots democratization” and intra-Party reforms as pointing 
to a promising path of de-authoritarian evolvement, the perception that China 
is moving out from the “politically closed authoritarian” category of regime 
type (see taxonomy in Diamond, 2002: 30-31, Table 2) could prove to be as 
misleadingly whimsical as it is empirical unfounded. Furthermore, past record 
of mismanagement and repressive, often violent, response to dissent, including 
the excesses during the Cultural Revolution both in China proper and in the 
ethnic regions like Tibet and Xinjiang, and the June Fourth atrocities, may not 
be encouraging for many, as a dissident astrophysicist, exiled after the 1989 
Beijing massacre, ruminated:
[…] changes are not devoid of suffering. China has again shed fresh blood, 
blood which testifies to an oft-proved truth:
–  Without respect for human rights, there will be resorting to violence;
–  Without tolerance and pluralism, there will be resorting to prison;
–  Without democratic checks and balances, there will be resorting to 
armed coercion.
China’s history has long since proven, and continues to prove, that using 
violence and imprisonment and armed coercion to enforce upon a nation a 
single belief, a single point of view, a single superstition, will only lead to 
instability, poverty, and backwardness.
(Fang, 1991: 259)107 
8. Élite as Seemers
Hence shall we see, / If power change purpose, what our seemers be.
– William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act I, Scene IV
And as to you, Sir, treacherous in private friendship (for so you have been 
to me, and that in the day of danger) and a hypocrite in public life, the 
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world will be puzzled to decide whether you are an apostate or an imposter; 
whether you have abandoned good principles, or whether you ever had 
any.
– Thomas Paine, letter to George Washington, 1796108 
While not denying that much progress is required before China turns 
democratic, Bo (2010) argued against the accusation that the CCP’s rule is 
illegitimate:
It is taken for granted in the Western media and academe that the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has an issue of political legitimacy. Since China 
scored very low on a series of widely used international indexes on political 
openness and governance, it is claimed, the CCP’s rule is in a serious 
legitimacy crisis […] It is wrong to evaluate the legitimacy of the CCP rule 
by relying solely on “expert” opinions of the Western academia and media 
because they are in no position to judge whether the CCP has right to rule or 
not. To assess the legitimacy of any political regime, we need to see whether 
such a regime is receptive to the governed. From this perspective, the CCP 
has no legitimacy crisis. It has been recognized as legitimate internationally 
as well as by the people of China.
(Bo, 2010: 102, 117)
Yet, according to Arthur Stinchcombe, legitimacy depends rather little on 
abstract principle or assent of the governed for the “person over whom power 
is exercised is not usually as important as other power-holders” (Stinchcombe, 
1968: 150, italics in the original)109 the probability of whose confirmation of 
the decisions of a given authority constitutes the latter’s legitimacy, and these 
other authorities, as Tilly commented,
[…] are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority 
that controls substantial force; not only fear of retaliation, but also desire 
to maintain a stable environment recommend that general rule. The rule 
underscores the importance of the authority’s monopoly of force. A tendency 
to monopolize the means of violence makes a government’s claim to provide 
protection, in either the comforting or the ominous sense of the word, more 
credible and more difficult to resist.
(Tilly, 1985: 171-172)
It is in this way that these “other power-holders”, be they societal pressure 
groups, professionals, or academics and the intelligentsia, “have been co-opted 
into the decision-making process, rewarded with perks and privileges, and are 
no longer available as a source of inspiration [for the dissident activists …] 
retreating from ‘politically engaged and intellectually oppositional topics’ to 
inquiries reconcilable with the prevailing order and designed to legitimate the 
hegemonic order” (Benton, 2010: 321-322)110 of a regime claiming credit for 
the economic successes that brought along heightened international stature 
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and diplomatic prowess and propounding existing stability as the key to 
continued economic prosperity which itself being the unfailing characteristic 
of the Chinese and Chinese diaspora worldwide – achievement which could 
have come naturally for the people once the Maoist yoke, both in the forms 
of the suppression of free entrepreneurial spirit and the political horrors, was 
lifted by the same regime that had foisted that yoke upon the Chinese people 
for three decades since 1949.
With the carrot-and-stick approach to maintain its survival, the once-
brutal-dictatorship-turned-benevolent-dictablanda (à la O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986) has managed to preserve the status quo of its own rule as 
well as the interests of the “other power-holders” by both selling the credit it 
claimed on behalf the industrious, enterprising and persevering masses whose 
newly freed entrepreneurial spirit, long-recognized in the communities of 
their brethren worldwide, resulted from the Party’s repudiation of the Maoist 
policies, has doubtlessly led to the country’s economic success during the 
economic reform decades since 1979, as well as extracting the support of 
these “other power-holders” who are willing to abdicate their opportunity to 
rule in exchange for other kinds of protection by the ensuing strong State run 
by the present regime (Stepan, 1985), in a faute de mieux deal much akin to 
Karl Marx’s description of the Bonapartist regime in The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Napoleon (1852). Marx’s classic analysis of Bonapartism as a basis of 
State autonomy rests mainly in the sharing of common interests between the 
State and the dominant group, which in the case of contemporary China, the 
ruling CCP regime and the dominant social élite and groups whose inability 
to overcome the present State’s monopoly of violence to force a regime 
change has given the Party-State the opportunity to use the leverage gained 
both to preserve the status quo and to propound its claim as the protector of 
stability and prosperity in exchange for the acceptance of its legitimacy, for 
even when “a government’s use of force imposes a large cost, some people 
may well decide that the government’s other services outbalance the costs of 
acceding to its monopoly of violence” (Tilly, 1985: 172), though it could turn 
out to be a Faustian bargain that these social élite and groups might live to 
rue. In the stylized representation in Yeoh (2010a: 254, Figure 8), proscription 
of even the slightest manifestation of dissent against the one-party rule has 
managed to contain societal political action to the routine intra-party politics 
at the far bottom right-hand corner, despite the sporadic outbursts of people 
power usually stemming from localized grievances which have always been 
quickly suppressed. Amidst all this, individual political actors are playing a 
central role in giving existence to the obduracy of the system, for the causal 
powers of systems and structures cannot exist without the mediation through 
the human agency, as Archer (2003) admitted despite her rejection of the 
theorem of the duality of agency and structure.
IJCS 2-2 combined text final 04-467   467 10/4/2011   12:50:18 PM
468      Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh  
“Infidelity,” said Thomas Paine, “does not consist in believing, or in 
disbelieving, it consists in professing to believe what one does not believe.”111 
Among members of the political élite, without the pressures from emerging 
critical junctures (Katznelson, 1971), critical decisions like those coming 
from Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping in 1989 are no longer forthcoming, 
and political decision-makers tend to lapse, for career security, into the safe 
zone behind the veil of ignorance – postponing critical decisions on the 
pretext of maintaining stability in the hope that problems would not come to 
a head so soon or would fade into the background with increasing prosperity 
– and come to be political seemers characterized by rhetoric barrages of 
nationalistic rhapsodies and Poolean unspeak112. As a case in point, Premier 
Wen Jiabao 温家宝 is increasingly being accused by the disillusioned masses 
of not matching any action to his frequent verbal outburst advocating political 
reform the details of which have been noted by observers to be much similar 
to those advocated in Charter 08 which landed its proponent Liu Xiaobo with 
an 11-year imprisonment.113
Postponing critical decisions on the last leg of reform – that in the 
political sphere – could only be postponing the inevitable and in fact 
accentuating the existing social contradictions, for both the speed and 
volatility brought about by the country’s breakneck economic transformation 
under increasing morphogenesis are making whatever State-sanctioned system 
with the bottom line of one-party rule short-lived in viability when all State-
guided modi vivendi as such could be at best pro tem. The inability to face 
up to the rapidly changing reality and shifting social context and keep their 
meta-reflexivity (Archer, 1995) constantly on call to realistically assess their 
existing modus vivendi and to be receptive to a transformative change (Yeoh, 
2010a: 285, Figure 21) has trapped the ruling élite, for political survival, 
in the unwavering upholding of a prolonged stage of morphostasis, being 
the agency and most powerful institution that is best positioned to block or 
promote (Yeoh, 2010a: 271-272, Figure 19) the path of morphogenesis, which 
according to Archer (1995), like morphostasis, is both generated and only 
exerting causal powers by working through social agents.
Distinctively, Archer’s critical realism grants causal powers to the human 
agency that are indeducible from or irreducible to the causal powers of society 
(Archer, 2000). Such endowment of causal powers must be crucial for the 
Bourdievian human agents who, involuntarily occupying social positions that 
define their life-chances, upon gaining cognizance of their class members’ 
common interests, are being transformed into Tourainean corporate agents 
who now set out as social actors to transform society, personalizing the latter 
as per their ultimate concerns (Bourdieu, 1974; Touraine, 1969, 1973, 1978). 
It is in this context that, according to Archer, the existing system itself would 
shape the life-world practices geared towards reproducing, reshaping or 
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transmuting the system, whose result, not really incompatible with Deng’s 
“river-crossing” dictum114 or Mao’s “perpetual revolution”, is poised to 
be contested and modified in the subsequent phase of the series of endless 
morphogenetic cycles of sociopolitical and sociocultural interaction and 
systemic conditioning and elaboration.
The political reform much hoped for by China watchers when Hu Jintao 
胡锦涛 and Wen Jiabao – both being former colleagues and subordinates 
of the former reformist premier Zhao Ziyang who was disgraced in 1989 in 
a power struggle with hardliner Li Peng 李鹏 who subsequently executed 
Deng Xiaoping’s decision for a brutal crackdown on the Beijing-Tiananmen 
protesters – took over the presidency and premiership respectively has never 
materialized. Their absence at the memorial service for Zhao, “the conscience 
of China” placed under house arrest for sixteen long years for his refusal to 
repent his decision to oppose the 1989 Beijing-Tiananmen crackdown and 
to urge for the accommodation of the hunger-striking students’ demands, 
when he passed away in 2005 has added to the doubt regarding the degree 
of their political power in the central politburo.115 The utter cold-heartedness 
Wen Jiabao exhibited towards the plight of Zhao Ziyang has long puzzled 
observers of Chinese politics and Zhao’s family and relatives have long 
found chilling. “Take from the mine the coldest, hardest stone, / It needs no 
fashion: it is Washington. / But if you chisel, let the stroke be rude, / And 
on his heart engrave – Ingratitude”, said Thomas Paine in his unpublished 
epitaph for George Washington116. While Washington’s betrayal of Paine, the 
little known father of both the French and American revolutions, during the 
latter’s incarceration in Paris waiting to be guillotined was a political necessity 
given Paine’s open espousal of religious unorthodoxy, the 1796’s American 
presidential elections, as well as America’s foreign policy turnabout, the same 
necessity for political survival could probably explain much the behaviour 
of Wen who survived through both purges of Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 and Zhao 
Ziyang. Political seemers they may both be, both Washington and Wen have 
indeed acted with good political sense as rational human agents interfacing 
with harsh political realities of their times. Nevertheless, revelations by 
political analysts based on internal Party sources have shown that, as in 
the case of Wen Jiabao, the personal allegiance and political orientation of 
individual political players who were highly visible during those critical 
junctures like June 1989 might have been greatly misread (see, e.g., Liu, 
2010).
The real “ruminating self” that intervenes in between the field and the 
habitus (à la Bourdieu, 1990, 2008) through those soul-trying months of 
passion and anguish at that critical juncture in 1989 and in the aftermath of 
the massacre, which constitutes the intercessor that connects the structure’s 
causal powers to agency, may be fully understood only by the particular 
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human agents themselves whose existential projects that they construct in foro 
interno upon which the actuation of social structures’ causal powers through 
constraints and enablements is contingent (Archer, 2003). It is in this context 
that human agents act to mediate their own social conditionings as well as 
effectuate the reproduction or transformation of society. “It is not an accident 
that Premier Wen Jiabao once called himself ‘grandpa Wen’ – Wen yeye [温
爷爷] – in front of the people”, noted Hung (2011). In a sense, the role of 
Wen, long cultivated as the loving grand patriarch who is at every scene of 
disaster to offer moral care for his “children”, is orchestrated to be an on-site 
projection of the central Party-State as the modern successor of the caring 
benevolent emperor who was always there to zuozhu 做主 (do justice) for 
his downtrodden subjects and punish his abusive officials, in a system that 
survives till today in the form of shangfang 上访 (travelling to the capital 
for petitioning) by the abused people suffering in the hands of corrupt local 
officials. Such an image is crucial to the survival of the Party-State, as any 
self-seeking dynasty-builder has long been acquainted with, for the mandate 
of heaven would be lost if that image is shattered – ever since Mencius (Meng 
Zi 孟子) emphasized two thousand three hundred years ago the people’s 
satisfaction as an indicator of a ruler’s moral right to power, and justified the 
overthrow of an unworthy ruler117.
The ultimate project of a self-seeking State is also manifest in the single-
mindedness in pursuing greater economic prosperity, sometimes dubbed 
“GDPism”118, a crazed quest that is increasingly unfolding in recent years to 
be at a terrible social cost, epitomized recently by the horrible train mishap 
in Wenzhou 温州 on 23rd July 2011 – the very Wenzhou that has long found 
its place in modern Chinese history in the typonym of the “Wenzhou model”. 
The scandalousness of the mishap lies neither in the derailment itself, which 
is not an uncommon phenomenon in China, nor the scale of the human 
casualties, nor the unfolding or imminent clampdown on media reportage 
and civil rights activists and lawyers which has been quite a routine from 
the Sichuan earthquake’s “tofu dregs” school-house scandal to the Sanlu 三
鹿 milk contamination disaster, but rather in the scale of the disregard for 
the dignity of human life. However, the uniqueness of this event, the unusual 
uproar it has led to stems from the open urban setting of the occurrence 
that renders surreptitiousness of scandalous actions impossible, unlike, for 
instance, the case of a similar mishap in Jiangxi on 23rd May 2010 in which 
the similarly alleged immediate destruction of train wreckage with utter 
disregard for the victims trapped therein, whom the authorities had hurriedly 
presumed dead, had also been carried out both to avoid publicity and to speed 
up the return to normal operation. In the Jiangxi case, the efficient returning 
the rail segment where the mishap had occurred to operation took even a 
shorter space of time – merely 16 hours compared to Wenzhou’s 34 hours’ 
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duration which is already considered reckless by international standard in 
the handling of such disasters.119 Wen Jiabao’s late appearance in Wenzhou 
six days after the mishap, while being jeered at by some disbelieving his 
illness excuse120 and rationalized by others in terms of the power struggle 
between the Hu-Wen and Jiang Zemin 江泽民 factions121, had followed the 
now routine format of Wen showing on-site the caring, human face of the 
Party-State, while the latter began to clamp down on media coverage and 
social activism stemmed from the incident. Wen’s pronouncements at the site 
of the disaster are apparently, as have become routine in the past calamities, 
to project the impression of a benevolent central court ruling an impossibly 
vast country, struggling to keep a rein on the sometimes wayward, corrupt 
and uncaring local officials.
Nevertheless, as a paramount figure within the gargantuan Party-military-
industrial complex that has metamorphosed during the reform years into 
an incredible modern Leviathan122 whose State-capital-collusion reach has 
since permeated into every corner of the Chinese society, Wen’s routine 
calamity-site pronouncements tend to sound hollow if not pseud. After 
all, while the perpetuation of one-party rule depends upon the monopoly 
of violence and ruthless suppression of dissent ever since the June 1989 
massacre, the legitimacy of the rule ultimately lies in the ability to maintain 
the miraculous GDP growth that has brought the country from poverty to 
prosperity, catapulted the nation to the second place in the world in economic 
size and given back the Chinese people, whether they be the Han-jen 漢
人 in the north, T’ang-jen 唐人 in the south or the worldwide Chinese 
diaspora, the long-lost pride, at least in material terms, in the nostalgia for 
the formidable Han and T’ang dynasties which have been reduced by the 
early part of the 20th Century to the shameful fate of the “sick man of Asia” 
and the bainian guochi 百年國耻 (hundred years of national humiliation), in 
a partial redemption for the unspeakable atrocities committed by the Party 
during the Mao years. Being a political seemer, while riding the waves of the 
miraculous economic performance that its reborn self has unleashed among 
the long-suffering Chinese people by lifting the Maoist yoke, the Party has 
demanded the same gratefulness and reverence long demanded by ancient 
imperial China’s Sons of Heaven for the very economic prosperity that the 
newly freed, long-suppressed Chinese entrepreneurial spirit has brought to 
fruition with incredible speed and geist.
Nevertheless, a seemer as it is, the Party’s ultimate concern is never 
disguised in the pronouncements of its leaders in party congresses, namely 
the perpetuation of the anachronistic one-party rule, while rejecting the 
“bourgeois liberal” practices of multi-party elections and trias politica 
separation of powers, supported by its continued ability to deliver on 
the economic front as well as to curb social ills resulted from economic 
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transformation including the rampant corruption and increasing income 
inequality before they lead to uncontrollable, large-scale system-threatening 
social protests. This is supported by the ruthless suppression of dissent and 
nipping any sign of “deviation-amplification” in the bud before it could take 
the first step to trigger systemic change, all under the façade of territorial 
unity, political stability and a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui 和谐社会), 
the key conceptual cornerstone since the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2006 passed 
the “Resolution on Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious 
Socialist Society” (关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定).
While rumours in cyberspace that the order for the alleged Wenzhou 
cover-up attempt immediately after the derailment had in fact come from the 
central State at a level beyond the Ministry of Railways could probably never 
be confirmed or refuted in a governing environment of lies and deceptions, 
the central Party-State’s paramount priority of maintaining a “harmonious 
society” and the “stability above all else” prime directive would have had a 
primary impact on local-tier decision-makers’ policy choices. Take the case 
of the famous Weng’an incident of 2008 that shocked the nation, when tens 
of thousands of people walked the streets of Weng’an, Guizhou Province, on 
28th June 2008, attacking police and burning law enforcement vehicles and 
government offices after the suspicious death of a beautiful young schoolgirl 
Li Shufen 李树芬, discovered at 1 a.m. of 22nd June 2008 drowned at 
the Daan Bridge 大堰桥 of the Ximen River 西门河. Three persons were 
present at the scene: Li’s female schoolmate Wang Jiao 王娇 and two male 
brick factory workers Chen Guangquan 陈光权 and Liu Yanchao 刘言超. 
Li’s family members believed that she was brutally raped and murdered and 
Wang, Chen and Liu were the prime suspects. There were even rumours that 
thugs were hired to rape and murder Li to punish her for refusing to submit 
to plagiarism demands during school examination, and that the perpetrators 
of this hideous crime had kinship relations with the county’s party secretary 
Wang 王 and the provincial public security department head Jiang 姜. Official 
autopsy results, however, stated that Li had committed suicide and drowned, 
and Wang, Chen and Liu were released before the first autopsy even began. 
While it is a social fact that rapid economic transformation during the reform 
era has brought about overall concomitant rise in crime – the 2010 Blue Book 
of China’s Society reported 12,000 cases of homicide (increase of 0.4 per cent 
from the previous year), 28,000 cases of rape (11.4 per cent increase), 6,064 
cases of arson (26.4 per cent increase), 1,045 cases of planting of dangerous 
material (37.5 per cent increase) and 237,000 cases of robbery (6.7 per cent 
rise) in the first ten months of 2009 (Fan, Song and Yan, 2009: 86)123 – and 
indeed acute social contradictions, deteriorating social order and State-civil 
society relations, out-of-control crime, worsening income and wealth disparity 
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in Weng’an, a mining county with a highly-mixed ethnic minority and Han 
Chinese population of 460,000, has often been blamed for the June 2008 
riots, the standard official “black box” approach, as in so many other cases 
throughout the country, had served to accentuate the people’s distrust of the 
government and fed further the rumour mill (Table 16124) and pushed the 
situation to the boiling point.
Covering up and news blackout have become a routine and standard 
procedure. In the Li Shufen case, for instance, the government had moved 
swiftly to impose si feng 四封 (“four blockades”), i.e. feng wang 封网 
(blocking the Internet), feng cheng 封城 (blocking the town), feng tongxin 
封通信 (blocking mails) and feng jizhe 封记者 (blocking reporters). As a 
result, the mainstream media simply reflected the standardized version from 
the local government officials, Internet postings were severely cut, people 
involved were kept out of reach of the press, and many family members of 
the victim disappeared for many days before reappearing to tell the press 
about their full support for hexie 和谐125 (“harmony”). In the parlance of the 
sarcastic Chinese netizens, they had already been “harmonized” (bei hexie 被
和谐) while Li Shufen had been “suicided” (bei zisha 被自杀).126 Just like in 
the case of the Wenzhou derailment and many other cases, while such State 
response can be blamed on the local governments and their officials, what 
lies behind is ultimately the central Party-State’s paramount concern over any 
perceived threat to a “harmonious society” and the “stability above all else” 
bottom line that it sees as a cornerstone, besides economic prosperity and the 
monopoly of violence, of the perpetuation of its one-party rule.
However, the ultimate question remains: Can social harmony be imposed 
top-down by State coercion and relentless suppression of dissent in a legal 
system devoid of judicial independence? Such a question is indeed futile as 
there has never been any pretension in the party leaders’ pronouncements that 
the fundamental concern represents anything other than the ultimate aim of 
perpetuating the one-party rule of the CCP which looks upon itself to be the 
only political organization in modern Chinese history that has been proven 
to be able to advance the livelihood of the Chinese people and make China 
a great and proud nation – a mentality described by China’s well-known 
writer Han Han 韩寒 recently in his weblog after the Wenzhou derailment 
as follows: “They feel that, from a larger perspective, ‘We’ve organized the 
Olympics, we’ve abolished the agricultural tax, yet you’re not applauding 
but instead always making a great fuss about trivialities – What are you up 
to? Originally we could be tighter in politics than North Korea, poorer in 
economy than Sudan, more ruthless in governing than the Khmer Rouge, 
because we have a much larger army than they do, but we aren’t. Yet you do 
not show your gratitude, but want us to apologize …’”127 
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9. Middle Class, trade unionism and Dissent
Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in the sociopolitical attitude 
of the country’s rapidly growing middle class and the changing behaviour of 
the workers amidst the demise of the State monopsony of labour, the rapid 
development of marketization, the inflow of foreign investments and the 
growth of China into the “factory of the world”.
9.1. Rise of the Middle Class and Extra-Party Activism
He bade me observe it, and I should always find, that the calamities of life 
were shared among the upper and lower part of mankind; but that the middle 
station had the fewest disasters.
– Daniel Defoe (1719), Robinson Crusoe, Ch. I
The existence of a middle class in the conventional sense of the term is still a 
debatable issue in China. For instance, according to Li (2008)128, it may not 
be appropriate to identify the Chinese “middle class” before China enters the 
stage of late industrialization or post-industrialization, as the majority of the 
Chinese white-collar service-sector professionals are part of the upper classes 
of the cadres and the reborn bourgeoisie. The speed with which this presently 
illusive class is going to emerge unequivocally in the changing class pyramid 
depends of course on the dynamics of social mobility in the long process of 
modern Chinese industrialization. The impacts of China’s economic reforms 
in the post-Mao period especially since the critical juncture of 1989 (a catalyst 
that led to Deng Xiaoping’s reaffirmation of the path of reform in his nanxun 
in 1992) on social mobility have been tremendous, and their significance 
is outstanding especially in view of the barriers that existed just before 
the reforms began, viz. the hukou 户口/huji 户籍 system, administrative 
documentation system and political status (ideological) barrier.
Nevertheless, amidst the prevalent confusion over the definition and 
the characterization of China’s urban middle class, some researchers have 
been trying to estimate its size. While Zhou Xiaohong claimed that 11.9 per 
cent of the urban residents of Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou and 
Wuhan belonged to the middle class as defined by occupation, educational 
background and income (Zhou (ed.), 2005: 45), Li Chunling estimated the 
middle classes of China to be 15.9 per cent by occupational definition, 
24.6 per cent by the income definition, 35.0 per cent by consumption-level 
definition, and 46.8 per cent by respondent’s identification (Li, 2005: 512). 
However, in an earlier paper Li identified just 4.1 per cent of total population 
in China who fulfilled the four definitions though the number increased to 8.7 
per cent if the focus was just on the urban district (Li, 2004: 62).129 On the 
other hand, according to data from the China General Social Survey (CGSS) 
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carried out by the Renmin University and Hong Kong University of Science 
and Technology in 2006, China’s middle class constituted about 22 per cent 
of the total population (see Yang, 2010: 438).
While Western journalists and social scientists tend to see the emergence 
of the Chinese urban middle class as conducive to political reforms and 
democratization, exemplified by American columnist Nicholas Kristof’s 
comment that “Western investment in China would bring a desire for 
‘bourgeois’ democratic freedom in China” (cited in Mann, 2007: 49), Chinese 
sociologists have focused more on the necessity to enlarge the urban middle 
class to attain sociopolitical stability – as in “buffering” social conflicts caused 
by the bipolarization of the poor and the rich (Zhang, 2004: 271).130 According 
to Zhang Wanli, this “buffering function” is the first of the three functions of 
the Chinese middle class, the other two being the role model of the acquisition 
of social status in a just and fair manner and the “behavioural role model of 
the socialist market economy and modern social value” (Zhang, 2004: 271-
272). Given the fact that unlike its Western counterpart, the Chinese middle 
class, besides the white-collar workers and well-educated professionals, also 
includes the reemerging bourgeoisie – the 2.6 per cent (2006 figure) of China’s 
population comprising mostly owners of small- or medium-sized enterprises 
– according to Yang (2010), as long as “the majority of the middle class are 
able to maintain their current lifestyle despite the social policy reform, the 
force of democratization is unlikely to become strong” (Yang, 2010: 437), 
and with the majority of them hoping “to benefit from the economic growth 
and maintain their current lifestyle; they are therefore more prepared to be 
subservient to an authoritarian state for economic security and sociopolitical 
stability” (ibid.: 452, citing the findings of Li, 2009).
In spite of the fact that extra-Party activism remains disjointed today, 
Benton (2010: 323) pointed out two positive developments for the democracy 
movement, namely, the germination in the political sphere of a systematic 
alternative to the politics of the Chinese Communist Party and the growing 
trend towards an independent labour movement. Despite what has been 
said above regarding the middle class in contemporary China, it has to be 
admitted that the country’s middle class is indeed a highly heterogeneous 
group. Yang (2010) noted the difference in sociopolitical outlook between 
the old middle class (mainly referring to the self-employed, small merchants 
and manufacturers whose emergence can be attributed to the early market 
liberalization in the 1980s) and the new middle class (emerged in the 1990s, 
mainly salaried professionals and technical and administrative employees who 
work in large corporations).131 
In contrast to the democratic consciousness and sense of social justice 
of the new middle class and “marginal middle class” (the latter referring to 
the sales and service workers and the middle/lower-level clerical workers), 
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the old middle class tends to care more about its own financial situation and 
“hold relatively conservative political views and are more likely to support 
state authoritarianism and have the least consciousness of social inequality 
and justice” (ibid.: 452). The rapid transition from the command economy 
to free market with extensive economic decentralization has engendered an 
interdependent patron-client relationship between local government officials 
and the private entrepreneurs who have in turn also adopted a series of 
adaptive strategies and close ties with local government officials, which 
essentially prevent them from being a force for change, and since many of 
them rely heavily on government patronage for their success in profit-making, 
it is not a surprise that they are among CCP’s most important bases of support 
(ibid.: 452-454)132.
Nevertheless, the new middle class, who has emerged and expanded 
rapidly since the 1990s and soon overshadowed the old middle class in 
terms of status and prestige, is shown by the CGSS 2006 to exhibit the most 
democratic consciousness while the marginal middle class is shown to be 
comparatively more vulnerable and hence more sympathetic towards the 
lower class and exhibit a strong sense of social justice and democracy (ibid.: 
437, 452-453, Table 9). Their existence and their sociopolitical outlook 
have definitely contributed to the birth of a coherent and organized political 
opposition culminating in the Charter 08 which called for liberal democracy, 
political federalism and an end to one-party rule, twenty years after the June 
Fourth Beijing-Tiananmen tragedy, three decades after Democracy Wall, and 
nine decades after the May Fourth Movement. Feng Chongyi 冯崇义, who 
called the Charter “the most important collective expression of Chinese liberal 
thought to emerge since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949”, 
pointed out that the imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo “has not succeeded in forcing 
one single signatory to withdraw, nor has it prevented more than ten thousand 
Chinese at home and abroad from adding their names to the document” 
although he conceded that it might have led “many more who share the values 
and aspirations of Charter 08 to remain silent” (Feng, 2010)133.
9.2. Working Class and Trade Unionism
The workers have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to 
gain.
– Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1872), The Communist Manifesto 
Regarding the trade union movement, when electrician Wei Jingsheng put 
up his manifesto “The Fifth Modernization” (i.e. democracy, in addition to 
the pursuit of the “Four Modernizations” of China’s agricultural, industrial, 
national defense and science sectors declared by Deng Xiaoping) on the 
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“Democracy Wall” on the morning of 5th December 1978 at a busy city 
intersection not far from the Tiananmen Square – an action that landed him 
a 15-year jail term and continuous subsequent persecution – no independent 
trade union existed in the country and Wei did not brought about one like 
Solidarność which emerged after his Polish electrician counterpart Lech 
Wałęsa scaled the fence of Gdańsk’s Lenin Shipyard in 1980. When Han 
Dongfang 韩东方 convened the Autonomous Workers’ Federation in Beijing 
during the student-led demonstrations of 1989, independent trade unions had 
also not yet emerged.
Then during the first half of 2010 while the nation and indeed the world 
were shocked, transfixed by and perplexed with the spate of suicides and 
attempted suicides134 at the Foxconn conglomerate’s factory in Shenzhen, 
Guangdong Province, that resulted in the death or injury of more than a 
dozen workers within the short span of about 4 months from the first suicide 
on 23rd January 2010 to the end of May (which continued with the fatal 
thirteenth and fourteenth “jumps” at its factories in Foshan 佛山, Guangdong, 
and Kunshan 昆山, Jiangsu, respectively on 20th July and 4th August135, 
and a 17th “jump” back in Shenzhen on 19th July 2011 bringing the total 
number of casualties to fifteen136), workers in some other enterprises in 
the country, such as Honda’s plant in Foshan, were seen organizing strikes 
seeking higher wages and better working conditions – a phenomenon unseen 
before in this state of the dictatorship of the proletariat ostensibly heeding 
Marx and Engels’s call of “Workers of the world, unite!”137 These striking 
Honda workers were observed to be “well organized, strategic and assertive, 
demanding sizeable wage increases, proposing a pay scale and a career ladder, 
electing their own representatives, re-electing office-bearers to their union 
branch and demonstrating solidarity and a determination to win”138. Indeed, 
as Benton observed:
[…] collective bargaining by elected shop stewards is now a feature of 
industrial relations in some factories. More and more workers, emboldened 
by legislation designed to strengthen their contractual rights, are calling for 
greater rights, and a few are calling for trade unions separate from the state-
controlled National Federation of Trade Unions.
(Benton, 2010: 323)
Indeed increasingly the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
– the only legal trade union in China, which in 2008 had a total of 212 million 
members and a union density (percentage of employees belonging to unions) 
of 73.7 per cent, making it the world’s largest union with more members than 
those of the rest of the world’s trade unions put together – has been criticized 
by Chinese and foreign labour activists and scholars for its inability to protect 
Chinese workers’ rights (Qi, 2010: 421-422). Unlike trade unions in the West 
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which represent autonomous labour organizations reflecting workers’ interests, 
a Chinese trade union is in fact just one of the State apparatuses serving 
governmental goals through mediating labour relations in the country (see 
the relationship between ACFTU and the Party-State in Qi, 2010: 424, Figure 
2), and together with the China Communist Youth League and the All-China 
Women’s Federation, the ACFTU is defined by the CCP as an important social 
pillar for its regime stability:
[…] as one of the government agencies, the ACFTU and its local branches 
are able to protect labour rights only to the extent that the government 
allows. For most local governments, labour relation is of a much lower 
priority than developing local GDP. If they have to develop local economy 
at the expense of labour rights, they usually would not hesitate to do so. 
Therefore, the major role of the ACFTU and its local branches is to help 
the governments achieve economic goals through maintaining stable labour 
relations. The grassroots trade unions at the workplace level are supposedly 
under the jurisdiction of the ACFTU’s local branches. Like ACFTU and its 
local branches, which are subordinated to the government at the same level, 
workplace unions are actually controlled by the workplace management. As 
a result, they also lack motivation and power to proactively protect workers’ 
interests in their respective workplaces.
(ibid.: 422-423)
Referring to the worker suicides at Foxconn and the migrant worker strikes at 
the Honda automotive company, Anita Chan 陳佩華 noted that “at Foxconn, 
the union did not even come forward to make a statement. And at Honda, 
the union blatantly sided with the local government, which in turn was on 
the side of the employer”139. In fact, Chan observed that the migrant workers 
were having a stereotypical image that the official trade unions are “useless” 
(ibid.).
In the process of maintaining a tight grip on political power in ensuring 
the CCP’s perpetuation of its Party-State monopoly while delivering on the 
economic front and bringing prosperity and wellbeing to the long-suffering 
people of this giant country, the neo-authoritarian developmentalism followed 
since June Fourth could be leading the country on a path threaded before by 
various East Asian countries like Taiwan (Republic of China) and Singapore 
– a model sometimes termed “State corporatism”. When the enraged and 
desperate Beijing citizens yelled “fascists” at the rampaging PLA armoured 
vehicles on that murderous night of 3rd-4th June 1989, when Chai Ling 
in hiding screamed “fascists” in her taped condemnation of the massacre 
shortly following that night of terror, when that lone individual140 stood in 
front of and blocked a column of tanks signifying terrifying State power 
in that poignant image reminiscent of Pablo Picasso’s Guernica141, when 
melancholy and despair descended upon and the tune of Xueran de Fengcai 
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血染的风采142 surrounded the hunger strikers in the Tiananmen Square, there 
was little telling of the course to come to pass in China’s subsequent political 
evolvement. “Fascism” could eventually prove to be an overstatement – other 
than that night’s slaughter and subsequent arrests and executions, nothing 
that came in this one-party state in the aftermath of June Fourth remotely 
approached Franco’s repression against the defeated Republicans and their 
supporters in the dictator’s “no-party” state143 immediately following the 
end of the civil war, though the term could still be in a certain way fitting 
if it is defined as the requirement for the faith in and unquestioning loyalty 
to the one-party State (or in the case of Franco’s Spain, in particular to the 
Caudillo). The post-June Fourth State corporatism, or referred to by some 
observers as “Leninist corporatism”144, could provide a closer resemblance 
to Franco’s Nuevo Estado (New State), and the “harmonious society” vision 
declared in recent years does recall Franco’s vision of social cohesion and 
harmonious relationship between employers and workers via corporatism that 
would promote a close collaboration between them under the direction of the 
State and his corporatist policies to regulate the economy by controlling the 
conditions of work, wages, prices, production and exchange.
On the other hand, illegal independent trade unions which have emerged 
sporadically in China since the 1980s were swiftly persecuted by the govern-
ment which is obviously wary of the possible birth of a Chinese version of 
Solidarność. Being uncompromisingly against independent trade unions, the 
CCP regime has in fact not been seen to be soft towards strikers in State-
owned enterprises but holds a double standard towards strikers in foreign-
owned plants on whom it is not only less likely to crack down but whose 
industrial actions it may even try to use “to blow new life into the official 
unions, bring the activists under control, get a handle on foreign firms, and 
play up to nationalist sentiments” (Benton, 2010: 323).
Such double standard, nevertheless, could carry inherent risks because 
like Tarschys’ law in public choice theories, demonstration effects might 
work if workers in foreign-owned factories were to have their way since 
“wages, rights, and conditions in Chinese-owned factories are usually even 
worse than in foreign-owned ones” (ibid.). Furthermore, nationalist sentiments 
have always been known to be a double-edged sword. The nationalistic 
fenqing 愤青 (“angry youths”), who form the backbone of what Yang and 
Lim (2010) called the third wave of Chinese nationalism, for instance are 
observed to be not only unhappy with the Western countries, but also with the 
domestic situation in China. The fenqing, being born out of the marginalized 
New Left after the mid-1990s due the Zhu Rongji 朱榕基 administration’s 
radical reform policies of corporatization and privatization, besides being 
unhappy with the perceived unfair treatment of China by the West – a feeling 
manifested in the 2009 bestselling book Zhongguo Bu Gaoxing 中国不高兴 
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[unhappy China], are also unhappy with the perceived pro-Western orientation 
in the Chinese government’s policymaking and China’s rapid integration with 
the international economic order and its neo-liberal economic policy that 
causes over-marketization and commercialization that they are blaming for the 
country’s increasing income disparities and social ills (ibid.: 477). “[W]hen 
the goals of the state and society are identical, the power of nationalism tends 
to be strong. But when their goals are different, the power of nationalism will 
be constrained”, commented Yang and Lim, for nationalism does not always 
complement the interest of the government: “The government and social 
forces might perceive and define China’s national interest differently. If the 
government does not control or guide various nationalistic forces with care, 
the greatest impact will be dealt on China’s domestic policies rather than on 
the external front.” (ibid.: 479) Top on the list of domestic challenges is of 
course none other than reform-era China’s attention-grabbing retreat from 
equality, as discussed earlier in this paper.
10. Conclusion
And as imagination bodies forth / The forms of things unknown, the poet’s 
pen / Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing / A local habitation 
and a name.
– William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene I
We have it in our power to begin the world over again.
– Thomas Paine (1776), Common Sense, Appendix to the Third Edition
This paper began by purveying various key issues underlying China’s social 
transition, such as poverty, inequality and social stratification, ethnoregional 
disparities and contradictions, rise of the middle class, development of trade 
unionism, and the relations between structure and agency within the overall 
political milieu in contemporary China where social change is moving apace 
amidst astounding economic transformation. Ironically, as pointed out in the 
paper, some factors which at first look seem to be system-threatening may 
instead work for the ruling regime’s advantage. According to Perry (2002), 
for instance, social protests in today’s China constitute one of the major 
components of social stability, as the protests serve as checks against the 
leaders’ abuse of power and as mechanisms ensuring the accountability of 
the government, thereby “undergirding rather than undermining the political 
system” in China’s authoritarian polity where multi-party competitive 
elections do not exist to provide an effective check on the misbehaviour of 
State authorities.145 In addition, Tong and Lei (2010: 499-500) considered 
large-scale mass incidents driven by economic grievances, which were 
due to “the misconduct of local officials or the process of socioeconomic 
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transformation when there was a lack of experience in handling these 
problems or the lack of proper regulations”, as not regime-threatening because 
by asking the government to zuozhu (enforce justice), the protests had in fact 
endorsed the legitimacy of the regime, and as long as the regime had plenty of 
financial resources to satisfy the protesters’ demands – hence the significance 
of GDPism as a cornerstone of regime maintenance – it further consolidates 
its legitimacy. On the other hand, in the case of inequality, Friedman (2009) 
argued that the beneficiaries of economic growth were able to find their 
own individual solutions to their problems and resigned themselves to an 
authoritarian government as a defense against the threat from potentially 
vengeful losers in the market economy, thereby rendering social polarization 
inconducive to democratic sentiment among them.146
Green (2008) showed the process of social change typically involving 
a combination of four different components: context (the environment 
within which changes take place, thus crucial in determining the nature and 
direction of change), institutions (the organizations and rules, both formal 
and informal, that establish the “rules of the game” governing the behaviour 
of agents – including culture, family structure, civil service, private sector, 
governmental system, patron-client network, etc.), agents (organizations 
and individuals actively involved in promoting or blocking change, e.g. 
ruling party, social movements, political and business élite, military and 
police, inspirational leaders, social entrepreneurs) and events (one-off events 
triggering wider change and being key catalysts for social and political 
changes, e.g. wars, pandemics like AIDS, SARS, A(H1N1), civil conflicts 
such as “mass incidents”, ethnic or ethnoregional riots, demonstrations and 
crackdowns, natural disasters, economic crises).147 As mentioned earlier, 
Archer’s double morphogenesis sees both structure and human agency as 
cojoint products of interaction. Upon the praxis between operating structures 
and purposely acting human agents, agency is constantly shaped by structure 
which in turn is being reshaped in the process. Hence, finally, it needs 
to be noted that amidst the dynamic interplay of such an array of critical 
socioeconomic factors that underlie the surging currents of social change, 
be they the overt or subliminal emergent changes that tend to act to subvert 
the stability of well laid-out projectable changes envisaged by the ruling 
regime (Yeoh, 2010a) or an illusive transformative change biding its time 
prior to a critical point of bifurcation as pointed out by the chaos theory 
(ibid.; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), the role of the individual as a catalyst 
for change cannot be underestimated, even if the long-term impact of the 
individual’s action is not immediately explicit and the lone crusade involved 
does not receive adequate sympathy of the wider public. Such is the tragedy 
of the commons (à la Hardin, 1968) resulted from incomplete feedback loops, 
among others.
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On the other hand, the duality of structure and agency pointed out by the 
structuration theory implies that there exists a symbiotic relationship between 
structures that shape agencies’ motives into practices and agencies whose 
routine practices in turn create structures. None can exist without the other. 
For instance, the brutal crushing of the democracy movement of 1989 “were 
of such magnitude that they continue to reverberate in people’s imagination 
and the collective memory – and in the sleep of party leaders and officials, 
as a nightmare”, commented Benton (2010: 322), “The experience of facing 
down the government created a generation no longer prepared to act as an off-
stage army for party factions, an attitude passed on to the protestors’ children. 
Although most of the 1989 generation have stopped being active, some 
continue to work for political and social change. The Chinese democracy 
movement in exile has survived in the current harsh environment and there 
have been many attempts to organize a political opposition in China, for 
example, the establishment of the China Democracy Party in 1998.” After all, 
individuals, who together form social movements, are at the very foundations 
of all socioeconomic and sociopolitical changes.
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1.  <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/227029.htm>
2.  The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) totaled 18. They are (1) Halve, 
between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one 
dollar a day; (2) Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who 
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suffer from hunger; (3) By 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will 
be able to complete a full course of primary schooling; (4) Eliminate gender 
disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and to all levels 
of education no later than 2015; (5) Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 
2015, the under-five mortality rate; (6) Reduce the maternal mortality ratio by 
three-quarters between 1990 and 2015; (7) Have halted by 2015, and begun to 
reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS; (8) Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, 
the incidence of malaria and other major diseases; (9) Integrate the principles 
of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the 
loss of environmental resources; (10) Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water; (11) Have achieved, by 2020, 
a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers; (12) 
Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and 
financial system; (13) Address the special needs of the least developed countries 
( ... enhanced program of debt relief for and cancellation of official bilateral 
debt ... ); (14) Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small 
island developing states ...; (15) Deal comprehensively with the debt problems 
of developing countries through national and international measures; (16) In 
cooperation with developing countries. develop and implement strategies for 
decent and productive work for youth; (17) In cooperation with pharmaceutical 
companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries; 
and (18) In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of 
new technologies, especially information and communications (summarized by 
Woo et al., 2004).
3.  Bert Hoffman, “Access to Opportunity Eases Income Inequality”, The Star 
(Malaysian daily), 21st January 2006.
4.  Or more officially, the “Communist Party of China” (CPC).
5.  Yan (2010: 179), based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 2008.
6.  In general, though not totally without ambiguity, “private entrepreneurs” or 
“private enterprise owners” (siying qiyezhu 私营企业主 / minying qiyejia 民营
企业家) here refer mainly to owners of domestic individually owned, family-
based or shareholding firms with eight or more employees though joint ventures 
and wholly foreign-owned firms are not by definition excluded, while individual 
entrepreneurs who employ fewer than eight employees are referred to as “self-
employed” / getihu 个体户. For more details on the ten major social strata, see 
Li and Chen (2004: 13), Figure 1-3, and Yeoh (2010a: 270), Figure 18.
7.  Referring to the 22 sheng 省 (i.e. provinces), 5 zizhiqu 自治区 (i.e. “autonomous 
regions” – each a first-level administrative subdivision having its own local 
government, and a minority entity that has a higher population of a particular 
minority ethnic group – of Guangxi of the Zhuang, Nei Monggol/Inner 
Mongolia of the Mongols, Ningxia of the Hui, Xizang/Tibet of the Tibetans and 
Xinjiang of the Uyghurs) and 4 zhixiashi 直辖市 (municipalities with province 
status, directly under the central government – Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and 
Chongqing).
8.  The largest denomination of China’s renminbi 人民币 (“people’s currency”, 
Rmb) is yuan 元 / 圆 (Latinized symbol ¥ or Ұ), a term with cognates in the 
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Japanese yen or en 円 (from 圓; Latinized symbol ¥) and Korean wŏn 원 / 圓 
(Latinized symbol ₩). A yuan is equivalent to about US$0.146.
9.  The ethnic fractionalization index (EFI, see Yeoh, 2003: 28) used to show 
provincial ethnic diversity is constructed through the computational procedure 
of Rae and Taylor’s index of fragmentation (F), defined as the probability that 
a randomly selected pair of individuals in a society will belong to different 
groups (Rae and Taylor, 1970: 22-3). The index varies from 0 to 1. The value 
is zero for a completely homogeneous country (the probability of belonging to 
different groups is nil). The value 1 occurs in the hypothetical society where 
each individual belongs to a different group. The fragmentation index is identical 
to Rae’s measure of party system fractionalization (Rae, 1967: 55-8) and 
Greenberg’s measure of linguistic diversity (Greenberg, 1956).
10.  The official population figures for Tibet which was used to compute EFI in 
Figure 11 differ much from certain unofficial ones. The official figures have been 
disputed by the Tibetan government-in-exile who claims that “accelerating Han 
population transfer into Tibet … has reduced the Tibetan people to a minority 
in their own land … [and today] there are over 7.5 million non-Tibetan settlers 
in Tibet including Chinese and Hui Muslims, compared to six million Tibetans” 
(Cook and Murray, 2001: 141). However, such allegations of population transfer 
is rebutted by the Beijing government, who argues that “the only Han Chinese 
living in Tibet are specialists who have gone there voluntarily to help in the 
region’s development … [and they] make up less than five per cent of the 
population and many of the people are there for only a few years before returning 
home” (ibid.).
11.  As the applicant of poverty relief fund and the last user of the funds, the county 
(xian) is the most important and basic unit in the work of poverty alleviation 
(Chai et al., 2004: 16).
12.  Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der 
Zukunft (1886), translated by R.J. Hollingdale as Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude 
to a Philosophy of the Future (1973), reprinted with revisions and an introduction 
by Michael Tanner (1990), London: Penguin Books.
13.  1 mu 亩 = 0.0667 hectares.
14.  东方日报 (Oriental Daily News/ODN, Malaysian daily), 26th July 2011.
15.  Ibid.
16.  ODN, 31st May 2011.
17.  Due to the abnormal size of China’s population and in particular the size of 
China’s citizens of the Han ethnicity, a distortion or misrepresentation emerges 
in the application of the term “multiethnic” to China as the country’s large 
populations of minorities – about 110 million in total, including the 16 million 
Zhuang, 10 million Manchu, 9 million Hui, 8 million Uygurs, 5 million Mongols 
and 5 million Tibetans – are practically dwarfed almost to invisibility by the 
sheer size of the Han population (about 92 per cent of the total population of 
China). In fact, based on the “critical mass” theory (advanced, among others, 
by Semyonov and Tyree [1981]), societies are considered multiethnic only if 
minorities constitute more than ten per cent of their population.
18.  ODN, 29th May 2011.
IJCS 2-2 combined text final 04-485   485 10/4/2011   12:50:19 PM
486      Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh  
19.  ODN, 29th May 2011.
20.  Ibid.
21.  Or the “Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party” (“Dotoγadu Mongγol-un 
Arad-un Qubisqal-un Nam” in Mongolian) which was founded in 1925, allied to 
the CCP. The party was dissolved in 1946.
22.  Such harsh landscape has been the object of lamentation since ancient days, as 
the Tang 唐 dynasty poet Li Bai 李白 grieved in his immortal poem Shu Dao 
Nan 蜀道难 [Hard Roads in Sichuan]: “Yiyu! Xi! / Wei hu gao zai! / Shu dao 
zhi nan nan yu shang qingtian … Huanghe zhi fei shang bude guo / Yuanrou yu 
du chou panyuan … Qi xian ye ruo chi / Jie er yuandao zhi ren hu wei hu lai 
zai? …” [Oh / but it is high and very dangerous! / Such traveling on the roads of 
Sichuan is harder than scaling the blue sky … Such height would be hard going 
even for a yellow crane / So pity the poor monkeys who have only paws to use 
… With all this danger upon danger / Why are you people from far away still 
coming here? …]
23.  ODN, 4th March 2008.
24.  Opening words of Thomas Paine’s The American Crisis, pamphlet I, 23rd 
December 1776 (first appeared in the Pennsylvania Journal, 19th December 
1776).
25.  Cited by Tong and Lei (2010: 488), the 2008 figure being from an estimate 
reported by Andrew Jacobs, “Dragons, Dancing Ones, Set-off a Riot in China”, 
New York Times, 10th February 2009, and an estimate of 90,000 such incidents 
annually for 2007, 2008, and 2009 being quoted from a Chinese insider by John 
Garnaut, “China Insider Sees Revolution Brewing”, Sidney Morning Herald, 2nd 
March 2010.
26.  The term “xiagang” refers to redundant workers mainly at State enterprises, 
without directly describing them as “unemployed”. Still officially attached to 
their work units or enterprises, the xiagang workers continue to receive basic 
minimum subsidies for their living and medical expenses, and are encouraged 
to change job, probably through State-run job and re-employment centres, or 
go into small businesses. In line with State enterprise reforms, the number of 
xiagang workers has been on the rise: 4 million in 1995, 8 million in 1996, 12 
million in 1997, 16 million in 1998, 20 million in 1999, though dropping to 11 
million in 2001. (Zhou, 2006: 289)
27.  See Chen (2004: 32), cited in Tong and Lei (2010: 488-489).
28.  ODN, 13th June 2011, 18th June 2011.
29.  ODN, 12th June 2011, 18th June 2011.
30.  ODN, 14th June 2011.
31.  In contrast with “free-floating aggression”, the more general concept of 
“scapegoating” is reserved for the transfer of hostility towards any object (Turner 
and Killian, 1957:19).
32.  Or paraphrasing Yazhou Zhoukan, “the hundred days of People Power that made 
one proud to be a Chinese” (“Preface”, Yazhou Zhoukan, 1989: 4).
33.  Unlike the Prague Spring of 1968 – which lent its name to the analogous Beijing 
counterpart a decade later and here again to foreign observers to describe the 
hundred-day Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989 – that was cut short by invading 
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foreign troops, the crushing of the 1989 “Beijing Spring” was entirely a domestic 
affair, described by the Western journalists as the Rape of Peking (Beijing) in an 
insinuated analogy with the infamous Rape of Nanking (Nanjing 南京) by the 
Japanese troops in World War II.
34.  “The Rape of Peking” (editorial), Asiaweek, 16th June 1989.
35.  ODN, 19th August 2011.
36.  See, for instance, Örkesh Dölet’s 8th July 2009 The Guardian article “A 
Declaration of Oppression” <http://wuerkaixi.com/>.
37.  世界維吾爾代表大會.
38.  “China’s Despair and China’s Hope”, originally appeared in The New York 
Review of Books on 2nd February 1989, translated by Perry Link.
39.  See, e.g. Bo (2010). In an interesting attempt at refutation of Minxin Pei’s 
(2006) claim of CCP’s illegitimacy, Bo set out to repudiate point by point Pei’s 
arguments which were based upon a series of international indexes which the 
former listed in details: “China is one of the most authoritarian political systems 
in the world according to the Polity IV Project, is almost completely ‘unfree’ 
according to the Freedom House; and is one of the most corrupt countries 
according to Transparency International. China was ranked in the bottom third 
of the eighty countries surveyed in terms of ‘quality of governance ranking’ 
according to one group of the World Bank and was considered a weak state 
according to another group of the World Bank. China found itself next to the 
legion of failed states and most repressive countries in terms of ‘voice and 
accountability’ and also in the company of weak states such as Nicaragua, 
Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Egypt, and Mali in terms of ‘regulatory quality’. 
China was no better than Namibia, Croatia, Kuwait, and Mexico in terms of 
‘government effectiveness’, was comparable to Belarus, Mexico, Tunisia, 
and Cuba in terms of ‘political stability’, and was in the company of Mexico, 
Madagascar, and Lebanon in terms of ‘rule of law’.” (Bo, 2010: 102-103, citing 
Pei, 2006: 5-6)
40.  ODN, 20th July 2009.
41.  After a storm of protest from Chinese intellectuals and academics against 
the arrest, Ilham Tohti was finally released on 23rd August 2009 (ODN, 11th 
September 2009).
42.  ODN, 10th July 2009, 15th July 2009, 17th July 2009.
43.  ODN, 24th April 2011.
44.  Such suggestions for China, which vary in arrangement details, include a 
prominent confederation proposal of a Chunghua Lienpang Kunghekuo 中華聯
邦共和國 (“Federal Republic of China”), a “Third Republic” – the first republic 
being the Chunghua Minkuo 中華民國 (Republic of China) and the second, 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 中华人民共和国 (People’s Republic of China) 
– proposed by Yan Jiaqi 嚴家其 (1992) encompassing the “loose republics” 
of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang (in an 
arrangement like that of the European Union) and “close republics” consisting of 
the rest of present-day China (in an arrangement akin to the US’s). Yan obviously 
had in mind some sort of coexistence of federal and confederal systems within 
a single country.
IJCS 2-2 combined text final 04-487   487 10/4/2011   12:50:19 PM
488      Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh  
45.  Following Professor Zhou Tianyong from the Central Party School, China’s 
authoritarian one-party political system will and should remain unchanged until 
at least 2037 (Zhou, Wang and Wang (eds), 2007: 2, 6, 45-46).
46.  For federal sustainability, see Yeoh (2010b: 616-618).
47.  O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 9) opined that a transition from authoritarian 
rule could produce a democracy, but it could also terminate with a liberalized 
authoritarian regime (dictablanda) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (demo-
cradura) (see Diamond, 2002: 24).
48.  Bo Yibo, the former Chinese vice-premier, was in fact expressing the reformers’ 
feeling towards the lessons of the multiple cycles of administrative decentraliza-
tion and recentralization in China: “A [more] important and fundamental lesson 
of the [1958] attempt to improve the economic management system is: We only 
saw the vices of overcentralization of power, and sought to remedy the situation 
by decentralizing powers to the lower levels. When we felt too much power 
had been decentralized, we recentralized them. We did not then recognize the 
inadequacies of putting sole emphasis on central planning (and in particular a 
system dominated by mandatory planning) and totally neglecting and denying 
the role of the market […] As a result over a long period of time (after the 1958 
decentralization) we were trapped within the planned economy model. Adjust-
ments and improvements could only work around the cycles of decentralization 
and recentralization. Moreover the recipients of more powers are invariably the 
local governments, rather than enterprises.” (Bo Yibo 薄一波, Ruogan Zhongda 
Juece yu Shijian de Huigu 若干重大决策与事件的回顾 [Looking back at some 
important decisions and events], 1993, p. 804, cited in Li, 2003: 1.)
49.  Such as the bloody Han-Hui ethnic conflicts in 2004 and 2007.
50.  ODN, 23rd March 2009.
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64.  ODN, 19th July 2009.
65.  The military junta that rules Burma has officially changed the name of the 
country in the English language to “Myanmar”. Nevertheless, the change has 
not been endorsed by the National League for Democracy (NLD) that won 
a landslide victory (80 per cent of parliamentary seats) in the 1990 People’s 
Assembly elections, yet prevented from governing the country to date by 
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SLORC, or the State Law and Order Restoration Council. SLORC was formed 
when the Burmese armed forces seized power following the 8888 (8th August 
1988) massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators. SLORC was reconstituted, 
essentially renamed, as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) on 
15th November 1997. On 7th November 2010, the junta held Burma’s first 
elections in two decades which it blatantly controlled, restricted and manipulated 
to retain military domination.
66.  “Hong Kong Reporter Being Held By China”, Washington Post Foreign Service, 
30th May 2005. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2005/05/29/AR2005052900986.html>
67.  ODN, 14th February 2009.
68.  Incidentally, both Malaysia and Singapore were recognized as without press 
freedom, ranked 143rd and 150th respectively, in a year that witnessed world 
population enjoying press freedom dropping to the nadir of the decade, with only 
one-sixth of the total world population of 6.7 billion enjoying the basic human 
right of press freedom (ODN, 4th May 2011).
69.  ODN, 4th May 2011.
70.  ODN, 9th August 2009.
71.  ODN, 20th July 2011.
72.  ODN, 27th June 2011.
73.  ODN, 4th May 2011.
74.  Dubbed “lüba 滤霸” [filtering bully], this software was originally scheduled for 
compulsory installation by 1st July 2009 on all personal computers entering the 
Chinese market. The attempt was later temporarily postponed following domestic 
and international outcry, and finally declared on 13th August to be abandoned 
except for those computers for public access in schools, cybercafés and other 
public places. (ODN, 10th June 2009, 15th August 2009)
75.  ODN, 2nd July 2009.
76.  ODN, 24th June 2011.
77.  ODN, 3rd September 2009.
78.  ODN, 2nd May 2011.
79.  ODN, 18th June 2011.
80.  ODN, 5th September 2011.
81.  ODN, 2nd May 2011, 6th May 2011.
82.  The devastating earthquake that hit the Sichuan Province’s Wenchuan 汶
川 County, Ngawa 阿坝 Zizhizhou 自治州 (“autonomous prefecture”) of 
the Tibetan/Zang 藏 and Qiang 羌 nationalities, and surrounding areas on 
12th May 2008 which killed at least 68,000 people and left long-lingering 
socioeconomic and even political fallout, especially those involving the “tofu-
dregs schoolhouses” (doufuzha xiaoshe 豆腐渣校舍) scandal, on the country.
83.  ODN, 23rd June 2011, 24th June 2011, 13th August 2011.
84.  Born Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo Franco Bahamonde in 1892 in 
the northwestern Iberian coastal town of El Ferrol.
85.  “Atado, y bien atado [Tied-up, well tied-up],” ruminated Generalísimo Francisco 
Franco (El Caudillo), prior to his death on 20th November 1975 (cited in 
Gunther, 1980: 285).
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86.  See Buckley (1967).
87.  “The Rape of Peking” (editorial), Asiaweek, 16th June 1989.
88.  The structure of political party systems and more specifically their level of 
internal centralization have been argued to be the determinants of the fiscal 
structure of the State, i.e. the degree of decentralization, in the studies on 
decentralization as a means for democratizing political regimes and enhancing 
the efficiency of public policy, its implications for service delivery and 
democracy, and the political determinants of the process of devolving resources 
and policy responsibilities to subnational governments (Montero, 2001: 43). 
In her paper on the case of Latin America, Escobar-Lemmon (2001: 28) noted 
that at least there “the process of decentralization has come about in parallel 
to the process of democratization” and the “rationale is that strong subnational 
power centers will check the national government, consequently preventing the 
re-emergence of a strong, authoritarian leader nationally.” Thus, according to 
Escobar-Lemmon, “decentralization becomes a way to avoid political crises and/
or democratic breakdown. Given that political decentralization could increase 
opportunities for democratic participation, there is reason to believe that there 
is a systematic relationship between decentralization and democratization.” 
Elaborating on his second fundamental characteristic of a federal system 
– democratic pluralism both between and within the territorial components 
– Duchacek (1988: 16-17) drew attention to federalism being a territorial twin 
of the open democratic society: “Federalism is not compatible with authoritarian 
socialist and fascist one-party systems and military juntas. If a single party 
delegates some minor parts of its central power to the territorial components in 
which single-party rule also prevails, the result is a unitary and centralist system 
or, at best, an association or league of territorial dictatorships […] a spatially 
sectorized unitary system or a confederation of […] single-party territorial 
components […] a territorial dimension of Lenin’s “democratic centralism” 
– inter-territorial and inter-factional consociationalism of a special kind, but not 
a federal democracy.”
89.  The twice-purged pragmatist and reformist Deng Xiaoping is today one of the 
most enigmatic figures in the history of China who would both be remembered 
as the pragmatist saviour of modern China who dealt the coup de grâce to 
Mao’s failed autarkic collectivist utopia in 1978 and the butcher of Beijing who 
unleashed his deadly wrath upon the “ungrateful” students and other denizens of 
the ancient capital in 1989.
90.  “Beijing” or “Beijing-Tiananmen” is a more appropriate appellation for the 
massacre than just “Tiananmen”, as most civilian casualties occurred not in 
the Tiananmen Square but on Beijing streets leading to the square, especially 
Chang’an Avenue 长安街, when the People’s Liberation Army clashed with 
Beijing residents and workers trying to protect the student demonstrators in 
Tiananmen Square during that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989.
91.  In a way analogous to the French Revolution being hijacked by Maximilien 
Robespierre’s Reign of Terror. Chen Tu-hsiu’s socialism was but one of the twin 
manifestations of the May Fourth spirit, the other being liberalism represented 
by Hu Shih 胡適.
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92.  While still rudimentary, the rehabilitation and other de facto de-Mao programmes, 
or even the liquidation of the research office of the central Secretariat, and the 
closing down of left-wing magazines such as Red Flag, led the way to further 
internal structural reform of the CCP in coming days (MacFarquhar, 2009: 
xxi).
93.  Began airing on 16th June 1988, He Shang, a six-part television documentary 
produced by the China Central Television (CCTV), is characterized by its 
condemnation of China’s isolation and admiration of and longing for the 
openness of Western civilization and modern democracy (Zhao, 2009b: 72, 
editors’ notes # 81). After the June Fourth massacre, CCP denounced the 
documentary, blamed it for helping to inspire the demonstrations, and according 
to Zhao Ziyang, attacked him with the claim that he had supported its production, 
distribution and suppressed criticism against it (Zhao, 2009a: 267-268).
94.  The 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations being the first uprising in a the whole series 
of similar events that led to the demise of authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe 
countries and Mongolia, the fact that most of these countries were Soviet satellite 
states with Communist Party rule virtually planted by the USSR rather the result 
of in the main part homegrown – though foreign-inspired – mass revolutionary 
movement, and that their 1989-1990 protest movements came after the shocking 
Beijing massacre all apparently played their roles in the diverse State responses 
between China and these states, perhaps with the exception of Romania which 
took a popularly supported palace and army coop to overthrow the hated 
Communist dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu.
95.  Translated from Bao Tong’s introduction in Zhao (2009c), pp. 33-34.
96.  Spontaneous as the 1989 Tiananmen protests, the “demonstrations that erupted on 
4th May 1919 developed into a loose nationalist political movement that was one 
of the antecedents of the Communist Party’s own official foundation in 1921” 
(Hutton, 2006: 7).
97.  Notably too, this was just hardly a year after the anniversary of the posting 
by Wei Jingsheng, the earlier vanguard of China’s democracy movement and 
an electrician like the Polish labour union activist Lech Wałesa who was later 
elected president of Poland after the fall of the Communist Party dictatorship, 
of his manifesto “The Fifth Modernization” on the “Democracy Wall” on the 
morning of 5th December 1978. The State responded by sentencing him to 15 
years in prison.
98.  ODN, 5th May 2011.
99.  “Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but 
a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one [… man] finds it necessary 
to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the 
rest; and this he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other 
case advises him out of two evils to choose the least”, said Thomas Paine in the 
beginning paragraphs of Common Sense (1776).
100.  According to a report published on China’s National Bureau of Statistics website 
on 14th January 2009, the confirmed 2007 GDP of China at current prices 
amounted to 25.7306 trillion yuan, an increase of 13 per cent from the previous 
year (ODN, 16th January 2009). While observed to be still short of a third of 
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US’s GDP, analysts had predicted China’s GDP to overtake Japan’s in three 
to four years, just as it overtook the United Kingdom and France in 2005 and 
Germany in 2008. Nevertheless, according to an announcement by Yi Gang 易
纲, the director of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange and the deputy 
governor of China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, on 30th July 
2010, China had already superseded Japan to become the world’s second largest 
economy in 2010. However, in terms of GDP per capita, Japan’s (US$37800) 
was more than 10 times that of China (US$3600) in year 2009, and Japan’s 
GDP per capita ranking, while having dropped from world’s number 2 in 1993 
to number 23 by 2008, was still far ahead of China’s which ranked beyond 100 
(ODN, 9th August 2010).
101.  ODN, 1st July 2011.
102.  Ibid.
103.  Ibid.
104.  ODN, 11th June 2011.
105.  Weiquan refers to the quest for protecting and defending the civil rights of the 
citizenry by non-State actors. Shangfang, a centuries-old tradition in China, 
refers to the action of people with grievances who take the last resort of going 
to Beijing, the capital, to attempt to get their complaints heard against local 
injustice.
106.  Ibid.
107.  From Fang Lizhi’s letter accepting the Peace Prize jointly sponsored by the 
newspapers Politiken of Denmark and Dagens Nyheter of Sweden. Fang received 
the award in absentia in September 1989.
108.  Cited in Bertrand Russell (1934), “The Fate of Thomas Paine”, in Bertrand 
Russel (1957), Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion 
and Related Subjects, London: George Allen & Unwin, published in Unwin 
Paperbacks 1975, re-issued 1979, p. 97.
109.  Cited in Tilly (1985: 171).
110.  Citing Lewis and Xue (2003: 933); Ma (2007); Xu (1999: 1, 168).
111.  Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason, Part First (1794).
112.  See Steven Poole’s Unspeak™ (2006) which begins with a description of 
Confucius’ “Rectification of Names”.
113.  For instance, see Yu (2010) and Lin Chuo-shui 林濁水, “Liu Siaopo he Wen 
Chiapao te Minchu Lu 劉曉波和溫家寶的民主路” <http://gb.udn.com/gb/blog.
udn.com/ baogon/4499978>. Lin is a former legislator of Taiwan’s Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) (民主進步黨 (民進黨)).
114.  Referring to Deng’s well-known gradualist dictum “Cross the river by groping 
the stones” (Mo zhe shitou guo he 摸着石头过河).
115.  See, e.g. the interview of the exiled dissident Yan Jiaqi 严家其, Zhao’s advisor 
when he was premier, in 2005 <http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/5/1/30/n798431.
htm>
116.  Bertrand Russell (1934), “The Fate of Thomas Paine”, in Bertrand Russel 
(1957), Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related 
Subjects, London: George Allen & Unwin, published in Unwin Paperbacks 
1975, re-issued 1979, pp. 97. While the epitaph remained unpublished, a long, 
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bitter letter written by Paine to Washington was published in 1796, ending in 
these words: “And as to you, Sir, treacherous in private friendship (for so you 
have been to me, and that in the day of danger) and a hypocrite in public life, 
the world will be puzzled to decide whether you are an apostate or an imposter; 
whether you have abandoned good principles, or whether you ever had any.” 
(ibid.)
117.  Mencius, edited and translated with an introduction by D.C. Lau, London: 
Penguin Books, 2005 (Penguin Classics first published 1970).
118.  See, e.g., Qi (2010: 420).
119.  ODN, 27th July 2011 and 1st August 2011.
120.  ODN, 30th July 2011.
121.  “鐵道部已病入膏肓 温家寶被迫“以病明志”, 蘋果日報 (Apple Daily, Hong 
Kong), 1st August 2011.
122.  The June 1989 tragedy can be observed to be the catalyst of the subsequent 
authoritarian corporatist evolution and reaffirmation of the path of economic 
reform (after Deng’s nanxun) and economic success as realization of the root 
causes of the tragedy had served to spur the CCP into attempting to reinvent 
itself as a strong, benevolent and enlightened ruler (i.e. a dictablanda), or as 
Thomas Hobbes referred to in his 1651 treatise, “the generation of that great 
Leviathan”. “The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to 
defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another […] 
is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly 
of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will […] 
This is the generation of that great Leviathan […]”, said Thomas Hobbes in 
Leviathan (1651).
123.  On the current crime trend in China, see also Yeoh (2010a: 246-249).
124.  Yazhou Zhoukan 亞洲週刋, Vol. 22, Issue 27, 13th July 2008, p. 26. The rumours 
about Li’s missing organs, while being perceived as part of the suspected cover-
up by the authorities, could be seen as an extension of the long-running allegation 
of illegal organ harvest from executed prisoners by the State apparatus and the 
grisly rumours of such harvest from imprisoned Falungong 法轮功 followers.
125.  Often ridiculed by the Chinese netizens with its homonym hexie 河蟹 (river 
crab).
126.  Yazhou Zhoukan 亞洲週刋, Vol. 22, Issue 27, 13th July 2008, p. 4; see also Liu 
(2009).
127.  ODN, 28th July 2011.
128.  Citing Gilbert (2003: 17).
129.  Cited in Sonoda (2010: 352).
130.  Cited in Sonoda (2010: 352).
131.  China’s detailed class structure is represented in Yang (2010: 436, Table 1) as 
follows (2006 figures): leading cadres and government officials (2.3% of total 
population), managerial personnel (1.3%), private entrepreneurs (2.6%, in general 
referring to individually owned, family based or shareholding firms with eight 
or more employees, plus joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned firms, but 
the focus is on Chinese domestic, private entrepreneurs), professionals (6.3%), 
clerical workers (7.0%), self-employed (9.5%, getihu – in general referring to 
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individual entrepreneurs who employ fewer than eight employees), sales and 
service workers (10.1%), manual workers (14.7%), agricultural labour (50.4%), 
semi-employed/unemployed (5.9%). 
132.  Citing Dickson (2007).
133.  Cited in Benton (2010: 324).
134.  Despite rumoured allegation that some cases could be murders linked to the 
factory security office (大紀元时報 (The Epoch Times (Malaysia)), Issue 93, 
June 2010).
135.  ODN, 21st July 2010 and 6th August 2010.
136.  ODN, 20th July 2011.
137.  Or “WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!”, this rallying cry forms 
the final sentence of The Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels, German edition, 1872 (translated by Samuel Moore, 1888, Penguin 
Books, London, 1967, 1985, p. 121). 
138.  Anita Chan, “Labor Unrest and Role of Unions”, China Daily, 18th June 2010 
(cited in Benton, 2010: 327).
139.  Anita Chan, “Labor Unrest and Role of Unions”, China Daily, 18th June 2010 
(cited in Hannan, 2010: 406).
140.  Later identified as a young man named Wang Weilin 王维林, whose fate remains 
unknown to date.
141.  Pablo Diego José Francisco de Paula Juan Nepomuceno María de los Remedios 
Cipriano de la Santísima Trinidad Ruiz y Picasso (25th October 1881 – 8th April 
1973). Guernica (1937), arguably Picasso’s most famous work, is his portrayal 
of the German bombing of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War.
142.  Usually translated as “Blood-stained Glory” but literally “blood-stained 
elegance”, a song written in 1987 originally to commemorate those who died 
during the Sino-Vietnamese War, the melancholic tune came to be a hymn to 
the determined but forlorn struggle of the hunger strikers during the Tiananmen 
Square protests of 1989.
143.  Describing Franquist Spain, Gunther (1980: 2) stated, “The ultimate source 
of political authority was the Caudillo, himself. Officially a single-party 
authoritarian state, it can best be regarded as a no-party regime.”
144.  See, e.g., Hutton (2006: 8, 98, 144-148).
145.  Cited in Tong and Lei (2010: 499).
146. Cited in Benton (2010: 321).
147. For the application Green’s model to the China context, see Yeoh (2010a: 271), 
Figure 19.
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